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TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY:
A CASE STUDY OF JAPAN AND MEXICO
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The importance of the role of technology in economic 
development has recently been receiving more attention in 
the literature. Problems of semantics and agreement over 
definitional terms still exist, but there is a broad consen­
sus that technology can no longer be assigned a backstage 
role as a parameter in development models. The transfer and 
diffusion of technology from the developed to the less devel­
oped countries is a complex process involving the people and 
institutions of both the sending and recipient countries. 
Knowledge of the cultural setting and institutional arrange­
ments of the recipient country is a necessary prerequisite 
to an understanding of the transfer process. Some cultural 
traits and institutional arrangements are conducive to the 
assimilation of foreign technology while others impede the 
acceptance of new technologies. Mere invention in a devel­
oped country does not necessarily lead to innovation in that 
country. Similarly the delivery of a new technology to a 
less developed country does not ensure the transfer and dif-
fusion of that technology. Since most of the technological 
research and development as well as the bulk of the existing 
fund of technology is found in the developed countries, it 
is useful to examine their role concurrently with the role 
of the less developed countries in the transfer process. 
However, the basic focus of this study is concentrated on 
the attributes of the recipient countries which permit or 
impede technological transfer and diffusion.
The transfer or technology from one region to another 
is not a recent phenomenon. The cross-fertilization of ideas 
resulting from exposure to different cultures is an old 
phenomenon. Marco Polo's exploration and the Crusades are 
typical examples of one culture gaining new techniques from 
exposure to different societies. Technological change has 
been occurring since prerecorded history in an irresistible 
and methodical manner. The pace of technological change 
increased during the Industrial Revolution and accelerated 
during World War II as science and technology became in­
extricably linked together. Thus the problems of trans­
ferring technology today are different from those in the past 
due to both the rapid pace of technological change and the 
concomitant change in social institutions. The accelerated 
rate of technological change in tue developed countries 
exerts great pressure on the less developed countries to 
speedily accept new technology or to be left in a techno-
logical backwash. This appears to have been the case in 
the 1960s as the economic gap between the developed and 
less developed countries widened.
It is the purpose of this study to investigate the 
transfer of technology to the less developed countries and 
its impact on economic development. Two countries, Japan 
and Mexico, are selected for a case study. These two coun­
tries have achieved well above average economic growth rates 
since World War II. They represent bright spots on what has 
turned out to be a rather dismal picture for the less devel­
oped countries. Japan is the only country to change from a 
less developed to a developed country status since World War
II. Mexico's progress in economic development has been good 
enough to earn the label, "The Mexican miracle." Technolog­
ical transfer and diffusion played a crucial role in the 
economic development of both these countries, although Japan 
and Mexico have very different histories and contrasting 
cultures.
It is hoped that the rather detailed examination of 
the processes of technological transfer and diffusion in 
Japan and Mexico may reveal certain commonalities useful to 
the less developed countries who are attempting to employ 
modern technology in their development. In addition to the 
basic purpose, this study attempts to test the hypothesis 
that the quality of human resources is a key force in the
process of development. In this connection the role of 
education and other forces bearing on the quality of human 
resources in the cases of Japan and Mexico will be examined.
The major sources for this study are English publi­
cations of books and journals. Some reliance has been 
placed upon unpublished Ph.D. dissertations and United 
Nations and government publications. The literature on 
technology is vast, and the literature on technological 
transfer, while less abundant, is plentiful and growing.
The bibliography listed in this study testifies to this 
point.
The methodology employed consists of historical and 
comparative analyses. Technological transfer, diffusion 
and adaptation for both Japan and Mexico are examined in 
the context of each country's history, culture and unique 
geographical position. The development of both countries is 
analyzed in the rather distinct periods of development which 
correspond to revolution, stability and rapid economic growth. 
Differences and similarities in the acquisition of technology 
are brought forth in order to bring the transfer process into 
clearer focus.
This study is divided into eight chapters including 
the introduction. Chapter II reviews some basic technolog­
ical concepts and establishes definitions to clarify the use 
of terms throughout this work. The different channels of
technological transfer are delineated with the focus on fac­
tors most crucial to the less developed countries. The role 
of technological transfer and Western economic theory in 
economic development is analyzed with an emphasis on barriers 
to the acquisition of new technologies.
Chapters III and IV develop the role of technological 
transfer and diffusion in Mexico. First the early history, 
cultural milieu and land patterns are introduced. Then the 
role of technological transfer in agriculture and industry is 
examined in the relevant periods, beginning with the Porfirian 
era, followed by the period of revolution and reform, and 
concluded with the period of steady growth.
Chapters V and VI develop the role of technological 
transfer and diffusion in Japan in a format similar to that 
of Mexico. Background material on history, cultural milieu 
and land patterns is presented first. Then the influence of 
technological transfer is developed by periods in the agri­
cultural and industrial sectors. The analysis proceeds from 
the Meiji period to the era of accelerated growth and con­
cludes with Japan's war and postwar experiences culminating 
in explosive growth.
Chapter VII brings together the Mexican and Japanese 
experiences for comparison and analysis. Differences and 
commonalities in history, cultural heritage and land patterns 
are discussed. The adaptation of technology to each country's
unique requirements and the corresponding institutional ad­
justment are evaluated. Chapter VIII presents a summary and 
the conclusions of the study.
CHAPTER II 
TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER
Concepts of Science and Technology 
The phrase "science and technology” is often dis­
cussed as if those using the term felt they were conveying 
a coraraon-sense statement understood by everyone. This is 
not always the case. The phrase "science and technology" 
can be used as an ambiguous parameter by economic model 
builders to simplify their task. The same phrase can also 
be used as a weapon by institutionalists and Marxists to 
attack the relevance of orthodox economic models. The pur­
pose of this chapter is to clarify the use of the term 
technology and to reduce the amount of ambiguity associated 
with such an all-encompassing word. Further, the role of 
technological transfer in the process of economic develop­
ment and its relationship to Western economic theory is 
examined.
Technology is sometimes described as know-how, 
while science is associated with know-why. Hence technol­
ogy aids in producing wealth, while science increases the
fund of knowledge.^ This simplistic distinction is some­
times replaced by a more sophisticated version which holds 
that there is a symbiotic relationship between science and 
technology. Science has few direct links to society# while
technology serves as the intermediary linking science to 
2society. Technology is seen as more than applying knowl­
edge to practical problems; it is a creative process that 
is independent of social needs.^
An opposing theory# stemming from the works of C. E. 
Ayres# suggests that there is no difference between science 
and technology. Both are viewed as results of the union of
4previously existing combinations of tools and skills.
This approach integrally connects human values and needs 
with technology. The valuing process becomes an instru­
mental tool-defined conception of truth. Technological 
values are deemed to be consistent with the life process as
^Graham Jones # The Role of Science and Technology 
in Developing Countries (London; Oxford University Press# 
1971)# p. 5.
2Albert H. Teich, ed.# Technology and Man's Future 
(New York: St. Martin's Press# 1972)# p. 3.
^Ibid.
^C. E. Ayres# The Theory of Economic Progress: A
Study of the Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cul­
tural Change (2nd ed.; New York: Schocken Books# 1962),
p. 113.
interpreted from the continuum of an on-going process.^
The approach used in the study is an eclectic one 
which combines some aspects of the Ayresian technological 
continuum emd some aspects of the sophisticated dichoto­
mized version of science and technology. It is recognized 
that science and technology may be essentially part of the 
same process, but they will be spoken of separately for 
pedagogical purposes. The value problem, though crucial, 
will not play a central role in this definition of technol­
ogy. Technology has a tremendous impact on value systems, 
but it seems wise to avoid Mill's mistake of concluding 
that the value problem has been resolved now with a scien­
tific framework of values.
Technology is defined as the combination of human
2skills (linguistic, intellectual and physical) with tools. 
It is the new combination of tools and human skills that 
advances the state of technology.^ Technology involves 
then not only changes in artifacts, but also incorporates
Ipor a different view see Jaques Ellul, The Techno­
logical Society, trans. by John Wilkinson (New York; Vintage 
Books, 1964}.
2Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress, p. 129.
Also see W. Paul Strassmann, Technological Change and Eco­
nomic Development: The Manufacturing Experience of Mexico
and Puerto Rico (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1968), p. 2.
3por a different view see Edwin Mansfield, Techno­
logical Change (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
1971), pp. 9-10.
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culturalÿ social and psychological processes.^
The inconsistent and ambiguous use of the word
technology has affected the use of the term "technological
transfer." Social scientists have sometimes used the term
too loosely. Spencer and Woroniak suggest economists are
not exempt from this criticism.
Economists^ too, with some notable exceptions, have 
been content to deal with technology as if it had 
somehow arrived as a datum for incorporation via 
market adjustments in general equilibrium theory, 
or a "residual factor" —  a shift in the produc­
tion function. When the specific idea of transfer 
technology does appear, it is often entwined with 
industrialization, social and revolutionary change, 
and other such sweeping ideas. ̂
John Joseph Murphy, "Retrospect and Prospect," in 
The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, ed. by 
Daniel L. Spencer and Alexander Woroniak (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1967), p. 6.
^Daniel L. Spencer and Alexander Woroniak, ed., The 
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1967), p. 2. See Strassmann, 
Technological Change and Economic Development, pp. 5-12 for 
a capsulizatxon of past views of technology and development.
A review of recent Ph.D. dissertations on technological 
transfer demonstrates the increased awareness of economists 
of the need to clarify their use of the term technology. See 
James Edward Annable, "The Trancier of Technology, Industri­
alization and the Urban Employment Problem in Low-Income 
Countries" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Univer­
sity, 1971), p. 10 or Moonsong Oh, "The Role of International 
Corporations in the Transfer to Developing Countries" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1970), 
p. 10 for their careful use of the term. It should be noted 
that institutional arrangements have received much the same 
treatment as technology has from economists. Institutional 
arrangements are often relegated to the role of a parameter. 
See Gayle D. Ness, The Sociology of Economic Development: A 
Reader (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), pp.
126-27.
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In this study technological transfer will be considered as 
one aspect of innovation, . . meaning by the word 'inno­
vation' the whole process from scientific discovery or in­
vention to the final emergence of a marketable product, or 
a social service.Technological transfer, in this con­
text, is the conveyance of a tool-using behavior from one 
group or person to another group or person. The particular 
channels of transfer will be explored in some depth later 
in this chapter.
Research and development increases the fund of 
technological knowledge. This is the first step in the in­
novative process. Most research and development occurs in
the developed countries and may or may not lead to innova-
2tion, depending on the type of research and development. 
Military research and development is not necessarily useful 
in producing marketable products in the innovative process. 
Markets may not exist for resultant products, or the re­
search and development expenditures may be used ineffi-
^Introduction by Lord Blackett in Jones, The Role 
of Science and Technology, p. ix.
2por instance the United States directs over $27 
billion to research and development, of which the government 
accounts for $15 billion and industry nearly $11 billion.
The bulk of the government expenditures is devoted to space 
and military related projects resulting in relatively few 
marketable innovations. See Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and 
American Economic Growth (New York: Harper and Row, 1972),
p. 178.
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ciently.^ Figure 1 suggests that since the 1950s both 
Japan and Germany have made much better use of their re­
search and development in terms of realizing economic gains 
from their investments than have the United States or Russia. 
This is probably due to the large percentage of research and 
development expenditures for military and space projects in 
the latter two countries. Thus research and development 
does not automatically lead to innovation or economic growth 
for the investing country.
The same problem exists from a different perspective 
when one country wants to transfer the research and develop­
ment created in another country. Research and development 
which led to fruitful innovation in a developed country may 
not necessarily lead to innovation in a less developed coun­
try. The innovative process in a developed country is con­
sciously planned and includes market structures and income 
distribution patterns as well as culturally defined tastes 
and preferences. It is important to perceive technological 
transfer as a process package concept and not as something 
which can be arbitrarily plucked out of one culture and 
plugged into another. This is especially true when the 
technology is created in a developed country and transferred 
to a less developed country. Technological transfer is not 
limited to the mere imitation of manufacturing techniques;
Ijones, The Role of Science and Technology, p. 10.
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FIGURE 1
THE RELATIONSHIP OF RESEARCH Al'ID DEVELOPMENT 
TO GROWTH IN PRODUCTIVITY
o\ h in o  o%


























AVERAGE COMPOUND GROWTH OF OUTPUT 
PER MAN EMPLOYED, 1955-1964
Source: Bruce Rodda Williams, Technology, Invest-
ment, and Growth (London: Chapman and Hall,
1967), p. 57.
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it is a cultural-political process.^ The success of tech­
nological transfer is dependent upon adapting the technology 
to the new environment or changing the inhibiting factors in 
the receiving country —  or both. If cultural manipulation 
is necessary, it should be done in a way which utilizes as 
many existing social patterns as possible. The process 
package concept is crucial.
From the wheel to the computer, success has been 
dependent upon the invention being integrated into 
a process, and often upon creating a process that 
demanded a new system of production. Technology, 
therefore, is embodied not in aggregate capital, 
nor in particular factors, but in the whole eco­
nomic process that extends from factor supplies 
on the one hand to the marketing outlets on the 
other.3
In essence, the transfer of technology involves the trans­
plant of a process package into a new system. Both the 
process package and the system may need to be adjusted to 
permit successful technological transfer. When the tech­
nology is sophisticated, the concept of a process package 
becomes a necessity for successful technological transfer, 
and when the receiver of the sophisticated process package 
is a less developed country, systems adjustments often be-
llbid., p. 21.
^Melville J. Herskovits, "The Problem of Adapting 
Societies to New Tasks," in Development and Society; The 
Dynamics of Economic Change, ed. by David E. Novack and 
Robert Lekachman (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1964), 
p. 291.
^Murphy, "Retrospect and Prospect," p. 7.
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come mandatory. Successful technological transfer results
in technological change and economic development. This
change does not take place in a vacuum.
The introduction of a simple material thing, for 
example, hybrid corn seed, an iron-tipped plow, 
or a tractor, also means that there will be a 
corresponding change in the values, behavior, 
attitudes, and beliefs of the people.1
Concomitant with mechanization and urbanization are unem­
ployment and a dislocation of value systems. For orderly 
change, great care must be taken to seek institutional ad­
justment rather than ripping apart existing institutional 
2arrangements.
Types of Technological Transfer 
The vast variety of types of technological transfer 
creates a problem of selectivity. Multinational corpora­
tions, governments and international organizations are 
probably the more obvious general modes of transfer.^ To
^Thomas F. Trail, Education of Development Techni­
cians; A Guide to Training Programs (New York; Praeger 
Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 90.
^Sidney C. Sufrin, Technical Assistance: Theory
and Guidelines (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University
Press, 1966) , p. 18.
^John Roger Hansen, "The Acquisition of Technology 
for Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of Colorado, 1970), Chapter VII, "Media of Technological 
Transfer," pp. 196-267; Chapter VIII, "Channels of Techno­
logical Transfer," makes a distinction between channels and 
media of transfer which makes sense, but which this study 
lumps together for reasons of simplicity. Channels of
16
be more specific, means of transfer include radio, televi­
sion, journals, mass media magazines and books, films, 
transfer embodied in products and machinery, research in­
stitutes, immigration, foreign students, consultants, tech­
nicians, salesmen, foreign friends, etc.
The Pearson Report emphasizes the need for multi­
lateral channels of foreign assistance.^ A multilateral 
transfer of technology would alleviate the present inade­
quacies of bilateral transfer which is a part of the assis­
tance strategy. The dependence of the less developed coun­
try upon a particular developed country would be lessened 
by such an approach, allowing a more consistent and continu­
ous flow of technology to the less developed countries. 
However, multilateral assistance should not be perceived as 
a panacea to the development problem, but rather as a limited 
additional and necessary tool for promoting economic devel­
opment .
A multilateral agency, like public and private 
agencies, must do more than merely deliver tools and in­
formation to the less developed countries. Designs and
transfer are corporations, government and private research 
groups. Radio, television, books, etc., are media of trans­
fer.
^See Maurice Domergue, Technical Assistance; Theory, 
Practice, and Policies (New York; Praeger Publishers, Inc.,
1968) , pp. 83-91 for a discussion of the pros and cons of 
multilateral aid.
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instructions must be accompanied by a continuing program 
sustaining the relationship between the donor of technology 
gmd the receiver. Another limitation is that technological 
breakthroughs initiated by private enterprises are not go­
ing to be given away cheaply. There is a financial con­
straint. Even when access to sophisticated technologies 
becomes available, the less developed countries may need 
huge investments in human capital before these technologies 
can be exploited.^
The local government plays a key role in the suc­
cessful transfer and diffusion of technology. Japan's suc­
cessful industrial development is partially due to its
government's recognition of the importance of technological 
2flows. Too often the focus is upon capital inflows and 
the limitation of earnings outflows. Rather than concen­
trating on negotiating licensing agreements and regulating 
foreign investment, the Japanese government attempted to 
select the most appropriate technology and then negotiated 
commitments of the sender of these technologies to follow 
up with training and further support programs to insure 
successful transfer.3
As important as the role of government is in the
Rutherford M. Boats, Technology for Developing 
Nations; New Directions for U.S. Technical Assistance 
(Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1972), P. 82,
^Ibid., p. 70. 3lbid., p. 71.
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transfer of technology, it is private enterprise which ac­
tually produces and transfers the bulk of industrial tech­
nology.^ The multinational corporation is probably the 
most important of the private agents transferring technol­
ogy.^ Given this reality it is necessary to examine the 
nature of technological transfer through the multinational 
corporations.
The transfer of industrial technology is accomplished
by the,
sale of their goods; through training for users 
of their products and establishment of local 
service facilities; through investment in local 
production and training of workers and techni­
cians; through technical assistance to local 
customers and to local suppliers of materials, 
components, or subassemblies; through introduc­
tion in their locally staffed field operations 
of the methodology of integrated research, 
development, and engineering innovation, and 
through influence on or example to local com­
petitors and suppliers.3
Thus the multinational corporation functions in such a man­
ner as to connect research and development to the production 
process to the ultimate marketing of the final product. The 
multinationals have the advantage of efficient organization
llbid., p. 63.
%The value of United States production abroad was 
nearly $110 billion in 1966 compared to United States ex­
ports of $43 billion that same year. See Robert Heilbroner, 
"The Multinational Corporation and the Nation State," The 
New York Review of Books, XVI, No. 2 (February 11, 1971), 21.
3poats, Technology for Developing Nations, p. 64.
19
and centralized authority combined with vast research and 
marketing units capable of finding demand for new products. 
In essence they have superior technology and the ability to 
use it.^
Many of the less developed countries are understand­
ably concerned about the immense power of the multinational 
corporations and view technological transfer from them as a 
mixed blessing. Some scholars suggest that this view is un­
fair to the multinationals.
Although some of the charges (exploitation) may 
have been true in the past, they are no longer 
applicable to most international corporations 
today. The international corporation has been 
unnecessarily hampered by government authorities 
both at home and abroad largely due to misunder­
standing of its true identity.%
However, based on past and present experience, it seems
that the multinationals warrant a jaundiced eye toward
their role in transferring technology. The interests of
profit maximizing institutions do not necessarily coincide
with the interests of the less developed countries. The
sheer concentration of economic power illustrated in Table 1
^James Quinn, "Technology Transfer by Multinational 
Companies," Harvard Business Review, XLVII (November-December,
1969) , 150.
^Oh, "The Role of International Corporations," p. 13. 
Although Oh's paper tends to place the multinational corpo­
rations on a pedastal, it is a very good general source for 
information on the role of the multinationals in transferring 
technology to the less developed countries.
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TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIALS, 
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1963 and 1967
Country 1963 1967

















Brazil — — 1
Austria — — 1
Portugal 1
apius two Anglo-Dutch firms.
^Including a German-Belgium firm.
Source: Jack N. Behrman, Some Patterns in the Rise
of the Multinational Enterprise (Chapel Hill; 
The Graduate School of Business Administra­
tion, University of North Carolina, 1969) ,
p. 161.
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justifies careful observation of their operations. Heil­
broner projects that 200 United States corporations and 100 
foreign corporations will dominate the world economy in the 
near future.^
One explanation for the rise of the multinational
2corporation is the product cycle theory. This theory sug­
gests that a product goes through stages of development. 
First, the product is developed by the home country. Then 
as the product is perfected and production processes are 
standardized, tbii product enters the export market. Finally, 
Figure 2 suggests that as more sophisticated products enter 
the domestic market (requiring more sophisticated technolo­
gies) the product may even be imported.
In general there will be a tendency for the product 
developed in an industrialized country to be exported to an­
other industrialized country due to similar income levels. 
Thus the branch plants of one developed country are built in 
another developed country.
If the product cycle theory is correct in explaining
^Heilbroner, "The Multinational Corporations,"
p. 22.
2Frank Shadle Wert, "U.S.-Based Multinationalism:
A Conceptual Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Colorado State University, 1972), Chapter V. Also see 
Raymond Vernon, "Investment and International Trade in the 
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Source: John E. Tilton, International Diffusion of
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(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution,
1971), Figure 1-1, p. 21.
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the investment behavior of the multinational corporations, 
then it has implications for the transfer of technology to 
the less developed countries. First, since the developed 
countries are the main trading partners, the less developed 
countries will get a small fraction of the world's techno­
logical transfer. Secondly, the transfer which the multi­
nationals create may often be in the less sophisticated 
technologies, leaving the less developed countries in a 
technological backwash. This, in fact, seems to be the 
situation as demonstrated by the growing economic and tech­
nological gap between the developed and less developed 
countries in the 1960s.
The firm located in the less developed country is 
often an agent of technological transfer, but it is limited 
in its transfer capacity. A desire to maximize profits is 
not supplemented with the knowledge of how much of what to 
purchase.^ Prices cannot direct information since the bids 
of firms which are based on inadequate information create 
the prices of the purchased information. The local entre­
preneur does not know the value of the information he bids 
for, and he cannot just spend until the net marginal gains 
disappear since the worth of the information is not readily 
apparent in a continuous flow of gains. It should be noted 
that the government can subsidize the purchase of informa-
1Strassman, Technological Change and Economic
Development, p. 25.
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tion in case of market failure, but the government is also 
faced with the problem of uncertainty. There is no way of 
forecasting an optimal purchase of information.
The transfer of technology to the firm occurs 
through a relay system. The relay system is composed of 
partially educated entrepreneurs and their connections with 
management consultants, machinery suppliers, trade journals, 
staff engineers, consulting engineers and license agree­
ments . ̂
The entrepreneur's role as an information seeker is 
limited since he is interested in improving his business 
and not concerned with the diffusion of technology per se.
He may be secretive and suspicious toward new information. 
This may result in only partially informing and training 
workers to reduce their mobility. Expansion is sometimes 
limited to the family to avoid training an outsider who 
could become a potential competitor. Greater exposure to 
new information can make the entrepreneur gradually more 
receptive and open, or he may change quickly if forced to 
cope with a modern competitor.
Face to face contact is necessary if the entrepre­
neur is to become a viable transfer mechanism. This contact 
often takes the form of his machinery supplier.
^his discussion of the relay system is drawn from 
Strassman*s analysis, Technological Change and Economic 
Development, pp. 29-42.
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Machinery suppliers are more interested in moving
goods than in the diffusion of knowledge. Often, due to
small markets, most machines are handled by one importer
and the demonstrations and transfer of knowledge are less
than desirable.
Failure by Japanese paper machinery builders to 
provide these services . . . once meant wide­
spread losses by the Japanese of Indian sales to 
sales of equivalent English and Swedish machinery 
which was priced over twice as high.^
The need for face to face contact and continuing technical 
assistance is imperative to the local entrepreneur, as fur­
ther illustrated by the following example;
I found a Mexican mattress manufacturer who 
claimed he had paid a 56 percent higher price 
for a new machine in preference to a one-year- 
old machine in order to obtain the manufactur­
er's manuals and technical assistance which 
went with the new one.^
Staff engineers, like machinery suppliers, do not 
always aid in the diffusion of technology. Often they go 
strictly by manuals with little effort to improvise or 
innovate.  ̂ Foreign textbooks used by engineers may con-
^Ibid., p. 33.
^Ibid. Simon Rottenberg notes the great amount of 
technical information transferred to Latin America by follow- 
up after the sale of precision control instruments. See 
Simon Rottenberg, How United States Business Firms Promote 
Technical Progress (Washington, D. C.: National Planning
Association, 1957), p. 65.
^Strassman, Technological Change and Economic
Development, p. 34.
26
centrate on mechanization and mass production while ignor­
ing the problems arising in the less developed country.
They tend to complain of the lack of funds to buy modern 
equipment and look with disdain upon makeshift adjustments 
and old equipment. These attitudes have an impact on the 
transfer process when the engineers make proposals to bring 
in management consultants.
Management consultants are often recommended by 
engineers to justify their desire for large capital expen­
ditures .  ̂ Owners sometimes agree to such arrangements 
assuming the engineer knows what he is doing. Consultants 
may recommend more than increased capital spending, however. 
They may make suggestions concerning planning inventory 
control, budget techniques, etc. The problem with such 
recommendations is that organizational changes are hard to 
make if they are not forced by the production process it­
self. Attempts at new record keeping may result in in­
creased costs and inaccurate information due to lack of 
comprehension of the workers. Problems such as these often 
are the reason foreign branch plants are not set up in the 
less developed country.%
^Ibid., p. 36.
2jn addition, foreign consultants may have problems 
with the language, appointment dates, etc. See E. T. Hall, 
The Silent Language (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett, 1959):
Fred Tickner, Technical Cooperation (New York: Praeger Pub-
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To gain information, the less developed country's 
firm may enter into licensing agreements with foreign firms. 
A patent is often used to make the transfer of information. 
Unfortunately, patents are usually not detailed enough to 
allow ready application unless the user is highly trained 
in the particular area —  which is usually not the case.^
The channel of communication is also a problem. The licen­
sor generally determines the kind of information to be de­
livered. Supposedly the licensee does have a better knowl­
edge of the indigenous surroundings in which the knowledge 
will be transferred. The one-way communication flow is ob­
viously inadequate (the licensor has an incentive for suc­
cess, usually a percent of net sales, but does not share in 
failure). The Japanese have been particularly successful in 
acquiring technology through patents. But they have taken 
great care to get commitments from the sending country to 
follow through with training and support programs.^
lishers. Inc., 1965), p. 159. See Trail, Education of Devel­
opment Technicians, pp. 46-74 for a comprehensive list of the 
needed adjustments for the development technician, e.g., 
maintaining cultural identity, group interaction, world 
ideologies, etc.; Yonah Alexander, International Technical 
Assistance Experts; A Case Study of the U.N. Experience (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1966), offers the experience
of United Nations technicians which are illustrative of the 
problem.
Ipoats, Technology for Developing Nations, p. 64.
^Strassman, Technological Change and Economic Devel­
opment , p. 38.
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Consulting engineers are responsible for making a 
new enterprise work, and thus they are generally more moti­
vated than licensors in the adaptive process. Yet they are 
most familiar with the techniques used in industrialized 
countries and have difficulty in adjusting to the require­
ments of the less developed country.^ Often the industrial 
process is considered to be set and routine —  only a matter 
of construction along existing guidelines. The attitude 
prevails that marginal adjustments can be made later. But 
where major innovations occur, the concept of adaptation was 
planned in advance, as demonstrated in Mexico with the de­
velopment of stabilized tortillia flour; direct reduction of 
iron ore with natural gas; and paper produced from bagasse, 
yuccas and tropical hardwoods.^
Research institutes in the less developed countries 
have been typically ineffective in creating technology for 
development. They often become involved in research more 
suitable to the needs of developed countries. Scientists 
throughout the world are interested in breaking through the 
existing frontiers of knowledge. Unfortunately the desper­
ate needs of the less developed countries are not directly 
met by esoteric research. As a result, research institutes 
in the less developed countries become isolated in a clois­
tered environment with little connection to the immediate
^Ibid., p. 40. ^Ibid., pp. 242-50.
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problem of finding technologies useful for creating economic 
development.
Research institutes can play a key role in the de­
veloping and diffusion of new technology. Priorities need 
to be set and adhered to while linking the research work to 
universities, government and agricultural and industrial 
enterprises.  ̂ Since a certain minimum effort is necessary 
which requires scarce resources, international cooperation 
may be desirable on regional levels. The linking of re­
search institutes in the developed countries and the less 
developed countries offers further promise for transferring 
technology.
International research centers such as the Rockefel­
ler Foundation develop new technologies for global distribu­
tion and support local research institutes. The new Cana­
dian International Development Research Center plans to 
focus specifically on the immediate and fundamental develop­
ment problems of the less developed countries. At times the 
international research centers can make dramatic technolog­
ical breakthroughs resulting in successful technological 
transfer, as with the Rockefeller Foundation's work on new 
seeds and the ensuing Green Revolution.
The Rockefeller Foundation's first agricultural 
sciences program was established in the Mexican Ministry of
Ijones, The Role of Science and Technology, p. 28.
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Agriculture in 1943.^ This program has been very success­
ful and greatly aided Mexico in becoming self-sufficient in 
the production of wheat. Importantly, the program was ini­
tiated with only a very few American scientists and no 
Mexicans holding a Ph.D. in the agricultural sciences. By 
1963 Mexico had institutionalized agricultural science into 
the fabric of society and had begun to produce its own 
agricultural scientists.
That research institutes in the developed countries
can make contributions to the less developed countries has
also been demonstrated by Batelle Memorial Institute (Ohio).
This institute, supported by an Agency for International
Development research contract, was able to develop a hand-
operated water pump suitable for use in the less developed 
2countries. Such action reflects the importance of link­
age between the research institutes, government and the 
less developed country.
The vast inflow of human resources of a relatively 
high quality (in terms of usefulness in initiating the in­
dustrialization process) that occurred in the development
Ivernon W. Ruttan, "The International Institute 
Approach," in Agents of Change; Professionals in Developing 
Countries, ed. by Guy Benveniste and Warren F. Ilchman (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 221.
^Organization for Economic Co-ordination and Devel­
opment, Development Assistance Review, 1971 (Paris: Organi­
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1971), 
p. 113.
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of the United States is not likely to repeat itself in the
less developed countries today. However, immigration in--
the form of scientists, engineers, technicians and manage­
rial talent is still an important channel for transferring 
technology from the developed countries to the less devel­
oped countries. The single most important source of this 
type occurs through the networks of the multinational cor­
porations. The transfer can be particularly successful when 
the local branch of the multinational corporation is attuned 
to the culture, political environment, and economic needs of 
the less developed country. Foreign skills can be used more 
efficiently in this context as opposed to a local branch 
which is isolated from the indigenous surroundings.
In recent years there has been a flood of talented 
people who have moved from their homes in the less developed 
countries to the developed countries, largely offsetting the 
influx of technologists sent to less developed areas. This 
phenomenon is referred to as the "brain drain." Scientists, 
engineers, doctors, etc., have moved from the less developed 
countries to the developed countries to take advantage of 
higher salaries, better working facilities, and other lures 
that the developed countries offer. If the "brain drain" 
can be stopped, or especially if it can be reversed, the 
rewards to the less developed countries may be considerable. 
To reverse the flow of human resources will require the
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cooperation of the developed and less developed countries 
as well as international organizations. Research grants, 
higher salaries, better working facilities, and better 
preparation of foreign students going abroad are necessary 
to achieve this goal. Foreign students are often not pre­
pared for the cultural shock they experience when the re­
alities of the developed countries do not match their pre­
conceived images of those countries. As a result they may 
become alienated from the developed countries, or they may 
reject their own cultural identities.
The danger of losing valuable human resources 
through the "brain drain" is a very real and important ob­
stacle to the acceptance of new technologies. If the selec­
ted trainees reject their own cultural images in favor of a 
developed economy's lure, the result may well be either an 
extended stay in the developed country under the guise of 
continuing education or a permanent change in citizenship.^ 
Plans should be made from the start to prevent potential 
alienation from the home culture in order to prevent tempo­
rary or even permanent loss of these scarce resources. An 
alienated person, even if he returns to his own country 
permanently may be more of a burden than a resource for 
future development. Persons forced to accept employment
^Domergue, Technical Assistance, p. 126.
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below their qualifications may even threaten the political 
stability of a less developed country as in the case of 
Sudan in 1961.^ Thus plans for preparing students before 
going abroad, while abroad, and for their eventual return 
is essential to creating a human resource base in the less 
developed countries.
Superficially the problem of the "brain drain" can
be solved simply by placing an embargo at the source or by
2exclusion at the destination. But this approach ignores 
the fact that the "brain drain" is a symptom of the struc­
tural maladjustment prevailing in the less developed coun­
tries. Many less developed countries cannot absorb the 
highly educated people they have trained at home and in 
foreign countries. Their infrastructure has not developed 
to the point where the present quantities of professional 
people can be employed according to their abilities. Fur­
ther, the developed countries often have inelastic supply 
curves for professionals such as doctors and engineers.
The long period of education contributes to the inelasticity 
of supply and is reinforced by monopoly power such as the
Walter Adams and Joel B. Dirlam, "An Agenda for 
Action," in The Brain Drain, ed. by Walter Adams (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1972), p. 250.
2This discussion of the brain drain is primarily 
based upon Adams and Dirlam's article "An Agenda for Action," 
pp. 246-63.
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American Medical Association, Thus there is a tendency for 
the professionals to be "pushed" out of the less developed 
countries due to structural maladjustment and "pulled" into 
the developed countries where there is often a shortage of 
these highly developed human resources.
Solutions to the "brain drain" problem are not sim­
ple, but there are some measures that could be taken to alleviate 
the present condition. It is probably impossible for the less 
developed countries to match the salaries offered in the dev­
eloped countries for key personnel, but apparently only a 
fractional increase, say 20 percent of base salaries, is often 
sufficient to keep many professionals in their home countries. 
There is a strong tendency for people to stay with their 
cultural heritages, familiar surroundings and families, A 
revision of salary structures in the less developed countries 
would also ease the flow of talent from these countries.
Financial reward should be made to be more in line with inter­
national markets which reflect the worth of technically skilled 
people in the twentieth century. Scientists, engineers, 
doctors, etc,, must be rewarded according to their relative 
contributions to the less developed countries. Bureaucratic 
jobs, often a holdover from colonial heritage, should be less 
rewarding. Thus the shift in salary structures is basically one 
from property and position to accommodate the level of human 
resource.
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Such a shift in salary structures requires an in­
crease in the receptivity to change by the leadership of 
the less developed countries. But often the elites of these 
countries rely upon the status quo to maintain their posi­
tions of social status and wealth. Less developed countries 
must find ways of breaking this barrier to change by allow­
ing new elites who are more receptive to change to come into 
power.
The developed countries can help ease the "brain 
drain" by eliminating monopoly power in the education of 
their human resources and by better planning of needed man­
power requirements. Foreign aid to the less developed 
countries is especially important to enable them to create 
an infrastructure capable of absorbing the products of their 
higher educational institutions. A greater participation of 
the less developed countries in international trade should 
be promoted in order to permit these countries to gain the 
foreign exchange needed to make the necessary structural 
changes.
Universities in both the developed countries and the 
less developed countries are important channels of tech­
nological transfer due to their position as suppliers of 
educated manpower. Universities in the less developed 
countries are too often patterned after the older European 
universities' study of the classics. To be more effective
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channels of transfer, the universities in the less developed 
countries should be closely linked with the research in­
stitutes and government agencies concerned with industrial 
and agricultural problems. As in the case of research in­
stitutes, the role of the university should be a pragmatic 
one, devoting the major thrust of its effort to immediate 
and fundamental development problems.^ Less developed 
countries placing a high priority on economic development 
should direct the bulk of educated manpower produced by the 
universities toward an education preparing it to enter in­
dustry, agriculture and agricultural extension services. 
Special attention should be given to support technicians 
such as nurses, welders, engineering technicians, etc., in 
order to correct past misallocations of human resources.% 
Given the scarce resources of the less developed countries, 
they cannot afford to devote more than a minimal effort to 
basic science.
In connection with the study of the role of the 
universities, it is useful to examine the relevance of 
Western economic theory obtained in these institutions. 
Western economic theory has played an important role in the 
economic strategies of the less developed countries, and
Albert E. Gollin, Education for National Develop­
ment; Effects of U.S. Technical Training Programs (New 
York; Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 184.
^Jones, The Role of Science and Technology, p. 32,
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consequently it has affected the modes of technological ac­
quisition, The economic theories spun in the Western uni­
versities contain implicit, if not explicit, value judg­
ments which may determine the general economic policy of a 
less developed country. The usefulness of Western economic 
theory may be greatly reduced if it is not adapted to the 
particular needs of the less developed countries. Uncrit­
ical application may emphasize short-run efficiency at the 
sacrifice of long-run structural development. For example, 
less developed countries with dense populations may do much 
better by utilizing labor-intensive techniques which seem 
inefficient by Western standards. Western theory is not 
necessarily inapplicable or useless, but it must be applied 
with intelligent care to the less developed countries.
The largely nonmonetized economies of the less de­
veloped countries greatly limit the use of capital output 
ratios, the traditional analysis of saving, the multiplier 
analysis, and consumption theory. Assumptions such as a 
homogeneous labor supply, ceteris paribus or automatic 
mutatis mutandis (used to control difficult variables such 
as technology and institutions), and homogeneity of capital
are not very useful in an instrumental analysis and can
1often lead to miscalculations. As Dudley Seers points
^See Paul Streeten, "Appendix 3" in Asian Drama;
An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations by Gunnar Myrdal (New 
York; Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), pp. 1944-51.
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out. Western economic theory was developed to deal with a
special case, an exception to most of the world's economies.
After analyzing the factors of production, the sectors of
the economy, public finance, foreign trade, households,
saving and investment, and other influences concerning the
industrialized countries, Seers concludes:
In brief, what is assumed is an autonomous and 
flexible socio-economic structure, in which each 
human being responds individually to the material 
incentives offered, and which is subject to no 
formidable exogenous strains,1
Quite obviously there are exogenous strains on socio-economic 
structures of the less developed countries which necessitate 
careful application of Western theory.
Economists in industrialized countries have been 
conlitioned from birth to a certain type of cultural stimuli. 
Each one becomes familiar with an industrial, monetized eco­
nomy. Newspapers, radio and television focuj on his country
cuid generally treat foreign economies as a kind of aberration 
2from his own. By the time the aspiring economist enters 
college he is conditioned to accept that his country's in­
stitutions are the best available. It only follows that 
these institutions should serve as models for the nonindus­
trial countries. With a misplaced sense of globalism, the
^Dudley Seers, "The Limitations of the Special 
Case," in The Teaching of Development Economics, ed. by Kurt 
Martin and John Knapp (London: Cass Publishers, 1966), p. 10
^Ibid., p. 19.
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economist may assume that foreigners will share his atti­
tudes toward economic and political systems.
Students from nonindustrialized countries may have 
an unfounded respect for the techniques of the industrial­
ized countries. Western textbooks such as Paul Samuelson's 
Economics can be misleading to both Western economists and 
economists from nonindustrial countries if the proposed 
models and theories are accepted without modification.
This text is mainly concerned with economics in the United 
States today. The focus is on the macro level for the coun­
try or the micro level for the firm or the individual.
Little attention is paid to the economic problems of the 
world or industry.^ Different types of economies such as 
exporters of metals, petroleum, fruits or coffee are vir­
tually ignored. Nor is there an adequate discussion of the 
importance of institutional and technological change and the 
problems which surround such change.
Since the training an undergraduate receives does 
little to relieve him of his narrow perspective, he is not 
likely to question the applicability of theory in graduate 
school. In fact, and especially if the class content is 
boring, he may concentrate on techniques, polishing the in­
applicable, but sophisticated tools offered to him. Instead 
of becoming a generalist, in the sense that he can perceive
llbid., p. 16.
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various economies removed from his earlier conditioning, he
may endeavor to build more and more abstract models of the
kind to which he is accustomed. Thus graduate students may
find themselves,
in a strange world of indifference maps, kinked 
demand curves, cross elasticity, marginal pro­
pensity to consume, liquidity preference, net 
national product, sampling error, linear pro­
gramming, and input-output matrices. They spend 
much of their time gaining familiarity with 
specialized concepts and techniques, and their 
success as graduate students is gauged largely 
by the degree to which they master them.^
In such a system the graduate student is rewarded by the 
elegance of the models he builds and not by their useful­
ness.
Dudley Seers suggests that macromodels of industri­
alized countries may not be applicable to nonindustrial 
countries since these models generally are closed models 
which largely ignore the foreign sector. But the foreign 
sector is especially vital to nonindustrialized countries 
and cannot be slighted.
The sales of their particular primary products, 
and thus their development, are determined by 
(i) the rate of growth of the industrial econom­
ies that buy from them, (ii) the incorae-elasticities 
of demand for the commodities that they export 
(which reflect, inter alia, the substitution of 
artificial materials for natural ones), (iii) pro­
tective measures that limit imports into industrial 
economies, (iv) influences on the distribution of
H. R. Bowen, "Graduate Education in Economics" 
American Economic Reviews, 1953 Supplement. Quoted from 
Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case," p. 20.
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the remaining markets between various suppliers 
(company policy, preferential tariff arrangements, 
etc.)
These factors cannot be ignored in models adapted 
for nonindustrial countries. The extent to which these 
countries can lessen their reliance upon the foreign sector 
depends upon their abilities to succeed at import substitu­
tion. And this requires a completely new manufacturing 
industry as well as advances in social overhead capital 
(energy sources, etc.). Further, import substitution is
2limited by the extent of the market and natural resources. 
Less developed countries may find later stages of import 
substitution have more obstacles as they try to produce 
more sophisticated products. The role of technological 
transfer and diffusion becomes increasingly important as 
these changes occur.
In the past the development of university systems 
in the less developed countries has often resulted in an 
excess of educated manpower for two reasons. First, there 
is a general lack of technical support personnel relative 
to the supply of scientists, doctors and engineers in the 
less developed countries. Most people who qualify for 
technical support training also are often capable of at-




taining the more prestigious degrees offered by higher 
education. A lack of government planning results in a 
dearth of intermediate training centers for those who wish 
to pursue such skills. Second, the university-educated 
person is likely to prefer the amenities of urban life to a 
rural setting.^ Therefore there may be an overall short­
age of educated human resources existing simultaneously with 
large numbers of unemployed or underemployed doctors and 
engineers in urban areas.
Beyond the direct contributions of universities is 
the externality of a general improvement in the receptive­
ness of the population to new technologies. But the exter­
nal benefits are directly related to the degree of isola­
tionism and elitism in the universities. Thus, universities 
not only need to be linked to research institutes and gov­
ernment agencies, but also need to establish a climate con-
*>ducive to the spread of ideas throughout the community."
As in the case of technological transfer,
the full benefits of higher education are not 
likely to be gained unless the system is adapted 
in form and content to suit the specific cultural, 
social, and economic environment.^
Frederick H. Harbison, "Approaches to Human 
Resource Development" in Leading Issues in Economic Devel­
opment , ed. by Gerald M. Meier (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970), p. 612.
Jones, The Role of Science and Technology, p. 31.
^Ibid., p. 141.
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Universities in the less developed countries should organize 
their efforts éuround their countries' unique needs. Unreal- 
istically high standards may be more of an obstacle than an 
asset to economic development. The basic direction of the 
university systems should be toward creating a general cul­
tural setting conducive to the acceptance of intelligently 
selected technologies for the purpose of economic develop­
ment.
Universities in the developed countries serve as an 
important channel for technological transfer in at least 
two ways. First, they can interact with universities in 
the less developed countries via cooperative projects and 
exchange programs. Secondly, the universities in the ad­
vanced countries educate foreign students who bring vital 
skills home with them. But in subsidizing their students 
abroad, the less developed countries need constantly to 
assess their manpower priorities. Does the less developed 
country really need a pool of high powered scientists?
Does the less developed country have the resources to sup­
port such a group of technically sophisticated personnel?
If not, scientists trained in the well equipped laboratories 
of the developed countries will be underutilized and dis­
satisfied with their positions upon returning to their 
home la rads. In the past, the result has been that many of 
the most skilled scientists permanently left their home
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countries, thus draining the resources of the less devel­
oped countries.
Technology and Economic Development 
The technological choices available to the less 
developed countries may be arranged into three parts of a 
spectrum: (1) sophisticated technology, (2) intermediate
technology and (3) rudimentary technology.^ If a country 
chooses to develop by utilizing sophisticated technology in 
a few sectors of the economy, it is assumed that there will 
be a trickle-down effect which will eventually bring modern 
technology to the rest of the economy. This approach is 
capital-intensive and is illustrated by the large private 
farms in Mexico which use modern agricultural equipment.
The drawbacks to using sophisticated technology are that it 
is expensive, it is developed by the advanced countries for 
their needs and may not be easily adapted, and it causes 
unemployment problems.
Intermediate technology offers some advantages to 
the less developed country. It is developed by the less 
developed country and is usually better suited to the pro­
blems of that country. Japan was successful in building 
up its intermediate technology for supplying its modern 
industrial sector. At the same time the Japanese utilized
^Jones, The Role of Science and Technology, p. 22.
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rudimentary technology in their agricultural sector. The 
labor-intensive nature of these technologies absorbed 
potentially surplus labor while providing a link to the 
modern sector. Thus the labor-intensive use of intermedi­
ate and rudimentary technologies served to avoid the unem­
ployment problem and to supply the modern sector with a 
labor supply capable of adapting to the modern sector. The 
Japanese have done well in selecting proper portions of 
sophisticated technology, intermediate technology and rudi­
mentary technology.^
The choice of technology has been biased in many of
the less developed countries toward a capital-intensive 
2approach. Well meaning programs have subsidized the im­
portation of capital-intensive machinery in several ways. 
Sometimes the currency in the less developed country is 
over-valued allowing an influx of "cheap" machinery. Legis­
lation for low interest rates provides businessmen with an 
incentive to purchase capital-intensive equipment. In some 
cases a minimum wage adds to the attractiveness of capital
C. H. G. Oldham, "Science, Technology, and Devel­
opment" in Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by 
Gerald M. Meier (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press,
1970), p. 322; R. B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelop­
ment (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1971),
p. 193; and Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan 1868- 
1940 (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 40-43.
^See Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment, 
pp. 146-59 for a detailed discussion of the technological 
choices available.
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goods. Welfare programs and strong unions in some less 
developed countries have often made it difficult or expen­
sive for an employer to fire or lay off employees during 
business downturns. The Japanese avoid this problem to 
some extent bfpaying a large proportion of the wage in 
bonus form and then reducing the bonus in recessions.
The impact of this capital-intensive bias generally 
results in an unemployment or underemployment problem. 
Earlier transfer of medical technology to the less devel­
oped countries resulted in large population increases. 
Urbanization in the less developed countries attracted many 
people who expected to better their life styles there, but 
only found unemployment. With the addition of capital- 
intensive technology, the situation has become worse. One 
result is an even more skewed distribution of income. In 
the case of Mexico,
the ratio of the income of the top 20 percent of 
recipients to that of the bottom 20 percent in 
Mexico increased from 10:1 in 1950 to 17:1 in 
1963.1
Mexico's choice of technology has created a dual system 
with large commercial farms using tractors and other ma­
chinery which has forced more peasants into subsistence 
agriculture. Not all of the impact from capital-intensive
iRobert d'A. Shaw, Rethinking Economic Development, 
Headline Series No. 208 (New York: Foreign Policy Associa­
tion, December, 1971), p. 4.
47
technology is bad, however.^ The growing commercializa­
tion of agriculture can be a dynamic force for development. 
It creates demand for seeds, fertilizer and agricultural 
implements which must be provided and distributed, thus 
creating jobs. Also, the increase in the agricultural pro­
duction means these foods have to be processed, marketed 
and transported, which means more jobs. If an agricultural 
surplus arises, it can be used for obtaining foreign ex­
change .
A token transfer of technology does not necessarily 
mean that rapid diffusion and adaptation follow. An exam­
ination of the diffusion of technology in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries presents examples of technology 
being transferred to some countries faster than to others. 
Also some countries adopted new technologies within their 
borders at a faster rate than did other countries.
Watt's steam engine was developed by 1776, but was 
not an essential ingredient in the British economy until 
the period 1 8 3 0 - 1 8 5 0 . 2  Although the steam engine was in­
troduced in France in 1779, it was still not a major source 
of power in 1 8 5 0 .  The diffusion of the steam engine pro­
ceeded at an even slower pace in Germany and slower still 
in Italy. Full utilization of the steam engine also lagged
^Ibid., p. 44.
Murphy, "Retrospect and Prospect," p. 9.
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in the United States where it was introduced before the end 
of the eighteenth century, but was not extensively used 
(except for river boats) until about the 1850s, Table 2 
indicates that these lags in technological adaptation, past 
and present, are striking when contrasted to the relatively 
short period of innovation in the initiating country. In 
all of the cases in the eighteenth century, the transfer of 
technology across national boundaries was faster than the 
internal assimilation of the technology that followed. The 
equipment that industrialized the production of cotton tex­
tiles followed a similar pattern, Hargreave's jenny was 
introduced in France only five years after its development, 
but was not at once put to general use,^ The water frame 
developed by Arkwright was brought to France in the 1780s 
and Germany in the 1790s, but was not in general use for 
several decades. The adoption of the power loom also fol­
lowed this established pattern.
Textile machinery did not move to the United States 
as fast as it was introduced to Europe, but once received, 
it was utilized at a faster pace. Both Arkwright's water 
frame and the power loom were diffused much faster in the 
United States than in Europe. Further, Americans rapidly 
began to initiate changes in the equipment and in some areas 




ESTIMATED TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN INVENTION AND 
INNOVATION IN INITIATING COUNTRY




Freon refrigerants 1 Wireless telephone 8
"Clean circulation" 3 Houldry catalytic cracking 9
DDT 3 Safety razor 9
Distilling of gas oil Turbojet engine 10
with heat and pressure 3 Continuous cracking
Long-playing record 3 (Holmes-Manley) 11
Plexiglass, Incite 3 Nylon 11
Shell molding 3 Steam engine (Watt) 11
Spinning mule 4 Terylene, dacron 12
Continuous cracking of Continuous cracking (Dubbs) 13
gas oil (Cross Process) 5 Continuous cracking
Magnetic recording 5 (tube and tank process) 13
Spinning jenny 5 Fluid catalytic cracking 13
Streptomycin 5 Gas lift for catylist
Ball point pen 6 pellets 13
Power steering 6 Radar 13
Self-winding watch 6 Crease resistant fabrics 14
Spinning machine Jet engine 14
(water frame) 6 Television 22
Steam engine (Newcomen) 6 Distilling of hydrocarbons
Titanium reduction 7 with heat and pressure 24
Triode vacuum tube 7 Electric precipitation 25
Catalytic cracking Zipper 27
(moving bed) 8 Cotton picker 53
Hardening of fats 8 Gyrocompass 56
Radio (oscillator) 8 Florescent lamp 79
Wireless telegraph 8
Source: Adapted from John L. Enos, "Invention and Innova­
tion in the Petroleum Refining Industry," in The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed. by 
the Universities-National Bureau Committee for 
Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1962), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 305, 307- 
308.
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initiative shown by the Americans was probably the product 
of a frontier society free of rigid cultural constraints 
combined with their geographical distance from Europe.
The technical advance in the making of tools was 
particularly important since the rates of advance in dif­
ferent countries varied considerably. Americans achieved 
expertise in this area, and other countries encountered 
difficulty in adopting the American process. The American 
focus on specialization eventually underpriced even the 
British. The continent failed to keep abreast of the Amer­
icans and the British and as a result relied upon the Brit­
ish for machine tools. Continental Europe did produce 
machine tools, but mainly for internal firm use. The Brit­
ish lost their superiority to the Americans largely due to 
the reluctance of British horological trades to accept the 
American system, substituting machines for men and incorpo­
rating standardized parts. It was the highly skilled Brit­
ish artisans, the descendants of the industrial revolution, 
who impeded the further diffusion of technology.^
The difficulties encountered in the diffusion of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century technology are probably 
slight relative to the problems of diffusing twentieth cen­
tury technology. Cultural differences then were not nearly 
as great as the differences between advanced countries and
llbid., p. 12.
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the less developed countries now. Ilor was the technological 
gap as great as it is at present. But the rates of techno­
logical diffusion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
illustrate the difficulties involved in the transfer pro­
cess. The mere existence of an invention does not automat­
ically lead to innovation. And the loss of technological 
and econœnic superiority seems to be the fate of those who 
do not create an atmosphere conducive to technological 
change.
Technological innovation generally has and does 
occur much faster in the initiating country than in the 
country trying to adopt the technology. Table 3 suggests 
that it is possible that the lag is decreasing within the 
industrial countries. If this is the case, the less devel­
oped countries' problems are exacerbated since they must 
then accelerate their rates of adaptation just to maintain 
their positions relative to the advanced countries.
William and Helga Woodruff have suggested that the 
history of international transfer of technology can be sep­
arated into two basic periods, the extensive period between 
1860 and World War I, and the intensive period from World 
War I to the present.^ The extensive period was marked by 
the transfer of empirical and traditional knowledge empha-
^William and Helga Woodruff, "The Interrelatedness 
of Continents and the Diffusion of Technology, 1860-1960," 
Technology and Culture, VII, No. 4 (Fall, 1966), 455-56.
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATIONS —  DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Average Time Interval (Years)
Factors Influencing the 







Early twentieth century 
(1885-1919)
30 7 37
Post-World War I 
(1920-1944)
16 8 24
Post-World War II 
(1945-1964)
9 5 14
Type of Market Application
Consumer 13 7 20
Industrial 28 6 34
Source of Development
Private industry 24 7 31
Federal government 12 7 19
Source; Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technological 
Change (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
Inc., 1968), Table 4.2, p. 102.
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sizing transportation and communication (steam powered 
transportation, and the construction of overhead capital 
such as ports and towns). The intensive period has focused 
upon more sophisticated technologies which are mainly trans­
ferred among the advanced countries. When these technolo­
gies are transferred to the less developed countries they 
are often used to extract raw materials. There have been 
very few spread effects from this type of technological 
transfer. Thus the schema for transfer has often been one 
of exploitation rather than adaptation.
A number of factors tend to obstruct the transfer 
and diffusion of technology. The scarcity of foreign ex­
change in the less developed countries impedes the techno­
logical inflow from the advanced countries. The less 
developed countries are caught in a vicious circle; they 
cannot purchase adequate flows of technology which means 
low productivity which causes an inability to purchase flows 
of technology. Multilateral aid can ease this problem, but 
the immediate prospects of increased aid, especially in the 
case of the United States, are not bright.
Even if the financial constraint were eased, there 
still remain several other problems. The less developed 
countries require a pool of skilled personnel to receive and 
disperse new technologies. In many cases these people are 
scarce and training facilities are very limited. Many of
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the less developed countries have constraints on their 
capacity to organize, plan and execute technical assistance.^ 
Large inflows of foreign technicians, tend to make the 
people of any country nervous. And these foreign experts 
are expensive to the less developed countries in that they 
require housing, supplies and liaison contacts.
The rate of economic growth of a less developed 
country is an important factor affecting the inflow of 
technology and its diffusion. This is one of the "chicken 
and the egg" type of problems in development economics, but
3it cannot be ignored. The fact is that a slow rate of 
economic growth is associated with a slow inflow of technol­
ogy. In reality, there is probably a complex symbiotic 
relationship between economic growth and the inflow and 
diffusion of technology. Slow economic growth is both a 
cause and a result of inadequate technological inflows.
The causes of poor economic growth rates are nearly endless: 
inadequate resources, low educational level, lack of polit­
ical leadership committed to development, cultural barriers, 
etc. Only two of these causes will be discussed, cultural
^Angus Maddison, "Role of Technical Assistance" in 
Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by Gerald M. 
Meier (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),
p. 314.
Zibid.
^Murphy, "Retrospect and Prospect," p. 15.
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barriers and political leadership, since they are expecially 
crucial to the transfer process. The educational factor 
will be considered in some depth in the chapters on Mexico 
and Japan.
C. E. Ayres, utilizing Thorstein Veblen's dichotomy, 
divides human behavior into two categories, technological 
and ceremonial.^ Ceremonial behavior is static, tradition 
bound, and past binding. Technological behavior is dynamic, 
secular, and pragmatic. When the people of a country are 
bound by traditions which inhibit change then the culture 
represents a barrier to economic development and technolog­
ical transfer. As suggested earlier in this chapter, the 
transfer of technology requires both adaptations of a tech­
nological package to the culture of the less developed 
country and a change of some degree in the culture. The 
chapters of Mexico and Japan will deal with this problem in 
some detail.
The role of government in the development process as 
determined by the political leadership may be the most im­
portant factor in promoting technological transfer in the 
1970s. Certainly the cases of Japan and Mexico indicate 
the validity of this statement. As this study demonstrates, 
both development and technological advance were concomitant 
with changes in the Japanese and Mexican governments. A
^Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress, p. 100.
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strong commitment by government to development is a neces­
sary prerequisite for economic change. If the government 
of a less developed country lacks this commitment, it re­
presents a formidable barrier to development and technolog­
ical transfer.
Summary
The terms science, technology and technological 
transfer were defined and related to the process of eco­
nomic development. Since most research and development 
originates in the developed countries it is essential to 
study the process of transferring technology to the less 
developed countries. Especially crucial to the successful 
transfer of technology is the adaptation of technology to 
each country's unique requirements. In many cases, partic­
ularly in the more backward countries in industrialization, 
institutional adjustment is required to facilitate techno­
logical flows. The "brain drain" was seen to be an espe­
cially severe problem, but one which, if solved by appro­
priate action, could yield great benefits to the less 
developed countries. The need to adapt Western economic 
theory was seen as crucial to the success of the develop­
ment process cuid therefore to technological transfer. 
Obstacles to technological transfer and diffusion were 
briefly described to establish the difficulties overcome by 
Japan and Mexico in the following chapters.
CHAPTER III
MEXICO —  DEVELOPMENT FROM PORFIRIAN 
ERA THROUGH 1940
Background
The period from 1810 (the Hidalgo revolt against 
Spanish domination) to 1900 was generally a period of eco­
nomic stagnation.1 The fighting between 1810 and 1821 
(Mexican independence) greatly damaged the mining industry 
which was of central importance to the old colonial eco­
nomic system. There was a capital flight out of Mexico 
accompanied by most of the inhabitants who had been born in 
Spain (peninsulares). Agrarian Mexico was left in ruins. 
Stagnation continued until 1900 due to political instability. 
Mexico had fifty different governments in its first fifty 
years of independence. Further, in this period, Mexico
fought two wars with the French and one with the United 
2States. Attempts to exploit Mexico's resources with the 
technology of the Industrial Revolution were upset by domes­
tic political instability and foreign intervention. Thus 
the growth of mining was hampered in the 1820s and the de-
iRoger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Develop­




velopment of manufacturing was retarded in the 1840s.^
Symbolic of Mexico's economic woes was the miserable 
state of her transportation system up to the Porfirian pe­
riod (1877-1911). By 1860 Mexico had only fifteen miles of 
usable railway track. There were only three roads which 
could be called highways in 1820, and these were in need of 
repair.
The inadequacy of the road system during this period 
was accurately reflected in prohibitive transporta­
tion costs. At a time when cotton sold for 15 cents 
a pound in U.S. markets, the Veracruz producer spent 
13 cents a pound to get his fiber from the field to 
the buyer. The failure of the government to provide 
an adequate highway network left the country fragmented 
into thousands of small and isolated communities, each 
with anywhere from twenty to a thousand inhabitants.2
Institutional constraints and political instability 
resulted in a weak fiscal structure. The few funds which 
could be raised were usually absorbed by government bureau­
cracy or local bosses. Thus Mexico relied upon foreign 
loans which created a large external debt. Eighty percent 
of government revenues were directed toward repayment of 
debts. Confiscation, debasement of currency and forced 
domestic loans were also used as sources of revenue with 
correspondingly bad effects. A heavy internal tax struc­
ture created an environment in which the Mexican producer
Iciark W. Reynolds, The Mexican Economy (New Havenj 
Yale University Press, 1970), p. 15.
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 12.
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often could not compete against American and European im­
ports. Only the textile industry was experiencing growth 
in this period. Due to tariff protection and other govern­
ment support, textile production in the modern industrial 
sector may have doubled from 1854 to 1877.^
The Mexican terrain presents formidable obstacles 
to agricultural development. Most of the land is mountain­
ous and therefore not easy to farm. Two mountain ranges 
have hampered agricultural support activities by making 
transportation and communication difficult. The population 
is dispersed throughout the country, isolated by rugged 
mountains. Extension services, general education, health 
support, etc., have also been difficult to deliver, given 
this geographical arrangement. Further,
the relatively level land is not all favorable to 
intensive agricultural use. In the north, a sig­
nificant portion of the level land is arid and 
semidesert. In the south, the Yucatan peninsula 
is mostly level, but the soil there is shallow, 
tends to leach easily, and is not suitable for 
general agriculture. Agricultural endeavors are 
further hampered by the uneven distribution of 
rainfall which supports jungle growth in some 
areas and only cacti and lizards in others. About 
50 percent of the country is subject to inadequate 
rainfall, and provision for sufficient water to 
otherwise fertile lands presents a formidable 
challenge for the Mexican people. Irrigation of 
the broad tablelands is difficult because most of 
the rivers and streams have their origins on the 
seaward side of the two mountain ranges, and
llbid., pp. 12-13.
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riverbeds drop abruptly into the Gulf of Mexico 
or the Pacific Ocean.1
Man has created problems in addition to these con­
siderable geographical constraints. With the Spaniards came 
the European plow which broke up the root structure that had 
held down the topsoil. They also brought sheep which over- 
grazed the hillsides leaving them unprotected from erosion. 
The Spaniards also introduced iron-making which created a 
large demand for charcoal. Thus much of the forests were 
destroyed. As the Spaniards cultivated the best land, the 
Indians were driven to the highlands where their slash and 
burn agriculture destroyed the natural protection against 
erosion. The problems faced by the present Mexican govern­
ment should be perceived against this backdrop as well as 
the following description of culture and evolution of land 
systems.
The Mexican Indian had a heritage of obedience to 
church, king and the warrior class under Aztec rule. This 
cultural pattern (with the help of superior technological 
force) was easily adapted to fit the social arrangement im­
posed by the conquering Spaniards.  ̂ But the Aztec system
^William E. Cole and Richard D. Sanders, Growth and 
Change in Mexican Agriculture (Knoxville, Tennessee; Center 
for Business and Economic Researchj The University of Ten­
nessee, 1970), pp. 1-2.
^Ibid. , p. 2.
^Eyler Newton Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937),
p. 6.
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had allowed for a supplementary land system largely indepen­
dent of the church and nobles and which was owned by local 
villages. With the arrival of the Spaniards, huge grants of 
lands which included villages were awarded to favored recip­
ients. These grants, or encomiendas, theoretically left the 
ownership of the land to the Indians. The recipient of an 
encomienda was rewarded by Indian labor and tribute. The 
encomienda grants, or repartimientos, were intended to be 
temporary —  a payment by the Indians for the civilization 
that the Spaniards had brought to them.
The encomiendas were passed from one generation to 
the next, eventually losing their temporary status. Thus, 
the Indians gradually lost their landed status and were 
transformed into serfs within the hacienda system.^ This 
system which spread th? ^̂ i.'ut Latin America was (and is) a 
notoriously inefficient system. The attitudes of the 
hacendados, the system of land tenure, the traditional labor 
system, and the man-master relationship were strong institu­
tional constraints preventing technological change.%
This is a very simplified description of the chang­
ing land pattern. In fact communal holdings existed side by 
side with the encomiendas. The conflict between the ejido 
and the hacienda lasted for some 400 years with the hacienda 
system consistently winning the struggles. See Simpson, The 
Ejido, p. 15 and George McCutchen McBride, The Land Systems 
of Mexico (New York; American Geographical Society, 1923), 
p. 124.
^Milton Lower, "Institutional Basis of Economic 
Stagnation in Chile," Journal of Economic Issues, II, No. 3 
(September, 1968), 289.
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The master of a hacienda was trained from birth to
command. Servants were at hand to help at every step. As a
boy, servants carried his books to and from school. His
education was often in Europe. A typical description of the
type of education received is illustrated by the following;
Most of his education had been in letters and arts.
He had never studied agriculture nor anything in 
the line of administration. During the period of 
schooling, vacations had been spent on the farm 
where, in association with his father, he had be­
come familiar with some of the problems of its 
management. He had never done any manual work.
His hands had never turned a shovelful of earth, 
nor had he followed a plow, nor milked a cow, 
nor yoked a team of oxen. He had hardly learned 
to saddle and bridle his own horse without the 
assistance of a mozo.l
Everything about the master reflected status and wealth —
his home, his clothing, his horse, the saddle and bridle of
his horse, his education, his bearing, etc.
The master's servant, or mozo, was the direct con­
trast of his patron. More than likely the mozo could not 
read or write. He lived in a single-room adobe hut and was 
given a small piece of land to plant corn for his own con­
sumption. Necessities were available at the hacienda store, 
and thus most of his small wage was returned directly to 
the hacienda.2
^George McCutchen McBride, Chile: Land and Society
(New York: American Geographical Society, 1936), p. 10.
^Robert A. White, "Mexico: The Zapata Movement and
the Revolution," in Latin American Peasant Movements, ed. by 
Henry A. Landsfaerger (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1969), p. 106.
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The evolution of the encomienda system and the con­
sequent shrinking of the communally held land areas was the 
result of both economic and cultural forces. Plantation 
crops (sugar, wheat, indigo and cacao) and the raising of 
cattle and sheep required large land areas. As the demand 
for ores increased, the work force grew and required a food 
supply from the agricultural sector. But perhaps the most 
important factor in creating the hacienda system was the 
hidalgo mentality which perceived land as a symbol of sta­
tus and wealth. It was not by accident that haciendas grew 
to sizes far greater than that needed for economic effi­
ciency . ̂
The Catholic Church was a powerful force in promot­
ing the hacienda system. It was the largest land owner in 
Mexico and was an important ally to the wealthy landowners 
and merchants. The Church consistently opposed any popular 
democratic changes. Much of its land was held in mortmain 
and could not be transferred or sold. As such it was seen 
as an obstacle to the cultural and economic development of 
Mexico by the liberal intellectuals. It is estimated that 
the Catholic Church held about one-half of all of the real 
property in Mexico at the time of the Revolution.  ̂ The




Reform government (1855-1872) tried to disperse some of the 
Church land, but the attempt did not achieve its purpose of 
distributing land to small farmers. Large landowners in­
creased the size of their holdings while small landowners 
were often forced to give up their land due to ignorance or 
insufficient credit. The very idea of private ownership 
was alien to the Indians who were used to communal owner­
ship. This, plus the Church's threat of eternal condemna­
tion if they acquired land, was a sufficient deterrent to 
the land reform attempt.^
It is the purpose of the following discussion to 
demonstrate that the trend toward dualism, especially in 
agriculture, and the increasing inequality is not an acci­
dental phenomenon, but has its roots in the value system of 
the colonial heritage. This value system is still strong 
today and places some light on the governmental development 
strategy both before and since the 1940s.
At the time of the independence from Spain (1821) 
the class system placed the Indians, who composed half of 
the population, on the bottom of the scale.% Above the 
Indians were those of mixed races, the castas, who composed 
from one-third to nearly one-half of the entire population.
llbid., p. 14.
Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 135. 
The following analysis is based on Chapter 6, "The Roots of 
Mexican Politics."
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The mestizos were the largest group in the castas and were 
of Indian and Spanish blood. They were generally rejected 
by both the Indians and the Spanish and faced great obsta­
cles in any attempt toward upward social mobility. The 
mestizo could hold no political position, could not join 
most professions, and could not move into some residential 
sections.
It was possible, however, for the mestizo to move 
upward in the caste arrangement to criollo status if he were 
able to obtain wealth. The criollo group was primarily com­
posed of the Spanish born in Mexico. Entry into this class 
was possible due to the traditional emphasis on wealth above 
racial origin. Entry into the top class, the peninsulares, 
was impossible. The peninsulares carefully protected their 
privileged status and wealth which they received from the 
Spanish crown.
Initially the criollo had led the revolt against the 
Spanish in order to improve their social standing. But 
this class's hatred of the Indians and mestizos became clear 
in the Hidalgo revolt (1810), and the criollo joined the 
royalists to put down the revolt which they had initiated. 
The achievement of independence in 1821 was mostly credited 
to the conservative criollo, especially the wealthier ones, 
as a result of their efforts to eliminate ties with a Span­
ish government which was becoming too liberal. Thus the
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revolution changed little except that the criollo then had 
control instead of the peninsulares.
The conservative powers in Mexico opposed further 
change unsuccessfully. The loss of the Spanish crown 
created a power vacuum which could only be filled by force. 
It was in the violent upheaval which followed that the mes­
tizos struggled for power.^ The mestizo had little to 
lose —  he could not fall below the Indian on the social 
scale, and slow economic growth allowed little room for his 
upward mobility. As Hansen states:
The mestizo was disinherited by both Mexican 
societies, Indian and creole. Without a place 
in the social order, he had lived for genera­
tions by his wits, his dissimulation. These 
qualities, cultivated for survival prior to in­
dependence, were of equal value after 1821.
The adaptive nature of the mestizo's personal­
ity allowed him to take full advantage of the 
opportunities for his own upward mobility pre­
sented by the social and economic instability 
which accompanied the ensuing period of polit­
ical chaos.2
The mestizo began to respect the only thing that could give 
him social mobility —  power. The mestizo wanted power for 
himself and not for any identifiable group.3 The mestizo
llbid., P. 140.
^Ibid., pp. 141-142.
The Indians were careful to redistribute power 
so as not to attach it to any individual. Thus their per­
ception of power placed them in a position of inevitable 
subjugation to the mestizo who considered power on an in­
dividual basis and as a tool to subjugate the less power­
ful. See Eric R. Wolf, Sons of the Shaking Earth (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 239.
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conceived life as a zero-sum game in which one either wins 
or loses. Power was an attribute of the self and was to be 
used for personal gain. The concept of the use of power to 
obtain group goals was alien to his personality. Things to 
be valued were personal strength, manliness and domination 
of others.
Given these personality traits in addition to the
limitations for achievement in the economic sphere, the
mestizos plunged into the struggle for power in politics
and the military. They achieved these goals and broke the
power of the previous ruling elites and the Catholic Church
in the War of Reform (1857-1860). They further solidified
their position in the Porfirian period. Political power
was used to gain personal wealth. The scenario to gain
mobility was to get access to the elite power center and
then join the elite. There was no desire to open the door
to followers —  quite the contrary. Upon attaining power
it was used for the self and not for redistribution of
wealth. In the Porfirian period, as today,
we see personalism prevail in the political realm,
«md from the lowest to the highest levels of the 
political structure loyalties flow upward from the 
appointee to the appointer, from the co-optee to 
the co-opter, from the follower to his patron.^
It is the mestizo elite that rule Mexico today. Their value
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 165.
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system is much the same as it was in the colonial period 
and the Porfirian period. One after the other of Mexico's 
revolutionary politicians have achieved success, acquired 
vast wealth, and done little for the masses. This has been 
consistent with mestizo behavior in the past and it contin­
ues into the present. This largely explains the economic 
dualism in Mexican agriculture and the growing inequality 
of the distribution of income.
The mestizo elite learned the lessons of the Por­
firian period. After the Revolution the principal causes 
of unrest were eliminated. Land reform was initiated, re­
turning the rural Mexican to his traditional role of polit­
ical apathy. Social and economic mobility were increased 
allowing ambitious groups to be assimilated by the existing 
power structure. Political stability has been a crucial 
factor in the "Mexican miracle," but because of the mestizo 
power ethic many of the Mexican people have not benefited 
from economic growth. Within this context it is perhaps 
easier to see why Mexico ranks so low in education and 
health care relative to other less prosperous Latin Ameri­
can countries: the leadership has not permitted Mexico to
fully develop its most emportant resource, its people. 
Without the improvement of Mexico's human resources the 
rate of technological transfer and diffusion will be re­
tarded and restricted to the upper and middle strata of the 
Mexican people.
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Mexico is not the only less developed country to 
have economic dualisms or vast inequalities of wealth.
Thus it would be unwise to place all of the burden of these 
economic attributes at the foot of the mestizo personality. 
However, êin understanding of the mestizo heritage seems an 
essential element if one is to interpret Mexico's develop­
ment, of which technological transfer and diffusion is an 
integral part.
1877-1910 —  Porfirian Period 
The Mexican population had reached 13.6 million by 
1900, about double the population of 1800. More than 50 
percent of the increase in population occurred between 1875 
and 1900. After 1900 the population growth rate dropped to 
1.1 percent from the 1.6 percent growth rate for the 1877- 
1900 period.1 Since medical technology had improved (new 
vaccines for typhus) and since Mexico had insignificant net 
immigration, the sudden drop in the birth rate needs an ex­
planation to demonstrate that the declining birth rate 
after 1900 was not a result of slow economic growth.
In essence, what transpired was the utilization of 
previously unused economic capacity, especially in agricul­
ture, permitting a steady growth of the population until 
1900. The Porfirian economic policy largely explains the
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 20
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sudden drop in the birth rate. Economic growth occurred 
most rapidly in the export sector between 1877 and 1900. 
Extractive industries increased by a 7.3 percent compound 
annual rate while manufacturing increased by 2.8 percent, 
and the export of cattle, forestry and agricultural products 
increased by 6.1 percent. In this same period agricultural 
growth as a whole grew at only one-half of one percent per 
year.l The period 1900 to 1910 continued this trend em­
phasizing export growth with a lagging domestic agricultural 
sector.
The Porfirian period witnessed steady economic 
growth by exploiting the increased foreign demand for Mex­
ican resources. Foreign investment and skills poured into 
Mexico to develop the natural resources utilizing cheap 
Mexican labor.% A few people prospered, but the vast 
majority of the Mexican people were excluded from the bene­
fits of growth. There was a redistribution of income toward 
recipients of rent, interest and profit which allowed in­
creased savings. But these savings accrued to foreigners, 
not Mexicans.3 Foreign investment accounted for 80 percent 
of the total investment in the Porfirian period with the
^Ibid., p. 21.
2peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations; A Com­
parative Political Study (New York; The Macmillan Company 
Company, 1971), p. 93.
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 24.
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United States accounting for 38 percent, Great Britain 29 
percent, and France 27 percent.^
During the Porfirian period a greater amount of 
artisan labor was displaced than was absorbed in the new 
machine manufacturing sector. As a resv'.t, the share of 
labor in all manufacturing declined, and the share of labor 
in agriculture and services rose.2
Mexico's emphasis on exports made the country more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in foreign trade patterns. The 
monetized enclaves became especially open to the vicissi­
tudes of trade cycles. A decline in terms of trade follow­
ing 1905 forced real income down in the monetized sectors.
The impact of the deteriorating terms of trade on the eco­
nomy was still a dampening influence at the outbreak of the 
Revolution.̂
Role of Technological Transfer in Agriculture 
Very little foreign investment went into traditional 
agriculture during the Profirian period. Most of the foreign 
investment directed toward agriculture was concentrated in 
commodities for commercial export such as cattle, cotton.
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 16. 
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 25.
3lbid.
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coffee, sugar and rubber.^ The emerging industrial sector 
began to consume quantities of cotton and cottonseed, istle, 
henequen, guayule, rubber, sugar, tobacco and coffee.%
These products were processed in plants in which foreigners 
often played an important role. Porfirio Diaz also welcomed 
foreign investment in land. It is estimated that about 22 
percent of the total land area of Mexico was foreign owned 
by 1910.3
The regime of Porfirio Diaz contributed to the 
forces for concentrating land in large holdings. Diaz em­
barked on a policy of economic development through economic 
liberalism based on the philosophies of Auguste Comte's 
positivism.4 The Indians and their culture were perceived 
as obstacles to development. Thus the scientific planners, 
or cientificos, utilized the land reform laws of 1857 to 
acquire communal Indian land holdings. The law had pro­
vided for the land held by corporations or the Church to be 
sold to tenants. But the Diaz regime applied the laws to
^Ibid., p. 24, footnote.
^George Wythe, Industry in Latin America (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 271.
^Eduardo L. Venezian and William K. Gamble, The 
Agricultural Development of Mexico; Its Structure and 
Growth Since 1950 (New York; Praeger Publishers, Inc., 
1969), p. 13.
^James D. Cochrane, "Mexico's 'New Cientificos;' 
The Diaz Ordaz Cabinet," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 
XXI, No. 1 (Summer, 1967), 61-72.
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the communal holdings which resulted in a vast transfer of 
land from the Indians to land companies and the hacendados.^ 
This policy was aided by a philosophy of racism which viewed 
the Indian as a legal minor and inferior by nature.
The land policies of Diaz also led to a transference 
of government land to hacendados and land companies on a 
monumental scale. During the Diaz regime nearly 27 percent 
of Mexico's land area was transferred to private hands in 
this manner.3 The Diaz land program was so ruthlessly ef­
fective that 95 percent of the heads of families in rural 
Mexico held no land in 1910.*
Role of Technological Transfer in Industry
Foreign companies initially trained most of the 
skilled labor in Mexico. This was especially true of the 
branch factories, mining and smelting units, telephone com­
panies, railroads, and the utilities. The foreign owned 
railroads were the first to set up apprentice schools.
These schools continued to operate for a considerable time
^Robert A. White, "The Zapata Movement," pp. 113-14 
and Nathan Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1948), P. 86.
^Charles B. Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 116.
^Simpson, The Ejido, p. 28.
4prank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution 
(New York: Macmillan, 1929) , p. 79.
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after Diaz nationalized the railroads. The personnel 
trained in these schools took over the operation of the 
railroads after the Americans left in 1911-1914.^
The economic growth in the Porfirian period was the 
result of a combination of political stability and the in­
flux of foreign investment which that stability brought 
forth. Real economic gains were made, although this state­
ment must be qualified by the long-run structural effects 
and the distributional abuses in this period.
The Porfirian regime eliminated many of the previous 
barriers to successful exploitation and development of 
natural resources. Attempts by the English to improve 
mining techniques after Mexico's independence from Spain 
had failed. Costly machinery had to be transported to areas 
which had previously been mined with crude technology, hav­
ing the ore hauled out by Indians. These early ventures 
were unsuccessful due to high transportation costs for both 
incoming equipment and outgoing ore. One such example was 
the Real del Monte Company which started in 1821 and closed 
in 1849.2
Political stability and reduced transportation costs 
stemming from railway construction permitted the successful
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 284. 
2lbid., p. 270.
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utilization of modern mining equipment, and foreign capital 
began to flow into the Mexican mining industry. The Amer­
icans and French were particularly heavy investors. Special 
advantages were offered to large investors which spurred 
the construction of the first smelters in the early 1890s.^ 
As a result of foreign development of Mexican resources the 
export of copper, zinc, graphite, lead and antimony in­
creased greatly.
Foreign investments were also important in building 
the railroads, hydroelectric power and the banking system. 
Mexican investment was small in these areas due to the size 
of the investments needed and the complexity of the tech­
nology. However, Mexico did invest relatively heavily in 
manufacturing which was related to the growth of the inter- 
nal and external markets.*
The Americans, French, English and Spanish were the 
most important powers in the early transfer of technology 
to Mexico. A few representative examples are given to il­
lustrate the nature of Mexico's nascent industrialization. 
Special attention is paid to the United States' role since 
the Americans were to become so influential in the indus­
trialization of Mexico.
^Ibid., p. 271.
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 18
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The English were the dominant foreign investors for 
50 years after Mexico's independence from Spain (1821).
The English helped to build the railroads and mining indus­
try in this period. Under Diaz the English expanded into 
utilities and manufacturing. In this period the English 
invested in a soap company, vegetable oil mill, a jute mill, 
a linen factory and a cement plant. The English were early 
entrants into the petroleum industry but were not success­
ful until after the Americans had developed some large 
fields.1
The French became interested in Mexican investments 
after the Mexican independence. Many Frenchmen moved to 
Mexico and remained as permanent settlers. They typically 
began in retail trade and then moved into manufacturing.
More Frenchmen came with the rise of Maximilian, further 
increasing the French influence. Later, under the Diaz 
regime, the French and Swiss formed the Société Financière 
pour l'Industrie au Mexique, S.A. in 1900 and invested in 
the main cigarette factory, the largest brewery, the largest 
paper factory, and a large cotton mi11.^
The Spanish had an early entry into Mexican industry.
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 290.
^Sanford Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1950), p. 123.
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 289.
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especially textiles, which is the oldest manufacturing in­
dustry. The Spanish built upon the indigenous cotton which 
had been developed by the Aztecs. In the sixteenth century 
the Spanish brought sheep to Mexico and developed the first 
woolen mill in Texcoco. Silk was also introduced by the 
Spanish, but this interfered with their China trade and was 
soon eliminated.^
The Spanish also started the modern papermaking in­
dustry in the 1890s. They modernized an antiquated plant 
and began producing newsprint, mechanical pulp, and a variety 
of papers. German technology was successfully utilized and 
the plant was producing about half of the paperboard and 
paper manufactured in Mexico in the 1940s.^
The first modern power-driven textile machinery was 
imported from the United States in the 1830s. This machinery 
was on occasion shipped from the American east coast around 
Cape Horn to San Bias and transported 60 miles to Tepic by 
mules. Some of this machinery was still in use as late as
1929.3
After 1880 the Americans became the dominant foreign 
influence in the building of railroads, developing smelting
^Ibid., p. 298.
^Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 266.
3wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 299.
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and mining, and the sale of supporting equipment such as 
vehicles and machinery. The first advanced drilling tech­
niques were introduced by the American dominated Mexican 
Petroleum Company in 1890. American settlers successfully 
engaged in developing the manufacturing sector. Small en­
trepreneurs entered into shoe manufacturing and steel and 
grew in size with Mexico’s advance.^
United States' capital has played a central role in 
Mexican development as demonstrated in Table 4. From the 
Porfiriato to the 1970s United States' capital has been 
greater than any other source of foreign capital. This fact 
combined with the construction of a transportation network 
between the United States and Mexico beginning in the 
Porfiriato has greatly affected the direction of the Mexican 
development. The Mexican economy has been closely tied to 
the United States' economy. Thus,
Mexican exports to the United States rose from 42 
percent of total exports in 1877 to 76 percent in 
1910-11; during the same period, imports from the 
United States rose from 26 percent to 54 percent.
This pattern remained relatively unchanged as late 
as 1964 when U.S. trade accounted for 67 percent 
of Mexican exports and imports.2
The large investments in mining and railway support has also 
affected the regional development of Mexico. Areas receiv­
ing mining development and connection by rail to the Federal
llbid., p. 290.
2john Leimone, "Patterns of Long-Run Interregional 
Economic Growth and Development in Mexico" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971), p.33,
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TABLE 4
APPROXIMATE VALUE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR IN 1911 
(MILLIONS OF PESOS)
U.S.A. U.K. FRANCE OTHERS TOTAL
Public debt 59 83 328 28 498
Banks 34 18 100 14 166
Railroads 535 401 116 78 1,130
Public services 13 212 10 3 238
Mines and metallurgy 499 117 180 22 817
Real estate 81 91 16 6 194
Industry 21 11 72 27 131
Commerce 9 — 80 33 122
Petroleum 40 57 7 0 104
Total 1,292 989 909 210 3,401
Source: John Leimone, "Patterns of Long-Run Interre­
gional Economic Growth and Development in 
Mexico" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Van­
derbilt University, 1971), Table 1, p. 32.
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District developed faster and still maintain that develop­
ment vis-à-vis other regions.^
A brief analysis of the railroads, mining and steel, 
oil euid hydroelectric industries is an illustrative inter­
pretation of the Mexican experience. The development of the 
railroads in Mexico was crucial for creating industrial 
growth. The Porfirian regime inherited a woefully inade­
quate railway system. By 1300 there were only 700 miles of 
track, and much of this was of dubious value. Foreign 
concessionaires had used different gauges of track which 
hindered the development of a transportation network. Con­
struction was often of poor quality, resulting in frequent 
accidents and derailings. The virgin run on the Mexico- 
Cuautla road ended in disaster when a bridge folded, 
throwing 300 men into a ravine.3
In 1880 Diaz made agreements with three American 
Companies to begin construction of roads connecting Mexico 
with the rapidly expanding railway system in the Southwest 
of the United States.* The United States invested heavily
^Ibid., pp. 33-34
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 17.
^Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico; The Struggle for 
Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 214.
*Ibid. See Fred W. Powell's The Railroads of Mexico 
(Boston: The Stratford Co., 1921) for a detailed description
of the many railway lines built in the Porfirian period, 
especially pages 4-6.
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in railroads in order to tie the Mexican market to the U.S. 
market.^ In the process, however, Mexico's domestic mar­
kets were open to expansion. Railroads allowed local cot­
ton production to be utilized in the domestic textile in­
dustry. As a result cotton production nearly doubled in 
the Porfiriato and Mexico approached self-sufficiency in 
this area.^ By 1910 there were 12,000 miles of track; 
about three-fourths of this was standard gauge, connecting 
Mexican internal and external markets.
American construction of the Mexican railway system
left a heavy stamp on the structure of the rail network.
The Mexican government had hoped to connect the east and
west coasts in order to develop domestic markets. Instead
the Americans built the roads (against the wishes of the
Mexican government) to connect the Mexican interior with
U.S. markets. Thus,
a shipment of goods from Mazatlân destined for 
Durango 100 miles away would have been forced to 
make a 1,000 mile trip via Nogales, El Paso, and 
Torreôn; small wonder that few men interchanged 
goods between the two cities. By the same token, 
any goods produced in the northwest had to traverse 
roughly the same route to reach a market in Mexico 
City; the northwest, including the Sonora mining 
communities, was more intimately connected, by
^See David M. Fletcher, Rails, Mines, and Progress; 
Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 1867-1911 (Ithaca, New 
York; Cornell University Press, 1958) for a biography of 
early American entrepreneurs in the construction of the 
Mexican railways.
2Hansen^ Politics of Mexican Development, p. 14.
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transport and communications, to the United States 
than to Mexico City.1
The influence of the railroads on the Mexican economy was 
great in spite of these obvious limitations. Internal mar­
kets did expand though less than they would have under a 
more rational rail network. Railroad construction did form 
the base for the mining industry and was a prerequisite to 
the development of an iron and steel industry.
Mexico was the first country in Latin America to 
establish a steel industry. In 1900, American, French and 
Italian interests combined to form the major iron and steel 
works in Monterrey which began production in 1903. Senor 
Prieto, a Spanish immigrant, in conjunction with Mexican 
associates and foreigners was active in forming the new 
mill.^ Mexican production of pig iron and steel has 
steadily risen and continues to be second only to Brazil in 
this industry in Latin America.
The development of the railroads enabled the ex­
ploitation of Mexico's resources on an unprecedented scale. 
Coal mining started in 1884 and reached a peak by 1910 
which it has still not regained.* The Guggenheim family
^Cumberland, Struggle for Modernity, p. 217. 
2wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 302. 
^Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 266. 
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 270.
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began to build a vast chain of mines and smelters in the 
1890s. The first smelter was a silver-lead smelter located 
in Monterrey. Other smelters followed quickly throughout 
northern Mexico. The Guggenheim smelter trust employed 
mining engineers to find new sources of raw materials for 
exploitation in order to guarantee a supply of ore for their 
smelters.^ Other American mining interests included 
Robert S. Towne who built smelters and also constructed the 
Mexican Northern Railway to facilitate his mining operations. 
The Compania Minera de Penoles and the Montezuma Copper 
Company were American influenced ventures of great profit­
ability.%
Production of petroleum began in about 1901, and by 
1911 Mexico ranked third in the world in oil production.^ 
Wheetman D. Pearson and Edward Doheny (English and American, 
respectively) pioneered the petroleum industry in Mexico.* 
Doheny's company brought in modern drilling techniques and 
hit a gusher in 1910 which catapulted Mexico into the ranks
^Pletcher, Rails, Mines, and Progress, p. 299. 
Zibid., p. 299.
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 270.
4jack R. Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 
1938-1950 (Berkely: University of California Press, 1956),
p. 8.
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of the top producers of oil in the world.^
Hydroelectric power was first used in manufacturing 
and mining in 1893. At this time the English constructed 
a jute mill powered by a hydro plant capable of generating 
5/000 horsepower. In 1902 the Mexican Light and Power Com­
pany Limited was financed by Americans and Europeans who 
combined electric utility power plants serving Mexico City. 
The construction of the large Necaxa hydroelectric plant
which supplied the capital and two important mining centers/
2El Oro and Pachuca, began in 1903. This construction was 
soon followed by the construction of hydroelectric plants 
by the English/ Canadians/ Americans and French. In all/ 
five important foreign companies entered the electric power 
industry between 1902 and 1906. These companies con­
structed four crucial power systems between 1905 and 1911 
emd were to remain the heart of the hydroelectric power 
industry until after World War II.3
1910-1940 Revolution and Reform 
Mexico experienced more political instability with
Ipietcher/ Rails/ Mines/ and Progress/ p. 298.
^Wythe/ Industry in Latin America/ p. 280.
^Miguel S. Wionczek/ "Electric Power; The Uneasy 
Partnership," in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in 
Mexico/ ed. by Raymond Vernon (Cambridge/ Massachusetts: 
Harvard University PresS/ 1964)/ p. 22.
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the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz. Stability was not regained 
until the Party of Revolutionary Institutions was formed in 
1929. Economic growth suffered in the first years follow­
ing the revolution as illustrated in Table 5. The growth 
rate of agricultural production fell from 1.0 percent to 
0.1 percent —  just matching the low population growth rate 
of 0.1 percent. Manufacturing production growth declined 
from 3.6 percent to 1.7 percent while mining and petroleum 
production growth rates receded from 7.2 percent to 5.6 
percent. Gross domestic product dropped from 3.3 percent 
to 2.5 percent. However, due to the drop in the population 
growth rate the per capita product increased from 2.2 per­
cent to 2.4 percent in this period. An interpretation of 
these figures reveals that nearly a million people died of 
malnutrition, disease and war. The continuation of rela­
tively high growth rates in mining and petroleum was a re­
sult of the protection of these enclaves by private armies.^ 
Rapid recovery began after the low which was reached 
in 1915. Political stability was improved under the govern­
ment of General Obregon (1921-1924) and the following presi­
dent, Plutarco Galles (1924-1928). Net growth in gross 
domestic product was not attained until after 1920.  ̂ By
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, pp. 26-27 
2Ibid.
TABLE 5
GROWTH RATES OF 
(COMPOUND
THE MEXICAN ECONOMY, 1900 










product 3.3 2.5 1.6 6.7 6.1 6.1 4.5
Population 1.1 0.1 1.6 2.8 3.1 3.4 2.6
Per capita 
product 2.2 2.4 0.0 3.9 3.0 2.7 1.9
Agricultural
production • 1.0 0.1 2.7 5.8 4.3 4.3 4.2
Manufacturing
production 3.6 1.7 4.3 8.1 7.3 8.1 6.4
Mining and petro­
leum production 7.2 5.6 -1.9 2.5 5.3 4.2 1.7
00
<T*
Source: Clark W. Reynolds, The Mexican Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1970), Table 1.4, p. 22.
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the mid-1920s production was only slightly higher than the
last of the Diaz period.^ Economic recovery was hampered
by several factors,
including an influenza epidemic (1918-19), over­
throw of the Carranza government (1920), the world 
business depression and a domestic drought (1921), 
the De la Huerta Revolt (1923-24), conflicts be­
tween the church and state and between oil compa­
nies and the government (1926-28), and a threatened 
military revolt in the autumn of 1927.2
Foreign investment came to a rapid halt due to fear of ex­
propriation. The banking system collapsed by 1920 followed 
by a liquidity crisis and deflation which continued in the 
decade of the 1920s.^
In spite of these obstacles, the economy continued 
to recover until the world-wide depression began in 1929.  ̂
Then Mexico's export sector deteriorated rapidly causing 
gross domestic product to decline 12.5 percent below the 
1925 level. Gross domestic product did not reach previous 
levels until the 1940s.^ Political stability increased 
with the formation of the Party of Revolutionary Institu­
tions in 1929 which permitted structural changes in the
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 30, 
2Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 29.
^Ibid., p. 30.
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, p. 272. 
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 32.
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economy and led to gradual recovery. Exports of petroleum, 
mining and commercial agriculture began to rise slowly in 
the 1930s, but production in mining and petroleum in 1940 was 
still below levels attained in the 1920s. In the period 
between 1930 and 1940, the government expropriated the petro­
leum industry, nationalized the railroads, and expropriated 
land.l Table 5 indicates that agricultural production in­
creased by 2.7 percent from 1925 to 1940 while manufacturing 
increased by a respectable 4.3 percent for the same period. 
The two sectors serving the domestic market, manufacturing 
and agriculture, were able to continue growth through the 
1930s due to the previously mentioned structural changes.
Industrial production and agricultural output in­
creased in the 1930s, but per capita gains were nonexistent. 
The population growth rate exploded in the 1930s, an increase 
from 0.4 percent in the 1910-1930 period to 2.0 percent in 
the 1930-1940 period.%
The structural changes between 1910 and 1940 set the 
foundation for future economic growth. Land reform, domestic 
ownership of the petroleum industry, higher taxes in the min­
ing sector and the nationalization of the railroads were some
^Ibid.
^The cause of this increase is probably due to land 
reform which increased farm output and to advances in medical 
technology. See Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, pp. 19, 33.
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of the more fundamental changes. The shift of the popula­
tion from rural to urban and from agricultural jobs to non- 
agricultural jobs began in the 1930s and continues into the 
1970s.1
Role of Technological Transfer in Agriculture
Agricultural production declined as a result of the 
fighting (except for henequen, an export commodity) and did 
not reach 1908-1910 levels until about 1945.  ̂ Very little 
transfer of technology was occurring in this period as is 
reflected in the crop production statistics shown in Table 6.3 
It should be noted that a shift of crop production took place 
after the fall of Diaz. Crop production was directed toward 
domestic consumption rather than export. The actual rate 
of growth of crop production doubled between the Porfirian 
period and the 1910-1940 period. In human terms, after 
about 1920 the Mexican people began to have enough food to 
bring them up to a subsistence level.
llbid., p. 33.
^Venezian and Gamble, Agricultural Development of 
Mexico, p. 58.
3por a geographer's interpretation of the impor­
tance of location and the development of the infrastructure 
see Laurence A. Brown and Barry Lentnek, "Innovation Diffu­
sion in a Developing Economy: A Mesoscale View," Economic
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OF MEXICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 








Total real crop 
production 0.6 1.1 6.3
Total population 1.4 0.9 2.9
Per capita crop 
production —0.8 0.2 3.4
®The period in the first column is 1877-1907.
Source: Clark W. Reynolds, The Mexican Economy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) , Table 3.2,
p. 96.
During the 1910-1940 period the Mexican government 
did initiate land reform (1917), added to the number of 
hectares under irrigation and invested heavily in road 
construction. Road construction and irrigation projects 
as a percent of total government expenditures doubled from 
22.6 percent in the 1925-1929 period to 45.2 percent in the 
1935-1939 period. The development of the rural infrastruc­
ture in the period of Revolution and Reform established the 
base for the rapid growth after 1940.
91
Role of Technological Transfer in Industry 
Some of the large foreign-controlled firms sent 
some of the best of Mexican workers to the United States 
for technical training. The graduates of Mexico's own 
technical schools were given the opportunity to work in 
American owned plants in Mexico and the United States for 
practical experience. United States companies such as 
Bethlehem Steel, Midvale Steel and Baldwin Locomotive Works 
participated in these types of programs. In 1931 a labor 
law was passed which aided the training of Mexican workers. 
This law forced employers to contribute to a fund which 
could be used to pay for training in either a domestic or 
foreign institute.^
The rapidly growing control over the Mexican eco­
nomy contributed to the overthrow of the Diaz regime. Any 
country resents huge amounts of control by foreigners, and 
the Mexicans were no exception. The following quote illus­
trates the cause of the Mexican uneasiness over foreign in­
fluence.
Foreigners controlled most of the mines and the 
petroleum industry, the principal electric power 
plants, a large part of the railway mileage, sev­
eral of the principal banks, numerous manufactur­
ing and commercial establishments, and about one 
fifth of the privately owned lands in the republic.^
^Wythe, Industry in Latin America, pp. 284-85.
^Ibid., p. 45.
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The result was a nationalistic reaction to regain control 
over the Mexican economy. It was not until the 1920s that 
foreigners began to invest in Mexico again.
Isolated enclaves protected by private armies and the 
wealth to support various rebel groups were able to maintain 
production. A brief description of the mining and oil in­
dustries is therefore necessary to an analysis of this 
period. Following the discussion of these two industries 
is a description of the development of the hydroelectric 
utilities which were so fundamental to Mexico's industrial­
ization. The last segment in this section deals with the 
establishment of foreign branch plants in Mexico in the 
1920s.
The Revolution had a disruptive effect on the min­
ing industry, forcing some mines to close and greatly cur­
tailing production in others. Production fell drastically 
in nearly all sectors of the economy between 1910 and 1914. 
Production recovered somewhat with the ebbing of fighting 
and the stimulus of new demand caused by World War I. Pro­
duction increased jerkily until 1938, but the central im­
portance of gold, silver and copper mining to the Mexican 
economy was a fading phenomenon.^
Almost all mining investment was foreign owned.
^Cumberland, Struggle for Modernity, p. 251.
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Large returns were made on these investments, and the gov­
ernment reaped large revenues with the increase in taxes 
after 1917. But the average Mexican benefited little from 
the mining enclaves. The mining industry, like the petro­
leum industry and the railroads, was built by foreigners for 
exploitation —  not for the development of Mexico.
World demand for oil greatly increased due to World 
War I and the growing use of oil-burning ships. Another 
tremendous oil strike by the Mexican Petroleum Company 
(American owned) brought forth more than 250,000 barrels per
day —  the largest in the world at that time. Mexico ranked
1second in the world in oil production by 1920.
In 1917 the new post-revolutionary constitution pro­
vided for the nationalization of petroleum resources. In­
creased regulation and direct government intervention by 
military force to stop unauthorized drilling was warning
enough to the foreign companies. By 1920 the oil companies
2had begun to cut back on their investments. They rushed 
to extract as much oil as possible before their property 
was expropriated and exhausted many of the wells. New in­
vestments were channeled into the safer areas of Venezuela
Wendell C. Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign- 
Owned Property in Mexico (Washington, D.C.; American 
Council on Public Affairs, 1941), p. 50.
^Ibid., p. 51.
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and Columbia. ̂  More stringent tax laws drastically cur­
tailed extraction of Mexican oil after 1921.
The dissatisfaction of the two largest oil compa­
nies, Dutch Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey, with the 
expropriation of their property in 1938 resulted in a boy­
cott of Mexican oil. Consequently Mexico turned to Japan, 
Italy and Germany for new markets. This in turn caused the 
oil companies to accuse Mexico of undercutting democracy.^ 
In any case, there was very little technological inflow to 
the petroleum industry in this period.
Mexico's national oil corporation (PEMEX) invested 
only slightly in the oil industry in the period between 
1938 and 1944 due to shortages of foreign supplies and in­
adequate financial reserves. Thus the growing domestic 
demand for oil resulting from the expansion of roads, hydro­
electric power and manufacturing in the late 1930s was not 
satisfied. Supplying internal petroleum needs was compli­
cated by the layout of the existing pipelines which were 
designed by foreigners to get the oil out of the country 
instead of to domestic markets. The lack of domestic re-
llbid., p. 53.
^Ibid., p. 91. Gordon notes that ". . .if that 
was true,’ these same companies were betraying democracy as 
well, for they were selling to Germany 68% of her total oil 
purchases."
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fineries compounded the problems facing PEMEX,^ It was not 
until 1945 that Mexico began to truly expand its petroleum 
industry as is shown in the next section (1940-1965).
The growth of the electric power industry which had 
begun at the turn of the century continued, in spite of the 
Revolution, until 1914. Perhaps, as was the case of the oil 
industry, the foreigners perceived the Revolution as a tem­
porary aberration which would not fundamentally affect their 
long-run investments. But the Revolution damaged the profits 
of the electric utilities in several ways. Mining, which 
was a principal user of electricity, had been hit very hard 
by various rebel bands. Municipal governments went bankrupt 
and did not pay their accounts. Other users paid their bills 
in local paper currency of no value.^
The major electric power companies resumed their 
heavy investment in construction in 1921 after General 
Obregon took command. Unlike the oil companies, the elecr 
trie utilities saw a greater future in Mexico without the 
fear of expropriation. Hydroelectric power was so vital to 
the Mexican economy cind so expensive that the utilities
^International Bemk for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment, Combined Mexican Working Party, The Economic Develop­
ment of Mexico (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1953), p. 46
^Wionczek, "Electric Power: The Uneasy Partner­
ship," p. 34.
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seemed assured a secure place in the growth of the economy. 
As a result the electric power industry led the economy in 
the 1920s in growth.1
Between 1928 and 1929 the American and Foreign Power 
Company obtained three of the five largest electric utili­
ties and continued expansion in some of its investments 
until 1935, marking the end of self-controlled private in­
vestment in Mexican electric utilities. The electric power 
industry did not resume expansion until after World War II.% 
Before World War I American and European pharmaceu­
tical companies had licensed their products to Mexican lab­
oratories and had sent manufacturing representatives to en­
sure quality control. Not until around 1925 did these com­
panies begin to establish branch plants in Mexico. Other 
manufacturers and assembly plants followed, including Ford 
(1926), Simmons (bedding supplies, 1927), packing houses 
near the American border (1929-1930), International General 
Electric Company (electric light bulbs, 1930), corn pro­
ducts, compound lard, celluloid products (1931), dry cell 
batteries (1932), Quaker Oats (1934), General Motors assem­
bly of trucks (1936), General Motors assembly of automobiles 
(1937) and Chrysler products (1939).^
1 9Ibid., pp. 36-37. Ibid., pp. 46-48.
^Wythe, Industry in Latin Anerica, p. 291, and 
Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 296.
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Americans entered the tire industry in 1933 when
two United States companies (General Tire and Goodrich)
made agreements with two Mexican firms to supply financial
and technical assistance. Goodyear followed a decade later
with similar arrangements.^
Most branch factories were American, but the English
did establish the biggest thread plant, and a British-
American tobacco firm accounted for over one-half of Mexican
2cigarette consumption.
In spite of the foreign influence in manufacturing, 
the Mexicans maintained control over the important sectors 
such as iron and steel, breweries, glass, cement, textiles, 
soap and furniture. There were some minority American in­
vestments in these areas and a few foreign technicians 
(Danish, American and German) were used under the control 
of Mexicans.^




MEXICO —  DEVELOPMENT AFTER 1940
1940-1965 —  Steady Growth 
Economic development faltered during the three 
decades of revolution, reform, and depression following the 
first surge forward in the Porfirian period. World War II 
had a buoyant effect on the Mexican economy through the ex­
panded demand for exports of raw materials.^ Textile ex­
ports increased rapidly in 1942 when Mexico began to move 
into the markets in Central America and- the West Indies. 
Exports again expanded rapidly during the Korean War (more 
than 20 percent per year for the years 1949, 1950 and 1951)
and had a stimulating effect on other sectors of the economy
2including the steel and cement industries. Gross domes­
tic product increased at an annual rate of 6.7 percent 
through the 1940s, and continued to grow at a rate above 
six percent through the 1950s and the 1960s.^ The funda­
mental structural changes in the Mexican economy during the 
revolution and reform period (1910-1940) assured that the
^Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, p. 125.
2piavia Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur (Paris; 




new economic growth was more soundly based than its typical 
export-oriented economy of the past. Thus the external 
demand spread to the internal sector with a multiplier ef­
fect which stimulated domestic production.^
Foreign investment began to flow back into Mexico 
due to the policies of President Avila Camacho (1941-1946) 
who promoted settlements with the former owners of Mexico's 
petroleum companies and for the payment on defaulted bonds. 
However, President Avila Camacho did pass a 51 percent law 
which essentially guaranteed Mexican control over most eco­
nomic sectors.2 The foreign exchange accumulated in World 
War II was used to purchase capital goods imports and was 
therefore an important factor in facilitating technological 
transfer. The capital goods inflow was aided by the under­
valued exchange rate throughout most of the 1940s, the re­
laxation of import controls on capital goods, and easy credit 
terms in the United States. As a result of the influx of new 
technology, output and productivity increased rapidly. The 
main constraint was the pace at which capital goods could be 
imported, installed and made operative. However, the empha­
sis on the importation of capital goods has resulted in a 
bias toward capital-intensive techniques which is perhaps
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 37.
%This "guarantee" was not vigorously enforced and 
foreign control continued in several key areas.
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less than optimal given Mexico's underemployed human re­
sources .
The years following World War II to the present have 
been marked by the building of overhead capital in Mexico.
Road construction, railroads, irrigation, rural electrifica­
tion, electric power plants, and communications have aided 
the Mexican development and have provided the basic economic 
structure for sound economic development.^
Mcuiufacturing has consistently been the forerunner 
in the Mexican economy in the three decades following 1940. 
Manufacturing increased at a rate of 8.1 percent in the 1940s,
7.3 percent in the 1950s, and 8.1 percent through the mid- 
1960s. Agricultural production also increased at respec­
table rates in these decades: 5.8 percent in the 1940s, 4.3
percent in the 1950s, and 4.3 percent up to the mid-1960s.
The extractive industries grew slowly in the 1940s (2.5 per­
cent) and then accelerated in the 1950s and mid-1960s (5.3 
percent and 4.2 percent, respectively).
The general economic scenario was one of initial im­
port substitution followed by an expanding domestic market 
which resulted in economic gains for a greater number of peo-
Ipeynolds, The Mexican Economy, pp. 39, 41 
2See Table 6.
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ple.^ However, the absolute increase in economic growth 
did not result in accelerating returns on a per capita basis. 
Productivity on a per capita basis continued to grow, but at 
a decreasing rate. Thus per capita product increased by 3.9 
percent in the 1940s, 3.0 percent in the 1950s and 2.7 per­
cent up to the mid-1960s.2 The population growth rate was 
responsible for the decline in per capita gains. The pop­
ulation growth rate was 2.8 percent in the 1940s, 3.1 percent 
in the 1950s, and 3.4 percent up to the mid-1960s. Mexico, 
as with many of the less developed countries, has had its 
economic growth greatly tempered by very high population 
growth rates and a highly skewed distribution of wealth and 
income. Further, as rapid as the growth of the modern sector 
has been, it has not grown fast enough to prevent sizable un­
employment and underemployment in the urban areas.3
A significant flow of technology occurs between the 
United States and Mexico through their respective universi­
ties. There were 2,053 students receiving government grants 
between 1952 and 1964, of which 1,742 were Mexican. Nearly
1Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 39 
3See Table 6.
3john Isbister, "Urban Employment and Wages in a 
Developing Economy: The Case of Mexico," Economic Develop­
ment and Cultural Change, XX, No. 1 (October, 1971), 43.
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half of the grantees entered the natural sciences.^ An 
additional 6,229 Mexican students came to the United States' 
universities between 1952 and 1962-1963. Many of these 
students were supported by foundations or private agencies, 
and nearly half of these students majored in the physical 
sciences.%
Role of Technological Transfer in Agriculture
Mexico's most notable accomplishments in agriculture 
have been achieved since the 1940s. The institutional re­
sistance of the hacienda system and the turmoil following 
the revolution delayed the development of Mexican agricul­
ture.
The overthrow of Diaz was largely a result of his 
land policy and his ready acceptance of foreign economic 
investments. As a result, the Revolution led to a program 
of general land reform. The cry of "Land for the landless" 
unified the peasants who believed land reform would cure 
their problems. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution allowed 
villages to again acquire communal land, the ejido. It also 
permitted the distribution of small private plots, an idea
^Cole and Sanders, Growth and Change in Mexican 
Agriculture, pp. 392, 394.
Zibid., p. 403.
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that had been popular with Mexican liberals for 100 years.^
Although land reform was initiated in the 1917 Con­
stitution, it was another seventeen years before the gov­
ernment took any vigorous action in this direction.% So 
it was not until 1934 that any real effort was directed to 
redistribution of land. The following discussion briefly 
outlines the three basic kinds of land holdings in Mexico 
and their economic significance.
These three types of landholding in Mexico are:
1) Ejido —  Indian communal holdings.
2) Large government or private holdings —  over 5 
hectares.
3) Minifundia —  small private holdings of 5 
hectares and under.
The ejido land is held in common and may be worked in common 
or divided among individuals and worked privately. Almost 
all ejidal land is worked individually today. These lands 
cannot be sold, mortgaged, or rented; however, the individ­
ual plots can be transferred from father to son. In 1960 
the ejido accounted for about 26 percent of total land area 
and 43 percent of cultivated land.^
^Cole and Sanders, Growth and Change in Mexican 
Agriculture, p. 21.
^It probably took so long to act on land reform 
because of the general political turmoil that followed and 
conservative resistance to such a program. See Cole and 
Sanders, Growth and Change in Mexican Agriculture, p. 20.
^Ibid., p. 24.
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The ejido sector has probably not grown at a pace 
equal to the private commercial farms in terms of produc­
tivity. While ejidal production increased only 210 percent 
during the 1940-1960 period compared to 364 percent for the 
large commercial farms the ejido did not receive as large a 
quantity of inputs as the private commercial farms. Large 
private farms increased the amount of land under cultivation 
as well as the value of machinery at a much greater rate than 
did the ejido. But still in 1960 the ejidal,
crop production totaled 43 percent of Mexican 
aggregate production that year. They produced 
36 percent of total agricultural output, and 
supplied 34 percent of all farm products mar­
keted. Finally, over 25 percent of total ejidal 
crop production was exported.!
While 85 percent of ejido plots are of a subsistence nature,
the above statement reflects that they are as commercially
oriented as the large private land holdings. (Fifty percent
of the large private farms and nearly all of the private
farms under 5 hectares are subsistence oriented.
The large commercial farms appeared between 1935 
and 1950 and were made profitable by the massive government 
program of building irrigation systems and roads. About 
three-quarters of the land opened up by irrigation was 
located in northern and northwestern Mexico. Of this, over
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, p. 61.
2lbid., p. 62.
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half is privately owned. Yields are three to four times 
larger than before irrigation began. Much of the land is 
farmed for export êuid often it is highly mechanized. Out­
put on these private farms has increased 364 percent from 
1940 to 1960.1
Production has increased only 142 percent on the 
minifundia for the 1940-1960 period, but these plots were 
always farmed without the benefits of credit, farm machin­
ery, or irrigation. Even so these plots produced higher 
yields on a per-hectare basis for several crops than either 
the large commercial farms or the ejidos (corn, cotton and 
beans). Evidently, the desire to hold on to their own plots 
of land has been a great incentive to the small landowners.
There is very little good land left to be distrib­
uted to individuals in today's Mexico. The land pattern 
consists basically of small labor-intensively farmed plots 
and large areas of land (ejido or private) which can or are 
being farmed with capital-intensive methods. The large 
private commercial farming in the north and north Pacific 
have received disproportionately large public investments 
in irrigation and roads. For example,
from 1940 to 1960 the North Pacific and North 
received almost 80 percent of federally irrigated 
land, over 50 percent of newly paved highways, and
^Ibid., p. 60.
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accounted for 67 percent of net private investment 
in agriculture.1
In the other regions of Mexico the public investment in 
roads and irrigation has generally served the large private 
farms rather than the ejido or the small private landowners. 
Construction of new railway trunk lines, roads and irriga­
tion projects tends to generate large private investments 
which take advantage of the improved infrastructure. The 
peasant, whether on small private lands or ejido, has little 
access to credit, extension services, or the general educa­
tion or cultural background to enable him to switch from 
subsistence agriculture to commercial farming.
The long-run trend has been toward the gradual elim­
ination of the subsistence sector. However, there are per­
haps some six million peasants still living by subsistence 
agriculture. This is roughly the same number that was en­
gaged in subsistence agriculture in 1910 and represents 
over 10 percent of the Mexican population.% Further, the 
commercial agricultural sector and the nonagricultural sec­
tor have not grown at a pace rapid enough to absorb dis­
placed labor. Thus slums continue to grow around the urban 
centers, and unemployment and underemployment remain high. 
Mexico's dualistic structure, unlike that of Japan, is be-
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 159. 
^Ibid., p. 160.
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coming more dualistic as the gap between the modem sector 
and traditional sector widens.
The examination of technological transfer to both 
the agricultural sector and the industrial sector must be 
perceived within this framework. Technology is not easily 
transferred to people who are deprived of the cultural- 
institutional setting conducive to its acceptance. The 
literature on Mexico's economic development is filled with 
the word "dilemma." Dilemmas of public vs. private, dualism 
vs. integration, revolutionary psychology vs. growing in­
equality, etc.^ The growth of technological enclaves in 
Mexico will continue. The question remains, will the Mexi­
cans educate their people as did the Japanese, permitting 
a gradual integration of the modern and traditional sectors 
while facilitating the flow and diffusion of new technolo­
gies, or will present economic forces and cultural behavior 
patterns obstruct this development?
Within the context of the land system just described 
the Mexican government greatly increased the inputs to agri­
culture in the 1940s. Increased agricultural output was 
needed to support Mexico's import substitution program which
^he difference between revolutionary psychology 
and practice is striking. One need only stroll down the 
boulevards in Mexico City, named after the Revolution, to 
see a modern Hilton Inn rising toward the sky with beggars 
on ragged blankets at its base.
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began in World War II. Agricultural products were needed 
for the manufacturing sector and its work force and as a 
source of foreign exchange to obtain capital goods for in­
dustrialization. ̂
Irrigation facilities had increased between the
Revolution (1910) and 1930 by nearly 700,000 hectares. It
is estimated that about one million hectares were being
irrigated in 1910 although much of this was of a temporary
nature. An additional 222,330 hectares were irrigated
during the 1930-1940 period. The real effort to improve
agricultural production started in the 1940s. Over 700,000
2additional hectares came under cultivation in this period.
Inputs of fertilizer also increased after the 1940s. 
The magnitude of these increases is truly amazing. Nitro­
gen consumption between 1948-1952 and 1966 increased by 
2,410.5 percent, phosphate 1,064.1 percent, and potassium 
545.4 percent.3 Table 7 reveals that fertilizer consumption 
per hectare is still well below an optimum level when com­
pared to countries such as the United States. This is
llbid., p. 52.
^Ibid., p. 51. Some transfer of technology came 
from the United States via Mexican students and engineers 
visiting United States projects such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. See Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Resources Survey for Latin American Countries (Washington,
D. C.: Department of State, 1965), p. 399.
^Venezian and Gamble, Agricultural Development 
of Mexico, p. 103.
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probably due to the large area of Mexico that remains with­
out irrigation, inadequate supplies of other inputs such as 
better seeds, the low income of most of the farmers and 
their lack of access to credit, the institutional resis­
tance of the poorer, uneducated farmers, and the lack of a 
sufficient extension service to promote agricultural infor­
mation . ̂
TABLE 7
FERTILIZER USE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Fertilizer Consumption (in Tons 
of Nutrient Elements) per 1,000 





Source: Eduardo L. Venezian and William K. Gamble, The
Agricultural Development of Mexico: Its Struc­
ture and Growth Since 1950 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 102.
The development of stabilized tortilla flour is a 
good example of Mexican innovation combined with foreign 
technical and organizational assistance. In the late 1940s
^Ibid., p. 104. Wendell Gordon has cited the Mexi­
can case as an example of providing excellent research with­
out proper follow up to ensure the transfer of technology 
to the farmer. See Wendell Gordon, "Capitalism and Techno­
logical Adaptation in Latin America," Journal of Economic 
Issues, III, No. 1 (March, 1969), 83.
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the Bank of Mexico sponsored a project through the Insti­
tute Mexicano de Investigaciones Technolôgicas to stabilize 
tortilla flour. Tortillas, the staple food of Mexico, are 
made from masa, a paste which is created by precooking maize 
in a solution of lime. The result is nixtamal which has to 
be ground to make masa, and consumed quickly to prevent 
decomposition. The Mexican institute combined efforts with 
the Armour Research Foundation and successfully began pro­
duction of a stabilized flour in 1954. The Quaker Oats 
Company constructed plants in the United States for Mexican 
consumption after obtaining patent rights. The stabilized 
flour can be stored easily and later mixed with water to 
form masa at the consumer's convenience.^
Another example of Mexican innovation is the devel­
opment of a process to make paper from bagasse. Bagasse is 
the term applied to sugarcane stalks after the milling pro­
cess. The first successful production of paper made from 
bagasse began in 1964 after a decade of research by the 
Compania Industrial de San Cristobal, S.A. Doctor Dante 
Sandro Cusi acquired patents on previous research and added 
his own innovations to create a successful process. The 
Scott Paper Company entered into the production of bagasse 
paper utilizing Doctor Cusi's method under a fifty-fifty 
ownership arrangement.
^Strassmann, Technological Change and Economic
Development, pp. 242-43.
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Mexico's most dramatic agricultural advance has been 
in the development of new strains of seeds. The Rockefeller 
Foundation euid the Mexican government initiated a research 
program in 1943 to study Mexico's crop structure with the 
objective of increasing yields by the application of modern 
science to Mexican agriculture. The program has resulted 
in unprecedented success in developing new varieties of 
corn, wheat, potatoes and other crops.^ This research is 
transformed into production by the Productora Nacional de 
Semillas, a government monopoly. The Productora Nacional 
de Semillas' production for the improved seed varieties is 
illustrated in Table 8.^ Unfortunately the use of hybrid 
corn has not been very widespread in Mexico. Most of the 
corn is grown in the traditional agricultural areas of Mex­
ico where the educational level is very low. Government 
support in terms of irrigation, roads, extension services 
and credit availability has been lacking in these regions. 
The use of the new corn seed varieties requires a combina­
tion of inputs and new techniques which necessitate govern­
ment assistance.^
^Venezian and Gamble, Agricultural Development of 
Mexico, p. 154.
^Most of the production of the improved production 
crop seed varieties is done by private firms (cotton and 
sugar cane). See Venezian and Gamble, Agricultural Develop­




PRODUCTION OF IMPROVED SEEDS FOR SELECTED CROPS
(METRIC TONS)
Crop 1949-50 1955-56 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1965-66
Corn® 2,250 5,200 6,840 b 7,360 3,920
Wheat —— " 20 409 6,508 27,886
Beans —— “ 93 90 — 1,480
Sorghum —— —— 166 79 153 5,445
Rice —— —— —— —— —— 4,275
Potatoes^ —— — —— — —— 13,052
Oilseeds —— —— — — — — —— 2,590
&For corn and potatoes, figures shown are average pro­
duction for the two years indicated; for other crops, the 
periods correspond to the cropping year.
^ o t  applicable, given explanation in note a.
Source: Eduardo L. Venezian and William K. Gamble, The Agri­
cultural Development of Mexico : Its Structure and
Growth Since 1950 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
Inc., 1969), Table 24, p. 106.
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The Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican Ministry 
of Agriculture cooperative program in agricultural research 
has proved to be a model example of international scientific 
cooperation. The program operated through the Office of 
Special Studies and now within the International Food Crop 
Improvement Plan. This program has served as the model for 
the other agricultural research institutes in Mexico and 
deserves special examination.^
Before an agreement was made between the government 
and the foundation, the foundation sent three highly quali­
fied American agricultural scientists to survey the poten­
tial for research. After extensive travel and investigation, 
these men recommended that the project should be initiated. 
The project was well funded, well staffed with the highest 
caliber of scientists, and well organized. The area of con­
centration was narrowly directed toward the most important 
crops: beans, wheat and corn. Field work, under the di­
rection of one of the scientists, brought pathologists, en-
2tomologists, and geneticists together to pool their talents.
^The Mexican experiment was so successful that it 
has served as a model throughout the world. New rice vari­
eties have been developed by the International Rice Research 
Institute in the Philippines which is patterned after the 
Mexican model. Norman Borlaug, one of the first American 
scientists working in the pioneering Mexican experiment 
received the Nobel Prize for his efforts. See Lester R.
Brown and Gail W. Ginsterbusch, Man and His Environment:
Food (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 130.
^Delbert T. Myren, "The Rockefeller Foundation Program 
in Corn and Wheat in Mexico," in Subsistence Agriculture and
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Mexican trainees were deeply involved in the project and 
received on-the-job training which later enabled the Mexi­
cans to build a cadre of the highest quality of agricultural 
scientists in all of Latin America.^ New varieties of seeds 
were maintained in "banks" and became a reservoir which has 
attracted international attention and cooperation, including 
cooperation with the Bureau of Plant Industry of the United 
States Department of Agriculture,^
The Rockefeller Foundation projects produced about 
700 Mexican graduates with on-the-job training between 1943 
and 1963.3 Between 1945 and 1964, scholarships were 
awarded to 150 agronomists on the Masters Degree level and 
70 scholarships on the Ph.D. level.^
It is difficult to assess the separate impact of 
the new variety of seed on Mexican agriculture. Improved 
fertilizers and pesticides, mechanization, land reform, the 
creation of rural social overhead capital, political sta-
Economic Development, ed. by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p. 440.
3-Arthur T. Mosher, Technical Co-operation in Latin- 
Aroerican Agriculture (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 
1957) , p. 110.
2lbid., p. 111.
^Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Resources 
Survey, p. 410.
^Venezian and Gamble, Agricultural Development of 
Mexico p. 154.
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bility and a growing demand for Mexico's agricultural
products enter into the dramatic increase in production.
But it is a fact that when the Rockefeller Foundation began
its studies in Mexico,
it was a hungry country, importing much of its food 
from the United States. By 1964, only a quarter of 
a century later, wheat production had tripled, corn 
production had doubled, and the average Mexican was 
consuming more food. Both wheat and corn were being 
exported, and the economy was prospering.^
Although the Rockefeller Foundation has had the most spec­
tacular success, at least two other research institutes are 
worth mentioning.^
The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations support the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center which is 
engaged in research on an international scale. Mexican and 
Rockefeller Foundation scientists have been working for the 
Center for over twenty years in an attempt to study genetic 
and production problems related to maize and wheat on a 
comprehensive scale.^
The National Livestock Research Institute through 
its National Center for Livestock Research is engaged in 
studying nutrition, new vaccines, disease control, biolog-
^Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change; The Green 
Revolution and Development in the 1970s (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 3.
^For greater detail, see Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Resources Survey, p. 410.
^Venezian and Gamble, Agricultural Development of 
Mexico, p. 164.
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ical products and pastures and forages in cooperation with 
the Rockefeller Foundation. In the mid-1960s, the Research 
Institute employed 60 professional and technical people in 
four experimental stations. Eight of these professionals 
were studying outside of Mexico.^ The United States gov­
ernment has assisted the Mexican agricultural development 
through several agencies. Some of the more important of 
these are discussed briefly.
The Agency for International Development has 
financed a number of cooperative educational contracts be­
tween Mexico and the United States. The only such exchange 
program in agricultural research listed by the State De­
partment was between the Texas Agricultural and Mechanical
2University and Escuelo Superior de Agriculture.
The Department of Agriculture entered a cooperative 
program with the Mexican government in 1947 to eliminate 
foot-and-mouth disease. By 1961 this goal had been report­
edly accomplished. Other research has been directed toward 
entomology and crop breeding. The Department of Agriculture 
has provided for nearly 300 Mexicans to do agricultural 
research in the United States between 1953 and 1965. The
^Ibid., pp. 155-58.
2Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Resources Survey, p. 396.
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Department also publishes papers related to Mexican agri­
cultural problems.^
The Department of Commerce conducted an exhibition 
in Mexico City in 1963 in which some 100 United States 
firms displayed products, including farm machinery.^
The small number of personnel engaged in extension 
services to the agricultural sector, as documented in 
Table 9, has greatly decreased their effectiveness. The 
limitations of the extension service becomes apparent when 
related to the United States, which has one extension agent 
to every 540 farm families and to Japan, which has a ratio 
of 1 to 650, compared to the Mexican ratio of 1 to 10,000.^ 
The Extension Department of the Secretariat of Agriculture 
operates the Federal Agricultural Extension Service, but 
the staff numbers only slightly over 400.* The government 
is attempting to decentralize the Extension Service to pro­
vide more flexibility at local levels. The Ford Foundation 
is helping the government to make the Extension Service 
programs more responsive to local needs.
Elementary and practical education facilities are
llbid.
2lbid., p. 397.





EDUCATION LEVEL: ACTIVE POPULATION IN AGRICULTURE
BY MAJOR SKILLS, 1950 AND 1960
1950 1960








technicians 1,197 0.2 8,072 1.3
Managers, salesmen 
and other 
employees 26,868 5.6 83,215 13.5
Labor^ 4,810,067 94.2 6,053,643 85.2
Total active 
agricultural 
population 4,838,132 100.0 6,144,930 100.0
^Labor is more than 50 percent illiterate.
Source: Eduardo L. Venezian and William K. Gamble, The
Agricultural Development of Mexico; Its Structure 
and Growth Since 1950 (New York: Praeger Publish­
ers, Inc., 1969), Table 29, p. 116.
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very inadequate. Only 10 percent of all students in the 
rural areas complete the sixth grade. In fact, there are 
many regions that simply have no educational facilities 
beyond the sixth grade. To make matters worse, the drop­
out rate beyond the third grade is quite high in rural 
areas. The total number of students engaged in agricultu­
ral institutions on the elementary and practical level only 
numbered about 1,000 students in the mid-1960s.^
Mexico has received some limited help from private 
United States organizations such as the Cooperative for 
American Relief Everywhere (CARE). CARE works with the 
agricultural program sponsored by the Mexican Ministry of 
Education and provides agricultural handtools and instruc­
tions in animal husbandry, dietary requirements and other 
related information.%
The National School of Agriculture, Chapinzo, is 
the most important agricultural school of higher learning. 
The National School cooperates with regional agricultural 
schools and offers their personnel and research facilities 
on a temporary basis. There is an effort to connect the 
activities of research, extension and education through 
Plan Ohapingo which was started in 1963. The National
llbid., pp. 143-45.
^Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Resources Survey, p. 408.
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School was enlarged to handle the headquarters of several 
government agricultural organizations in 1967 in conjunction 
with this plan. The government has received the assistance 
of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the United 
Nations Special Fund. The purpose of the project is to es­
tablish a pool of sophisticated Mexican agriculturalists 
who can provide direction and leadership in the areas of 
agricultural education, research and extension services.  ̂
There are only eleven schools offering university 
degrees in agriculture and seven of these have been estab­
lished since 1950. Only two universities offer postgraduate 
education in the agricultural sciences.^
Although Mexico has done well by Latin American 
standards in agricultural development, its success is 
clouded with grave problems. The development of the rural 
infrastructure has been directed toward large private com­
mercial farms. Most of the new technologies have also gone 
into these areas (fertilizers, pesticides, tractors, air­
planes, new seeds, etc.). The majority of Mexican farmers 
have benefited little from the new technologies. Govern­
ment aid in the form of extension services, general educa­
tion cuid health improvement has been insufficient. There




are two rural Mexicos: one is utilizing modern technology
on large farms; the other is engaged in antiquated modes 
of production. It is very likely that greater returns in 
productivity could be made by developing the second Mexico.
Role of Technological Transfer in Industry
Mexico's economic and social base have changed 
greatly since 1940. The shift has been from rural to 
urban, from traditional to modern, from an export base 
economy to a more diversified economy. This section exam­
ines technological transfer within this context. It is 
necessary to deal in some detail with the features of 
various Mexican economic sectors in order to comprehend the 
process of technological transfer and diffusion in these 
sectors. First, two of the traditional sectors, textiles 
and mining, are briefly described. Then some of the more 
modern basic sectors (border plants, automobiles, steel, 
electric utilities and petroleum) are delineated. Finally, 
the problem of technological dependence is discussed. The 
focus is upon United States domination of sophisticated 
technologies and the general shift from economic dependence 
to technological dependence.
World War II spurred Mexican textile production 
which has traditionally been a leading industrial sector. 
The most important textile output, cotton, increased by
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nearly 64 percent between 1939 and 1945.^ Plants operated 
two and three shifts a day where they had previously worked 
only one shift. Machinery was antiquated and maintenance 
was neglected in these war years. Inefficient production 
was in part due to the negligence of management in previous 
years to acquire modern machinery, preferring instead to 
hide inefficiency behind high tariff barriers. Union re­
strictions were another cause of restricting the importation 
of modern technology. The trade unions resisted labor-saving 
machinery —  requiring four operators per loom compared to 
the ratio of thirty to one in the United States at that 
time.̂
The demand for cotton textiles in World War II 
broke down some of the previous barriers to the acquisition 
of modern technology. Some new machines were acquired, but 
there were not many available due to war shortages in the 
producing countries.  ̂ New machines were imported follow­
ing the war and some new plants were built. But by and 
large the textile industry remained in a technologically 
retarded state. Mexico could not compete against the in­
dustrial powers in the textile export market, especially
^Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, p. 124. 
2lbid., p. 216.
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel­
opment, The Economic Development of Mexico, p. 67.
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with inferior equipment. Thus little new equipment was or­
dered, ensuring a low competitive status in future interna­
tional textile markets.
Mexico's boom year in textiles was 1951, but even 
in this year the textile industry operated at less than half 
its capacity. This was largely due to the poor state of 
the cotton industry which suffered from inefficiency, poor 
purchasing power of rural Mexicans, and the substitution 
of synthetics for cotton in urban areas.^
In spite of the weaknesses in the Mexican cotton 
industry, cotton remained the most important export from 
1950 through 1965.  ̂ Cotton yields have increased due to 
the use of new varieties and better agricultural technology. 
Textile mills still utilize foreign equipment which is 
usually at least a decade behind the technology used in the 
developed countries. This is not necessarily a criticism 
of Mexican practice, since the introduction of the latest 
textile technology would result in mass unemployment. Mex­
ico seems to be imitating Japan's practice of labor-intensive 
technology in textiles until other sectors of the economy
^Morris Singer, Growth, Equality, and the Mexican 
Experience (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1969),
p. 168.
^Joseph Grunwald and Philip Musgrove, Natural 
Resources in Latin American Development (Baltimore : The
John Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 432.
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can absorb the labor that would be displaced by capital- 
intensive technology.
The Mexican experience in the production of woolen 
cloth is perhaps illustrative of how not to improve a mar­
ket. Mexican wool has been of traditionally poor quality. 
Sheep breeding has not been directed toward better wool.
The main economic policy in the wool sector has been to 
seek protection against foreign competitors (Australian 
wool). Mexico did not set up extension services to im­
prove the quality of raw wool nor were workers trained to 
handle modern equipment in the manufacture of wool.
The Mexican rayon industry began in the 1930s when 
the number of rayon plants grew rapidly. However, many of 
these plants were crude backyard operations producing poor 
quality fabric for the lower income groups. After World 
War II, more modern equipment was brought in from the 
United States. The reliance upon Japan and Italy for 
rayon yarn greatly reduced production during the war years. 
During the war, the Celanese Corporation of America began 
to join with Mexican firms in the construction of rayon 
yarn-producing plants. The extent of the Celanese Corpora­
tion involvement in rayon production in the 1940s became a 
concern to many Mexicans who feared the company was con­
trolling the rayon industry in Mexico.
Mining has traditionally been one of Mexico's key
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economic sectors. However, mining has consistently been 
shrinking as a share of total investment. And since mining 
investment is almost entirely foreign owned and of an en­
clave nature, there has been very little transfer of tech­
nology in this area, especially in terms of spreading 
throughout the population. However, more of Mexico's ex­
tracts are being used domestically as illustrated in 
Table 10 thus changing the old traditional export economy.
Some technological transfer related to mining has 
transpired through the United States Department of the 
Interior. Between 1946 and 1962, over forty Mexican scien­
tists were engaged in geological research under the super­
vision of the Department of the Interior. Other Mexicans 
have received training at the Department's Bureau of Mines 
and the Bureau of Land Management.^
United States firms operate just inside the Mexican 
frontier under an arrangement to compensate for the elimina­
tion of the bracero program.% These plants employ cheap 
Mexican labor to make solid-state electronics, textiles and 
handicraft goods which are competitive with Hongkong and
^Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Resources Survey, p. 398.
^The termination of the bracero program eliminated 
an important channel of technological transfer. The Mexican 
farmer had a chance to observe first hand the use of differ­
ent technology. Perhaps the program should have been ex­
panded rather than phased out. See Gordon, "Capitalism and 
Technological Adaptation," p. 82.
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TABLE 10
PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND CONSUMPTION 
OF MINING COMMODITIES 
(THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)
Commodity Period Production Exports Consumption
Copper 1935-39 40 35
1950-51 62 56 8.3
1962-64 52 31 28
1965-66 56 19 42
Iron ore 1935-39 123 106 268
1950-51 535 177 908
1962-64 2,111 57 2,103
1965-66 2,456 5 2,693
Lead 1935-39 234 218 m m m m
1950-51 232 201 8.9
1962-64 184 116 55
1965-66 170 100 67
Zink 1935-39 149 147
1950-51 202 182 11
1962-64 246 207 28
1965-66 233 142 79
Tin 1935-39 • M W •M  ̂
1950-51 —  — —— 0.5
1962-64 0.9 — — 1.3
1965-66 1.0 — — 1.2
Coal 1935-39 899 1,256
1952-53 1,375 — — 1,433
1961-63 1,929 —  — 1,910
1965 2,006 2,142
Source : Joseph Grunwald and Philip Musgrove, Natural Re­
sources in Latin American Development (Baltimore :
The John Hopkins Press, 1970), Table B-1-14, p. 86.
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Taiwan. The work is largely labor-intensive with some 
sixty companies employing more than 4,000 Mexicans in 1967.1 
United States firms entered into these agreements anticipat­
ing low cost labor in labor-intensive work. Significant 
flows of technology transpires in the process as Mexican 
labor is exposed to more modern capital and more sophisti­
cated techniques.2 Thus the border project may play an 
important role in the introduction of intermediate technol­
ogy to be used in building manpower resources.
In addition to the influx of foreign automobile 
assembly plants established in the 1930's, the Mexican 
government began producing automobiles and trucks using 
Fiat patents. This venture failed and was replaced by a 
govemment-Renault partnership to assemble economy automo­
biles. Automobile assembly firms had to use 60 percent 
locally made parts by 1965. Eight foreign automobile assem­
blies were operating in Mexico in the early 1960s. These 
were Ford, General Motors, Renault, Chrysler-Fiat, Kaiser, 
Toyota, Volkswagen, and the German Borgward factory which 
was shipped to Mexico by a Mexican organization.3
The steel industry has played an important role in
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, pp. 214-15.
^Benjamin J. Taylor and M. E. Bond, "Mexican Border 
Industrialization," MSU Business Topics, XVI, No. 2 (Spring, 
1968), 34.
^Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 297.
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the industrialization of Mexico. Foreign technology has 
been a crucial element in the successful development of the 
steel industry. The Altos Hornos de Mexico, S. A., was built 
in the early 1940s and was partially financed by the Export- 
Import Bank of Washington and the American Rolling Mill Com­
pany which provided the technical supervision of the con­
struction of the plant.1 Rolling mills and blast furnaces 
were imported from the United States. The blast furnace 
for the Altos Hornos plant was dismantled in the United 
States and sent to Mexico for installation. Patents were 
acquired, and technical supervision was employed by the 
Americans.
Mexico's steel industry expanded greatly with the 
increase in demand from the war. This expansion was re­
stricted, however, by the amount of iron and steel Mexico 
could import from the United States. Mexico's iron and 
steel industry has expanded steadily since the war and 
Mexicans are beginning to make their own technological 
contributions in this industry. One example is a process 
utilizing natural gas in the blast furnace instead of coke. 
The process was developed by Hojalata y Lamina, S.A. in 
Monterrey. It combines Mexico's resources of abundant
^Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, pp. 139-43. 
Also see p. 27. The Altos Hornos and American Rolling Mill 
cooperation is representative of the kind of investments now 
made by American firms. Patent rights and technical super­
vision replace direct cash investments.
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electrical power, high-grade iron ore, and supplies of 
natural gas in a process uniquely suitable to the Mexican 
environment. Efficiency is increased by the savings of 
coke and the reduction of costly scrap iron. Interestingly, 
the Japanese are now utilizing similar techniques to cut 
down their reliance on coke and imported scrap.^
Mexicanization of electric utilities in 1935 de­
creased the direct flow of foreign investment in this sec­
tor, causing the government to bring in foreign technical 
assistance following the war. The group of American ex­
perts was directed by Edward Falek, who had been the head 
of the United States Office of War Utilities Administration.^ 
The electric power industry has expanded steadily since 1945 
under the direction and control of the Mexican government.
In 1960 the two remaining large foreign owned firms, Amer­
ican and Foreign Power Company and the Mexican Light and 
Power Company, were nationalized.3
Mexico's petroleum industry began to expand again 
after World War II. Increased financial reserves accruing 
from the war permitted PEMEX to increase the size of its
^Fredda Jean Bullard, Mexico's Natural Gas; The 
Beginning of an Industry (Austin: Bureau of Business Research,
The University of Texas at Austin, 1968), p. 305. The "Hy L" 
process has decreased the use of scrap iron in the Mexican 
steel industry by 62 percent from 1957 to 1962.




investment several times. The refinery capacity increased 
by 91 percent from 1938 to 1950. The import of American 
technology included not only refinery construction, but 
also drilling equipment, exploration techniques, pipelines 
and supporting railway equipment.^ Significantly, capi­
tal goods accounted for more than 38 percent of total im­
ports in 1950 as compared to a 20 percent share of imports 
in 1943. Mexico received more than 80 percent of its im­
ports between 1940 and 1950 from the United States.^ 
However, this percentage had declined to 63 percent by 1968 
as shown in Table 11.
PEMEX, in spite of early difficulties, has proved 
to be a success, pointing to the fact that Mexicans have 
been able to operate a complex industry with a minimum of 
foreign assistance. This is especially pleasing to Mexi­
cans, who were repeatedly informed by American oil compa­
nies that they were incapable of operating a petroleum 
complex.^
The Mexican government controls many of the basic 
communications, transportation and industrial sectors of 
the economy. In 1962, as illustrated in Table 12, the
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel­
opment, The Economic Development of Mexico, p. 47.
2lbid., pp. 119-21.
^Grunwald and Musgrove, Natural Resources, p. 260 
and Cumberland, Struggle for Modernity, p. 315.
TABLE 11
MEXICO'S FOREIGN TRADE, BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA: SELECTED YEARS, 1940-1968
(PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS)
1940 1945 1950 1956 1960 1965 1968
Exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
United States 89.4 83.5 86.4 72.6 72.0 62.6 68.2
Europe 5.4 0.6 5.5 15.2 13.5 15.2 12.5
Rest of North and Central
America 1.9 15.8 6.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
Latin America n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.2 4.1 8.6 10.5
Rest of world 3.3 0.1 1.8 6.8 9.3 12.7 8.0
Imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
United States 78.8 82.4 84.4 78.2 72.1 65.7 63.0
Europe 13.8 4.9 10.4 15.6 20.9 24.7 27.0
Rest of North and Central
America 3.6 11.1 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.5 1.7
Latin America n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.3 1.3 2.6 2.9
Rest of world 3.8 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.8 4.5 5.4
Source: B. Griffiths, Mexican Monetary Policy and Economic Development (New York:




MEXICO; NONPRIVATELY OWNED SECTORS 








Maritime transportation (by tonnage) 70
Docks and other port facilities 90
International commercial aviation (owned
domestically, according to projects pending) 65
Newsprint manufacture by paper mills in which
state owns majority equity 100
Newsprint distribution 100
Motion picture distribution and exhibition 80
Motion picture production (financing) 35
Basic industries
Electric power (installed capacity) 85
Electric power (sales to public) 96
Petroleum exploration (ownership of sells,
natural gas reserves, oil lines and gas lines) 97
Petroleum refining 96
Petrochemicals (percent of total investments) 70
Iron and steel production (by mills in which
the state enjoys majority control) 60
Other indicators
Private investment as percent of total
investment, 1950 61
Private investment as percent of total
investment, 1961 55
Percentage of total national investment directly
attributable to foreign capital, 1951 13
Percentage of total national investment directly
attributable to foreign capital, 1961 23
Source: Rawle Farley, The Economics of Latin America:
Development Problems in Perspective (New York; 
Harper and Row, 1972), Table 10.2, p. 216.
133
state owned 100 percent of the telegraph sector, 97 percent 
of the railroads, 85 percent of electric power capacity, 97 
percent of petroleum exploration, and 96 percent of petro­
leum refining. The flow of foreign capital into Mexico 
(1970) is less than 10 percent of total manufacturing in­
vestment. This would not seem obtrusive except for the 
type of investment represented by foreigners. These in­
vestments (most of which are of United States origin) are 
generally in high technology sectors of the economy such as 
electronics, chemicals and sophisticated machinery which 
are the key economic sectors. The problem is not one of 
foreign domination by ownership, but rather a dependence on 
foreign technology. Like most other Latin American coun­
tries, Mexico has brought in modern technology intact with 
little adaptation to local needs.^ Mexico, unlike Japan, 
has grown increasingly dependent on foreign technology of 
the most sophisticated nature. Thus Table 13 shows that 
foreign investment accounts for 61 percent of machinery,
60 percent of electronics, and 50 percent of the chemical 
sector. The major transition in foreign investment and 
correspondingly technological transfer has been a shift 
from the private businessman to the multinational corpora-
^William P. Glade, "The Employment Question and 
Development Policies in Latin America," Journal of Economic 
Issues, III, No. 3 (September, 1969), 52.
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TABLE 13
CONCENTRATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 














A Few Foreign 
Concerns in Sector 
Represented
Paper 9/14 75 Kimberly Clark, 
Scott Paper
Vehicles 7/16 66 General Motors, 
Ford
Rubber 5/5 100 Goodyear, 
Firestone
Machinery 8/12 61 SKF, Singer,
International Harvester, 
John Deere
Electronics 8/12 60 General Electric, 
RCA, Philco, Phill
Chemical 8/15 50 Union Carbide, 
Monsanto Chemical, 




14/19 61 Parke Davis, Ciba, 
Roche, Eli Lilly, 
Johnson and Johnson, 
American Cynamid
Source: Flavia Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur (Paris:
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop­
ment, 1971), p. 70.
135
tion; from European investment to United States investment; 
from basic industries such as cattle raising, mining, trans­
portation, petroleum and electric power to manufacturing, 
commerce and light industry; and finally from traditional 
sectors to modern sectors.^ Nationalization of basic 
industries has complemented and aided the transfer of 
foreign investment into modern and highly profitable tech­
nologies. It is in these areas where the greatest growth 
potential exists.
Between 1950 and 1959, the United States accounted 
for $344 million dollars of direct private investment to 
Mexico. More than 90 percent of foreign-controlled firms 
were owned by the United States or Canada. Approximately 
65 percent of United States investment was directed toward 
industry and was responsible for 16 percent of value added 
by manufacturing.2 Over 80 percent of United States in­
vestment is largely concentrated in the Federal District. 
Much of this investment is centered in the modern sector as 
shown in Table 14.
Foreign investments in Mexico have been very prof­
itable. The rates of return on capital invested is probably
^Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur, p. 60.
^W. Paul Strassmann, Technological Change and 
Economic Development; The Manufacturing Experience of 
Mexico and Puerto Rico (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1968), p. 294.
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TABLE 14
UNITED STATES INVESTMENTS IN MEXICO ACCORDING TO 
BRANCHES OF ACTIVITY AND LOCATION 
(NUMBER OF INVESTMENTS PER REGION)
F.D. and Nuevo- Other
Branches of Activity Mexico Leôn States Total
Food 29 2 8 39
Beverages 2 — “ 2
Tobacco 1 —— 1
Textiles 8 1 6 15
Garment 8 1 2 11
Wood Cork 1 —— —— 1
Wood Furniture —— 1 1
Paper 15 1 — • 16
Printing 8 —— 8
Leather 5 1 -- 6
Rubber 11 1 —— 12
Chemicals 146 12 10 168
Petro-chemicals 5 2 —— 7
Minerals 8 5 4 17
Steel and Iron 15 2 2 19
Metal 72 7 6 85
Mechanicals 40 7 3 50
Electrical 63 7 12 82
Vehicles 17 4 —— 21
Various Manufacturers 49 1 3 53
Total Manufacturing 502 55 57 614
Traditional Industry 61 6 17 84
Modern Industry 441 49 40 530
Building 4 1 5
Services 132 20 25 177
Mining 7 3 24 34
Agriculture 1 6 7
Total 645 79 113 837
Source: Flavia Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur (Paris;
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1971), Table H, p. 72.
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twice that of capital invested in the United States. The 
United States accounted for approximately 70 percent of all 
direct foreign investment in the late 1960s.^ A clear 
picture of the magnitude of direct foreign investment and 
the net profit outflows is shown in Table 15. Note that 
the inflow since the mid-1950s has about doubled while the 
net outflow has increased approximately fourfold. Fewer 
companies compete in the modern sector than in the tradi­
tional sector and the growth of the modern industries is 
high. Between 1951 and 1963 chemicals have grown by 12.3 
percent, vehicles 10.1 percent, machines 9.4 percent com­
pared to 3.3 percent growth in textiles.2 Mexico has 
been successful in acquiring new technology, but not in 
establishing a scientific research base which is a prere­
quisite for technological independence. As a consequence,
technological dependency appears in fact built in 
with the development of domestic firms; all the 
positive features of Mexican industrialization: 
the process of industrial concentration, the in­
creasing number of industries in the modern sec­
tors: the considerable percentage of firms making
technological improvements, lead to it. It looks 
as if any further increase in size and any addi­
tional adoption of new products and new methods 
would further increase dependency, so that it can 
be foreseen that the domestic industry will in the
B. Griffiths, Mexican Monetary Policy and Eco­
nomic Development (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1972),
p. 60.
^Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur, p. 123.
TABLE 15
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
















1939 41,980 3,553 -269 45,264 11,900 2,887 14,787
1940 3,979 -5,816 3,284 1,447 21,394 3,855 25,249
1941 11,532 -5,587 5,318 11,263 28,143 4,625 32,768
1942 16,851 -9,959 10,013 16,905 36,457 4,576 41,033
1943 9,191 7,436 66 16 ,.693 25,875 7,054 32,929
1944 30,926 5,690 11,755 48,371 21,997 5,288 27,285
1945 -1,349 19,961 4,650 23,262 19,692 , 9,279 28,971
1946 22,126 13,375 2,223 37,724 35,557 8,756 44,313
1947 18,344 19,352 24,207 61,903 40,120 15,163 55,283
1948 79,741 -85 7,035 86,691 61,439 7,221 68,660
1949 59,618 8,482 -4,487 63,613 39,443 6,353 45,796
1950 38,010 18,453 15,920 72,383 39,428 8,150 47,578
1951 49,608 49,932 21,069 120,609 38,575 13,091 51,666
1952 36,514 37,033 -5,375 58,172 46,385 24,217 70,602
1953 37,183 3,527 1,106 41,816 56,957 22,371 79,328
1954 77,786 12,826 2,547 93,159 38,127 24,352 62,479
1955 84,926 12,479 7,951 105,356 48,658 18,474 67,132
1956 83,325 29,142 13,918 126,385 54,452 36,519 90,971
1957 101,024 29,046 1,521 131,591 47,785 40,402 88,187
1958 62,833 36,045 11,389 100,267 47,169 49,378 96,547
1959 65,581 16,152 -578 81,155 59,070 53,399 112,469
w00
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1960 62,466* 10,570 5,392 78,428 72,166 58,830 130,996
1961 81,826 25,178 12,258 119,262 57,338 65,551 122,889
1962 74,871 36,190 15,422 126,483 56,439 66,715 123,154
1963 76,944 36,040 4,492 117,476 68,119 81,408 149,527
1964 95,060 50,221 16,652 161,933 89,951 95,910 185,861
1965 120,087 61,252 32,537 213,876 83,297 91,599 174,896
1966 111,112^ 73,700 -2,013 182,799 103,414 100,320 203,734
1967 105,400“ 105,518 16,800 194,000 24,263 132,263 156,526
1968 111,000 110,200 5,700 226,900 89,200 156,200 245,200
1969 n,a. n,a. n.a. 197,300 n.a. n.a. 291,300
^Does not include $116,5 million corresponding to foreign disinvestment, repre­
sented by the purchase of electric companies,
^Includes $64,4 million corresponding to foreign disinvestment, represented by 
the sulphur companies.
Source: B, Griffiths, Mexican Monetary Policy and Economic Development (New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc,, 1972) , Table 24, p, 64,
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future be even more dependent on foreign technology, 
in particular on that from the U.S.A.^
The result of technological dependence in Mexico beyond the 
obvious fact that the interest of the multinational corpo­
rations may not coincide with the interests of Mexico is 
that the flow of resources to purchase technical assistance 
will continue to increase as illustrated in Table 16. Roy­
alties paid increased nearly fivefold between 1955 and 1964 
while investment of foreign capital had not even doubled in 
volume. The scientific and technological gap between the 
developed countries and Mexico is increasing, indicating a 
greater dependence upon foreign technology in the future. 
Mexico seems to fit the product cycle theory as outlined in 
Chapter II rather well. New products are developed in the 
United States, marketed there first, then imported to Mex­
ico, and finally manufactured or assembled in Mexico.
The pattern of Mexican imports has been shifting 
from consumer to capital goods as demonstrated in Table 17. 
This shift represents Mexico's import substitution policy, 
but it also has important ramifications in the transfer of 
technology. The increase in capital goods imports reflect 
a growing dependency on foreign embodied technology which 
is of far greater importance than their monetary value.
One indication of the structural shift which has
^Ibid., p. 128.
TABLE 16
INDEX OF MEXICAN ACQUISITION COSTS OF FOREIGN 











1950 100 100 100 100
1955 168 254 676 248 H*
1960 191 742 895 171
1964 274 1,189 1,577 348
Source: Flavia Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur (Paris: Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1971), p. 130.
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TABLE 17
COMPOSITION OF MEXICO'S OFFICIALLY REGISTERED 
IMPORTS BY GROUPS OF PRODUCTS, 1940-1960a
Groups of Products 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960^
Total registered imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Consumer goods 23.9 21.7 15.8 15.4 12.1
Nondurable 13.8 11.4 8.3 7.0 6. 6
Durable 10.1 10.3 7.5 8.4 5.5
Fuel^ 2.6 2.7 4.1 7.9 4.1
Raw materials 42.0 38.3 39.4 37.2 44.4
Metallic 12.0 9.8 10.5 10.4 11.4
Nonmetallic 30.0 28.5 28.9 26.8 33.0
capital goods 30.6 36.8 40.0 39.3 39.1
Construction materials 6.3 5.7 7.8 5.9 4.4
Other goods for 
agriculture 3.4 3.5 4.6 5.0 3.2
Other goods for manu­
facturing and mining 13.8 23.7 23,1 22.7 24.0
Other goods for trans­
portation 7.1 3.9 4.5 5.7 7.5
^Detail does not add exactly to 100 percent, mainly because an 
"unclassified" category of less than 1 percent is here omitted.
^Preliminary figures.
°The imported fuel, most of which is petroleum products, may 
be considered part consumer goods and part production goods, the 
exact proportions being undetermined.
Source: Rafael Izquierdo, "Imports and Import Contois," in Public
Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico, ed. by Raymond 
Vernon (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), Table 2, p. 246.
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been occurring in Mexico is the rapidly declining share of 
traditional exports in the gross domestic product. A 
growing share of exports consists of manufactured goods. 
Mexico/ like Japan, seems to be moving away from the export 
of raw materials and primary goods and toward the export of 
goods from the modern sector. This is partially due to the 
depletion of traditional resource supplies, the increased 
domestic demand for those resources, and especially due to
the changing structure of the Mexican economy.
' ,
Foreign firms are locating in Mexico to participate 
in the export of manufactured goods. In the late 1960s, 
Volkswagen established a subsidiary in Mexico to produce 
for the United States market. In the same period, Rolls- 
Royce acquired a franchise to produce diesel engines in 
Mexico for export to the Latin American market.^
If an accurate description of the Mexican indus­
trial sector has been given, the dominant trends are from 
a traditional export based economy to a more diversified, 
modern economy. The traditional sectors, including tex­
tiles and mining, are becoming relatively less important 
to the economic base. Government ownership of other basic 
sectors such as utilities, petroleum, railroads and commu­
nications has erased much of the foreign exploitation of 
the past. However, it was pointed out that the shift in
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 214.
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foreign investment, particularly United States investment, 
has been toward the most modern industries (electronics, 
chemicals, machinery, etc.) which are the growth industries 
and the most profitable investments. Therefore, nationali­
zation has helped to shift foreign investment into more 
profitable ventures. Mexico's dependence on United States 
technology seems to be increasing, not diminishing. The 
specter raised is a shift from economic dependence to tech­
nological dependence.
Summary
Mexico's Spanish heritage, the mestizo personality, 
land system and culture greatly affected the process of 
acquiring and adapting new technologies. Mexican develop­
ment, from the Porfirian period to the present, has its 
roots in the past. The rapid economic expansion of the 
Porfirian period must be qualified by the long-run struc­
tural impact of foreign investment in rail transportation, 
oil pipelines, and mining and agricultural export enclaves. 
Mexico was developed for foreign exploitation and any side 
benefits to the domestic economy were nearly incidental to 
the process. This type of economic growth was not condu­
cive to the overall development of the country. Mexican 
railroad track was built largely to service American mining 
interests and tropical agricultural exports. Its pipelines
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were connected to the harbor at Veracruz for export. Lack­
ing an internal network of railways or pipelines to urban 
areas or domestic refineries, Mexico classified as a typi­
cal export-based economy. The transfusion of technology 
within such a setting was narrowly restricted to modern 
enclaves with very little spread effects. The vast major­
ity of the Mexican people suffered under the export- 
oriented policies of the Diaz regime, while the traditional 
elite and the foreigners reaped rich rewards for the open­
ing of Mexico. The land v s  ripe for revolution.
The period 1910-1940 was a tumultuous era encompas­
sing revolution, depression and the impact of two world wars. 
After the worst of the fighting ebbed in 1914, the Mexican 
economy recovered slowly during the remaining years. Growth 
was hampered by the decline in foreign investment and retal­
iation by the giant oil companies against the government. 
However, there was an influx of foreign branch plants in 
the 1920s.
During this period the government dramatically 
changed the Mexican infrastructure. The Revolution v;as 
aimed at the Porfirian tolerance of foreign exploitation 
and the land enclosures. The 1917 Constitutuion provided 
the framework for expropriation and nationalization of key 
sectors of the Mexican economy. Redistribution of land 
began in this period and has resulted in both agricultural
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gains due to increased incentives and to diseconomies of 
scale due to the small size of many of the farms. Govern­
ment inputs to agriculture in the form of roads and irriga­
tion projects set the stage for the growth in the 1940-1965 
period.
The overthrow of Diaz broke down many of the insti­
tutional barriers to the development of Mexico. The record 
of growth of Mexican agriculture and nonagricultural sectors 
has been exceptionally good in relation to most other less 
developed countries. However, the benefits of economic 
growth have not been distributed to many Mexicans. The gov­
ernment tore down old barriers and built up the infrastruc­
ture of rural Mexico in terms of roads and irrigation pro­
jects, but it did not develop the human resources. General 
education, extension services, and health facilities were 
all slighted. Thus the Mexican agricultural sector has 
become more dualistic with the large commercial private 
farms being favored. This presents great obstacles in the 
transfer of technology to any but a few large landowners.
The transfer of nonagricultural technology has per­
haps been more even and successful than in the agricultural 
sector. Foreign ownership is small compared to the total 
value of assets. However, there is a trend toward techno­
logical dependence in the sophisticated technological sec­
tors of the economy which may overshadow the financial 
independence.
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An examination of the material presented on the 
Mexican experience reveals that the government has been 
eclectic in both its selection of technology and the role 
of the state vis-a-vis the private sector. The government 
has regulated foreign investments and established financial 
institutions and research institutes with the goal of in­
corporating foreign technology suited for Mexican develop­
ment.
In the private sector firms have acquired foreign 
technology through capital goods imports, licensing agree­
ments, and foreign technical advisors. This technology was 
adjusted to the human and material resources of Mexico. It 
was noted that there has been a bias toward capital-intensive 
techniques resulting from the generally low educational level, 
easy credit terms in the United States, and low import duties 
on foreign capital goods.
CHAPTER V
JAPAN —  DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE 
MEIJI PERIOD, 1868-1912
Background
The Tokugawa feudal system ended with the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868 after a period of more than 260 years. 
Japanese feudalism had much in common with European feudal­
ism. The Japanese had nearly eliminated trade with foreign­
ers and were virtually isolated from the rest of the world.1 
Within this isolation, the social structure was rigid and 
perhaps less conducive to change than the feudal societies
of Europe.2
But there were important differences between the
3Japanese and European brands of feudalism. Unlike Europe, 
in Japan the feudal lords were not independent but were 
subordinate to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Secondly, the in­
fluence of the Shinto and Buddhist religions, though impor-
^G. B. Sansom, "History: From Earliest Times to
1853," in Japan, ed. by Hugh Borton (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1951), p. 268.
^Harold G. Moulton, Japan : An Economic and Finan­
cial Appraisal (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1931), p. 8.
^Kamekichi Takahashi, The Rise and Development of 
Japan's Modern Economy, trans. by John Lynch (Tokyo: The
Jiji Press, Ltd., 1969), p. 48.
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tant, did not represent an independent force as did Chris­
tianity in Europe. Third, during European feudalism, the 
merchant's role was separate from church and state, whereas 
the Japanese merchant submitted totally to the command of 
the Shogunate.
The importance of these differences between Euro­
pean and Japanese feudalism is that they are responsible for 
Japan's unique ability to transfer the loyalty from the Toku­
gawa Shogunate to the new prefectural government in the Meiji 
Restoration. This, combined with other factors stated later 
in this chapter, explains Japan's smooth and rapid transi­
tion from feudalism to capitalism.
Perhaps the main characteristic of Japanese feudal­
ism was the centralized control of the Tokugawas. This 
system was designed to maintain the power of the Tokugawas. 
The status quo was maintained by avoiding foreign contact 
and by ensuring that local lords did not gain independent 
power.^ As a result, a rigid class structure developed 
which allowed very little change. The favored class, the 
samurai, received a disproportionate share of the economic 
surplus. Much of the surplus was dissipated on luxurious 
consumption by the samurai class. In an effort to maintain 
and increase the consumption of the elite, the Shogunate 
increased the tribute required from the agricultural sector.
^Moulton, Japan, p. 6.
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causing a decline in the incentive of the farmer.^ The 
Shogunates' tribute system drained the agricultural sector, 
and their disinterest allowed the productive industries to 
stagnate. By the time of the Meiji Restoration, the strength 
of the Tokugawa's centralized feudal structure had been sig­
nificantly eroded.2
Japan's feudal structure limited economic growth 
in a variety of ways.3 Human resources were wasted, since 
roles were determined by status, tradition, and heritage 
rather than ability. The samurai class drained the economic 
surplus for luxury consumption while holding a disdain for 
problems of production and trade. The self-sufficiency of 
the feudal system restricted foreign and domestic trade. 
Production was directed not toward producers' goods, but for 
the needs of the samurai, villagers and the religious class. 
The use of inferior technology had nearly exhausted the min­
ing industry. These constraints upon the economy resulted 
in low productivity and stagnation. Karl Marx's remark about 
the necessity for the elimination of European feudal institu­
tions also applies to the Japanese feudal institutions. "They 
had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 51.
^Ibid., p. 49.
3lbid., pp. 92-93.
4%arl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in
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The Tokugawa legacy was not, however, entirely 
without positive contributions. Although the samurai 
class lived in comparative luxury at the expense of the 
other classes, they did represent an important pool of 
human talent.^ The samurai were warriors, but when the era 
of warfare ended, their education shifted from warfare to 
assimilating culture. Their education enabled them to 
comprehend the culture and technology of the West and to 
adapt to the Western technology.
Another aspect of Tokugawa feudalism was the lords' 
alternating year of residency in the City of Edo. This pat­
tern was established to keep the lords from building a con­
tinuous power base and to weaken their power by draining off 
2their wealth. The City of Edo attained a population of 
over one million in the Tokugawa period and created a market 
demand for skills which could later be used in the post- 
feudal society. Shipbuilding, construction, civil engineering, 
sword making, cloth dyeing, industrial arts, a warehouse sys­
tem, water mills for the milling of flour and hiring proce­
dures for the factory system were some of the results of the
Marx and Engels; Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, 
ed. by Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 12.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 53.
Ĝ. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern 
Japan (London: Alen and Unwin, 1963), p. 10.
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tremendous purchasing power centered in Edo.^
Other contributions in Edo included commercial 
skills, an emerging market system, formation of a credit 
system and the development of transport and communications 
systems.^
Further, the level of agricultural productivity 
was high by Asian standards at the end of the Tokugawa 
period which enabled the Meiji regime to utilize the ex­
isting economic surplus.3
Local communities were controlled by the bushi 
(warriors) before the Tokugawa period. Land use and rights 
to land were traditionally defined but were subject to 
change by the bushi. Upon gaining power, the Tokugawa gov­
ernment ordered the bushi to towns to be controlled by the 
diamyo (lord). The shogun (overlord) recognized certain land 
areas controlled by the diamyo which were the basis of his 
wealth.* The diamyo received between 40 to 60 percent of the 
yield of the land he controlled. Representatives of the 
diamyo collected the tribute once a year from clusters of
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 55.
3Ibid., pp. 56-57.
^Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern 
Japan (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1959), p. 211.
^Erwin H. Johnson, "Land Tax and Its Impact on Use 
and Ownership in Rural Japan," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, XIX, No. 1 (October, 1970), 51.
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houses or buraku. Then the buraku divided up the burden 
among the individuals in the community. Within each buraku 
existed a complex set of social obligations within each 
household and between households. These obligations to 
other households did not go beyond the households in the 
buraku.1
The class structure in the Tokugawa period consisted 
of a rigid heirarchy beginning at the top with the bushi, 
composed of the lords and their retainers, the samurai, who 
were divided into upper and lower classes, followed by the 
farmer, artisan, and at the bottom, the merchant. An hered­
itary class system maintained the social order and severely 
restricted mobility from class to class. Only a fixed ratio 
of the population was allowed samurai status (five or six 
percent of the entire population). Farmers, who composed 
the vast majority of the population, were fixed in proportion 
since they could not move upward and did not want to become 
artisans or merchants since these were lower classes. The 
status quo was maintained by respecting the "law of the 
ancestors" and engaging in numerous ceremonial rites to 
validate the existing social structure.
Even clothing and housing were used to cement class
^Ibid., p. 52.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 51. See 
also, Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkely, California; 
University of California Press, 1970) , p. 142.
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relations. The samurai wore identifiable clothing when they 
traveled while the farmers could wear nothing more elaborate 
than dark blue, cotton cloth. The samurai class was always 
identifiable at a mere glance.^
The value system of any society affects its poten­
tial to bring about economic growth and technological change. 
In the Tokugawa period this potential was greatly restricted. 
The emphasis on heredity rather than ability was not condu­
cive to economic and technological change (as mentioned 
earlier, hereditary status purposely limited change to main­
tain the status quo). Not until Japan was faced with an out­
side. threat did the old status system break down. Men who 
obtained important positions through heredity were often not 
capable administrators. Over the years this system gradually 
weakened the Tokugawa power base. With the threat of outside 
intervention, the Japanese rapidly moved to a value system 
which selected men according to competence rather than status.
The samurai contempt for the lower classes was not 
conducive to economic and technological change. Neither 
trade nor manufacturing were taken seriously by the samurai. 
The samurai who were appointed as financial administrators 
were from the lower class and were looked down on by other 
members of the samurai class. As a result the brighter men
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 52
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did not enter into finance# and the financial position of 
the clans was in ruinous condition by the end of the Toku­
gawa period.1 Again, it was the threat of foreign interven­
tion that drew talented men into the financial sector and 
who could work there for the good of country and Emperor 
without losing face. Money-making became a respectable 
activity, just as it had eventually become respectable in 
Europe with the rise of Calvinism.%
The samurai influence was essential to the smooth 
and rapid transition from feudalism to capitalism. During 
this transition, the samurai were important in developing 
a government devoted to national economic growth and pro­
vided a source of entrepreneurial talent.  ̂ Many of the 
samurai, fearing the threat of domination by foreigners, 
supported the new prefec. oral government. While they had 
always been loyal to only one superior, their lord (diamyo), 
they traditionally paid allegiance to a higher power, the 
Emperor. Seeing the inability of the Shogunate to cope with
^Ibid., p. 77.
^The Japanese value system did not change without 
stress. The samurai must have had great emotional conflict 
during this adjustment. The poetry and literature of the 
time reflect this conflict of values. It should be noted 
that the villagers who were engaged in agriculture did not 
change their values as fast as their urban counterparts and 
remained a bastion of conservatism for many years. See 
Smith, Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, pp. 206-10.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 31.
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the foreigners, the samurai rapidly transferred their 
loyalty to the new government by identifying such support 
with tribute to the Emperor.^
It should be emphasized that not all samurai sup­
ported the overthrow of the Tokugawa regime. Samurai of 
different ramk and from different regions took very dif­
ferent positions toward the restoration movement. It was 
primarily the middle and lower samurai who supported change 
in the hopes that they might increase their status. Their 
position was not high enough to warrant support of the 
feudal system nor low enough to completely destroy the 
system. The result was not a samurai movement but rather 
a samurai influence contributing to a smooth transition 
from one form of government to a new arrangement offering 
greater prospects for advancement.̂
The new government was largely composed of the 
samurai class and was molded by the samurai influence.
With the elimination of feudalism, the samurai lost their 
privileged status. Under the new system, they were reward­
ed according to their ability and performance instead of 
their relative position in the old social heirarchy.
The samurai directed their efforts toward achiev-
^Allen, Economic History of Modern Japan, p. 25.
^W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1972) , p. 421.
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ing status in the new system by demonstrating their devo­
tion to the nation with intelligent, hard work. They 
carried their traditional intellectual talents and their 
belief in their worth to the nation into the government 
bureaucracy.^ The samurai spirit was well suited to the 
needs of a government striving for economic change. This 
spirit was characterized by a willingness to submit to the 
needs of the nation even at personal or family sacrifice.% 
Their dedication to the government over their personal 
desires resulted in an efficient and nearly corruption-free 
bureaucracy directed toward the assimilation of Western 
civilization for the purpose of establishing an independent 
Japanese state. As government officials, they worked with 
diligent pride, sensing their responsibility as a trust of 
the Emperor.3 The samurai traditionally looked v. )wn upon
^Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon (London: Blackie and Son,
Ltd., 1904), pp. 38, 39. See also, E. K. Norman, Japan's 
Emergence as a Modern State (New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1940), p. 83.
2Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 26.
^The samurai's dedication to a higher affiliation 
is not unique to that class. The Japanese have traditionally 
placed a low value on blood kinship relations, favoring the 
family unit regardless of blood relationship (fictive kinship) 
Thus servants and clerks are treated as a part of the family, 
while sisters who have married and left the family unit do 
not have very close family ties. The samurai dedication to 
state or corporation is thus not very different from the rest 
of the population's attitude toward group allegiance. Even 
today the Japanese attitude toward the family is seen in the 
modern corporations. It is more important to identify one-
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money-making for personal gain (they had received stipends 
according to social rank) and therefore were content to work 
for the state while sacrificing personal gain.^
Since the samurai viewed themselves as the chosen 
people they readily faced the task of assimilating Western 
civilization.2 with the fall of the old order, they 
developed an insatiable desire for Western knowledge which 
was combined with their new desire to rise in society. Even 
the lowest samurai classes channeled their resources into the 
education of their children so they might improve their posi­
tion. Ifhen the parents could not afford this, the samurai 
youth worked to put themselves through school. This drive 
of the samurai for education spread out to the rest of Japa­
nese society resulting in a nearly universal quest for knowl­
edge. The extremely high literacy rate in Japan today stems 
from this early samurai influence.
Although the samurai's greatest contribution was in 
the government, they also provided valuable business leader­
ship. Since the samurai traditionally looked down on money-
self with the corporation than with the particular job in 
the corporation. Similarly, in academia it is more impor­
tant to relate your university affiliation than the specific 
degree obtained. See Nakane, Japanese Society, pp. 7, 8.
^Dyer, Dai Nippon, p. 43.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 29.
159
making, only a few entered into the business sector.^ But 
those few were influential and contributed a different type 
of entrepreneurship than came from the merchant class. The 
samurai businessman was a "gentleman businessman" more in­
terested in national development than private gain. Japan 
had need of this kind of altruistic entrepreneur, since in 
the early Meiji period almost all business ventures bore a 
high risk of failure.% It was essential to have a class of 
entrepreneurs more interested in promoting modem economic 
development than their own personal gain. ̂ The samurai who 
entered into the business world were able to preserve their 
identity by utilizing a philosophy of "service to the nation 
through industry. in this manner they did not feel they 
were deserting the samurai tradition but exemplifying it in 
the only avenue they had left. Even today the leading Japa­
nese businessmen speak of the duty of the businessman to the 
community.^
S. Uyehara, The Industry and Trade of Japan (London; 
P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1936), p. 8. It should be noted 
that the samurai were not experienced businessmen, and often 
their new business adventures failed.
yTakahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 28.
^Since the Japanese merchant class had been treated 
with contempt for years it would have been rather naive to 
expect them to embark on economic adventures in the name of 
a higher cause.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 34.
^James G. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory; Aspects
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The old merchant class in Japan was conservative 
and not open to new forms of economic organization. The 
samurai entrepreneur, being new to the world of business, 
was not inhibited by traditional practices and was able to 
create and work within new institutions. Therefore, they 
did not inhibit technological change when it came but ac­
tually actively promoted it. And concurrently, the samurai 
entrepreneur was influential in creating a new organization 
in the economy —  the corporate system.^
The samurai's devotion to higher goals than per­
sonal gain was crucial in the rapid effective acceptance of 
the company system in Japan. Japanese merchants lacked this 
quality and were not suited to developing the company system. 
Further,
the situation was the same in Europe where it took 
over a century to develop the company system, and 
it was so in neighboring China where, though there 
were outstanding national characteristics among the 
private businessmen the development of the company 
system was very s l o w .2
The immediate adoption of the company system in the first
Meiji period was important in developing an institutional
framework capable of procuring large amounts of capital.
of Its Social Organization (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1958), pp. 11-25.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 39.
2Ibid.
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competing with the large trading companies of the West, 
and absorbing the high risks involved at the time.
The new Japanese government was from its inception 
heavily committed to economic development. Table 18 
demonstrates that government expenditures in the Meiji 
period compare favorably to relative government expendi­
tures in the West. A heavy concentration of government 
expenditures did go to the military sector but still had 
an important impact on the developing Japanese economy.^
The government and the private sector shared nearly evenly 
the amount of investment in the Meiji period. In the 
agricultural sector, however, most investment came from 
the private sector.2 The fact that the Ministry of the 
Interior was created almost as soon as the Meiji govern­
ment was established demonstrates that the Japanese govern­
ment did not ignore agriculture. The new technological 
developments in both agriculture and industry were support­
ed by the government.
The government played a more active role in develop­
ing Japan's industry simply because the merchant class had 
no modern industrial experience. The government built some
^Military expenditures ranged from 10 percent to 
21 percent of gross domestic capital formation between 1887 
and 1913. See Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan,




GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURE ON GOODS AND 
SERVICES AS A PROPORTION OF GROSS 









United Kingdom 4.9 7.0




Source; Adapted from Angus Maddison, Economic Growth 
in Japan and the U.S.S.R. (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), Table 5, 
p. 13.
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railroads and subsidized others. There were government 
banks, insurance companies, and ". . . a cotton spinning 
mill, a silk reeling mill, an agricultural machinery plant, 
a cement works, a glass factory, a brick factory, nine 
modern mines, and shipyards, as well as military installa­
t i o n s . M o s t  of the factories were not financially suc­
cessful and were sold to private interests beginning in 
the 1880s.2 The government may not have been successful at 
creating financially successful factories, but it did build 
much of the necessary overhead capital which was later used 
by private enterprise. The iron and steel industry, the 
paper industry, the sugar industry, and the beer industry 
are examples of this.  ̂ The government was more directly 
successful in mining and in subsidizing the merchant marine. 
By 1913 Japan's merchant marine had become the sixth largest 
in the w o r l d . * This accomplishment is important when com­
pared to China and India which relied almost entirely on 
foreign shipping lines.^
^Angus Maddison, Economic Growth in Japan and the 
U.S.S.R. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969),
pp. 22-23.
2w. W, Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan: 
Growth and Structural Change 1868-1938 (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1966), p. 15.




The Meiji government inherited an educated popula­
tion that included the samurai, wealthy farmers, and mer­
chants. Although the traditional education stressed clas­
sical Chinese, it was somewhat secular. With the fall of 
feudalism, Japan adjusted its educational system to promote 
the building of a modern society:
The alphabet was simplified to foster literacy; 
the Ministry of Education was established in 1871 
and the school system law was passed in 1872. The 
education system was standardized throughout Japan, 
and in 1886 four years of schooling were made com­
pulsory, and in 1907 this was extended to six years.
In 1868, school enrollments (mainly in Buddhist 
temple schools) were about 10 per cent of children 
aged 5 to 19. By the end of the Meiji period al­
most two-thirds of the children in this age group 
were getting elementary schooling, and a fifth went 
to secondary schools.1
The Japanese success in increasing literacy was essential
to the rapid diffusion of new technology.
The Japanese built vocational schools, modern 
universities, research institutions, agricultural colleges, 
and sophisticated technical skills in medicine, navigation, 
fisheries, military science and commerce.̂  The increased 
emphasis on education is illustrated by the increase in 
construction expenditures for new schools in Table 19 and 
the rising enrollment ratio in Table 20.





LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION ON 
NEW SCHOOLS, 1877-1913 
(THOUSANDS OF YEN)
New School New School
Year Construction Year Construction
1877 758 1896 2,811
1878 818 1897 3,262
1879 747 1898 4,3481880 799 1899 6,386
1881 896 1900 9,809
1882 987 1901 12,362
1883 1,406 1902 10,888
1884 1,067 1903 9,545
1885 . 896 1904 2,8471886 583 1905 3,028
1887 627 1906 6,965
1888 927 1907 13,2961889 787 1908 21,0901890 737 1909 22,0451891 737 1910 18,207
1892 1,221 1911 16,708
1893 1,627 1912 14,374
1894 1,602 1913 10,909
1895 1,485
Source: Adapted from Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation
in Japan, 1868-1940 (London: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1961), Table VII-2, pp. 170,173.
TABLE 20
ENROLLMENT RATIQS IN JAPANESE 
EDUCATION, 1880-1915
Year
Primary and Two Secon­
dary Levels, Enroll­
ment as Percent of Popu­
lation Aged 5-19
Upper Secondary Enroll­
ment as Percent of Popu­
lation Aged 15-19
Higher Education Enroll­
ment as Percent of Popu­
lation Aged 20-24
1880 31 1 0.3
1915 63 21 1.3
Ma\
a\
Source: Adapted from Angus Maddison, Economic Growth in Japan and the U.S.S.R.
(New York: W. W, Norton and Company, inc., 1969), Table 6, p. 17.
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students to the West and bringing foreign experts with 
skills in military science, law, medicine, agriculture and 
industry.
Foreign experts were utilized at all educational 
levels and were influential in establishing new research 
institutions. Foreign literature was translated, aiding 
the technological inflow. Almost 4,000 foreigners were 
employed by the government during the period 1876-1895.
On the average, the foreign experts were paid ten times 
more than their Japanese counterparts.^
1868-1913 —  Building an Economic Base
The Meiji era witnessed two wrenching developments 
which changed the fundamental orientation of the Japanese 
political economy. These were the opening of Japan to 
world commerce (Commodore Perry 1853-1854) and the crumb­
ling of feudalism.2 it was largely the foreign threat that 
caused the rapid demise of feudalism. The Japanese were 
able to make the rapid transition rapidly and smoothly due 
to the informed public's fear of foreign domination and the 
weakness of the Shogunate at the end of the Tokugawa period.
^Ibid., pp. 16-17. Some 600 students were sent 
abroad from 1868 to 1895. In the same period nearly 4,000 
government officials traveled to foreign countries.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 91. It 
should be noted that perhaps Japan made the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism with less turmoil than other coun­
tries going through this phase.
168
Traditionally the Japanese glorified the Emperor above the 
Shogunate, and the Emperor gave his blessings to the anti- 
Shogunate forces which allowed a peaceful transition in the 
effective government of Japan. The new Imperial government 
was thus politically endowed with vast prestige enabling it 
to enact the needed reforms to combat foreign domination.
With the fall of feudalism, Japan's government began to take 
an active role in transforming Japanese institutions into a 
form amenable to assimilating a modern economy. This was a 
formidable task since Japan had perhaps been more severely 
restricted by rigid feudal institutions than any other pre­
capitalist country.! one eminent Japanese scholar states:
Every effort was made for over two hundred years 
to suppress growth and change . . . society was 
frozen into a legally immutable class mold . . . .  
Maintenance of the warrior class continued to take 
the surplus of society, leaving little for invest­
ment . . . .  The closed class system smothered 
creative energies and tended to freeze labor and 
talent in traditional occupations.^
The feudal institutions were an obstacle to larger markets, 
specialized and mobile labor, and the accumulation of cap­
ital.^ It was the elimination of feudal barriers which
!paul A. Baran. Political Economy of Growth, 
Prometheus Paperbacks (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1957),
p. 151.
^Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial
Development in Japan; Government and Enterprise, 1868-1880, 
as quoted by Baran, Political Economy of Growth, p. 152.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. xv.
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allowed the introduction of Western technology into a more 
receptive institutional framework.
Several factors may explain why Japan was able to 
embark on a path of sustained economic growth while its 
Asian neighbors remained in the backwash of Japan's forward 
surge. In the first two Meiji decades (1868-1885), Japan­
ese government stressed the assimilation of Western tech­
nology and opened economic advancement to all classes 
based on ability instead of status. Compulsory education 
was introduced in 1872 as a part of this policy. These 
changes were peacefully accomplished within a consciously 
planned dismantling of feudalism in a short period of time. 
Other Asian countries did not accomplish these things and 
were thus susceptible to the dehabilitating effects of 
colonialism.1 Japan was able to avoid foreign domination 
partly due to the fact that poverty and a lack of natural 
resources did not attract foreign interests. A perhaps 
typical Western opinion appeared in the Japan Herald in 
1881 which included the following statement;
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. v. Paul 
Baran suggests several reasons for the imperial powers' 
lack of an attempt to colonize Japan as they had done in 
India and China. First, Japan had little to offer as a 
market or as a source of raw materials. Second, the 
European powers were over extended in their imperialist 
efforts. Third, they did not want to spark a war over a 
rivalry in Japan. See Baran, Political Economy of Growth, 
pp. 159-60.
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Whilst by no means of opinion that the natural 
resources of Japan, whether mineral or agricul­
tural, are particularly or noticeably great, or 
that its population is especially hardworking or 
prudent, nevertheless it has the promise of a 
moderate future before it. Without expecting 
too much from its Government —  for a government 
is seldom found to differ widely from the people 
whose affairs it administers —  a condition of 
moderate affluence and tolerable content is before 
it. Wealthy we do not at all think it will ever 
become: The advantages conferred by nature, with
the exception of climate, and the love of indolence 
and pleasure of the people themselves, forbid it.
The Japanese are a happy race, and being content 
with little, are not likely to achieve much.l
As a result of the Western evaluation of Japan's 
limited economic potential and the changing attitude of 
the Japanese government toward foreign investment there 
was comparatively little foreign investment in manufactur­
ing until after World War I. In the late 1890s, when 
Japan's rapid industrialization became apparent, another 
barrier to foreign investment appeared. The zaibatsu had 
gained powerful control over the basic economic sectors 
in Japan and were able to match the West in terms of 
entrepreneurial and managerial talent. Unlike China, the 
foreigners could not operate in an institutional arrange­
ment of their own making and were thus at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the zaibatsu.%
Economic growth was necessarily slow in the first
^Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, p. 225, 
2jbid.
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years of the Meiji Restoration due to the efforts to trans­
form a feudal society into a modern economic system. Until 
1885, effort was directed toward eliminating feudal bar­
riers and building the substructure for future development. 
From 1886 to the end of the Meiji period (1913), the Japa­
nese built on this foundation with striking success.
Development of the economy was spurred by renego­
tiation of treaties which had been detrimental to economic 
growth. Japanese sovereignty over its trade was generally 
reinstated. Concurrently foreign capital was permitted to 
flow into Japan. Japan's involvement in the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese wars gave a further impetus to develop­
ment. Military success in China brought around $200 
million in reimbursements to Japan, almost equal to one- 
third of Japan's gross national product.^ The fruits of 
war were largely used to promote economic and technological 
development. They,
made possible the expansion of the army and navy, 
the extension of the railroad, telegraph and tele­
phone services, the establishment of the Yawata 
Iron Mill, as well as the adoption of the gold 
standard.^
Military success impressed the Western powers, and Japan 
was able to take advantage of the huge and unprotected
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 15.
^M. Shinohara, Growth and Cycles in the Japanese 
Economy (Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1962), as quoted by Maddison,
Economic Growth, p. 15.
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markets of China and India. These markets, along with her 
colonies served as a mass market for her manufactured goods.^ 
Data for the economic growth in the first decade of 
the Meiji period is sketchy and there are no reliable esti­
mates for this period. The growth rate from 1879 to 1913 
has been estimated to be 3.3 percent a year although this 
may be high.2 Agricultural growth was considerably less, 
perhaps less than 2 percent a year. Most estimates for in­
dustrial growth center around 5.5 percent a year for this 
period.
Japan's growth rate in the Meiji period is probably
comparable to Western countries in their same phase of
development. The distinctive factor in Japan's development
in the Meiji period was its high investment level which
enabled future growth. For example,
the joint share of government and investment in 
Meiji G.N.P. was considerably higher than in 
Europe. The share of gross domestic fixed capital 
formation in G.N.P. was 9.1 per cent from 1887 to 
1913, and government current expenditures absorbed 
up to 10 per cent of G.N.P. in this period.3
It will be demonstrated that a great deal of Japan's invest-
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 27.
^Ibid., p. 30. Estimates range from 2.7 percent 
(Maddison) to 4.3 percent. (See Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry 
Rosovsky, "A Century of Japanese Economic Growth," in The 
State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, ed. by W. W. Lock­
wood (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1965), pp. 89-92.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 33.
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ment went to developing and incorporating new technologies.
Japan's rapid acceptance of Western technology is 
attributable to several factors: the fear of foreign domi­
nation; the intellectual drive of the samurai class; the 
fact that Japan had already absorbed Chinese culture which 
eased the stress of accepting Western culture; a common 
denominator in race, law and language; a trait of obedience 
of the population; and a government willing to give high 
priority to technological improvement.  ̂ In short, the 
Japanese cultural milieu was conducive to technological 
change. Institutional resistance had crumbled and viable 
social arrangements were adapted from the previous cultural 
heritage to promote economic and technological change.
Role of Technological Transfer in Agriculture
The Meiji Restoration brought forth the Land Reform 
of 1873 replacing with prefectures the land system which 
had been controlled by the diamyo. The small buraku were 
combined into villages or mura. The tax in kind was elim­
inated along with the feudalistic structure and replaced 
by a system more consistent with a monetized economy.^ a
^Ibid., pp. 11-12. The Japanese had also been 
exposed to the Dutch influence and were not completely 
unaware of Western culture. They referred to their Western 
knowledge as "Dutch Learning." See Allen, Economic History 
of Modern Japan, p. 18.
^Ibid., p. 57.
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3 percent tax was placed on all land according to land 
value to ensure the government continuous revenues regard­
less of variance in agricultural yields.^ Land was sur­
veyed Euid its value was estimated for tax purposes. 
Responsibility for record keeping, such as ownership, was 
given by the central government to the newly established 
village office in each mura. The village office reported 
to the county level which was closely related to the pre- 
fectural government which in turn was in contact with the 
central government.2
The new land system was more compatible with Japan's 
surge toward modernization, but it carried with it a social 
cost. Wie new taxes were collected from the tenants in 
kind. Smaller landowners could not pay their taxes and 
many were forced off their land. Perhaps 7 percent of all 
farm households lost their land between 1883 and 1890. As 
the concentration of land grew, the large landowners passed 
the burden of their taxes on to their tenants. ̂ The grow-
^This is a steeper tax than it first appears. The 
actual tax on the gross value of the crop amounted initially 
to about 34 percent. See Shigeto Tsuru, "The Take-Off in 
Japan (1868-1900)" in Economics of Take-Off Into Sustained 
Growth, ed. by W. W. Rostow (New York; St. Martin's Press, 
Inc., 1963), p. 146.
oJohnson, "Land Tax and Its Impact," p. 59.
^Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century; From Perry 
to 1970 (2nd ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970),
p. 175.
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ing population pressure ensured high rents, and the large 
landowners had little desire to farm the land themselves 
or with hired labor. As a consequence small plots were 
leased to unsupervised tenants, thus inhibiting the growth 
of large farms.^
The bulk of Japanese governmental expenditures were 
directed toward sectors other than agriculture. But it was 
not until 1910 that factory manufacturing output exceeded 
cottage industry production. In 1910, Japan still had 
essentially a pre-industrial economy with agriculture respon- 
sible for more than 40 percent of net national product.
The first decade of the Meiji period witnessed the 
assimilation of ideas from the newly opened West. Japanese 
representatives came back from the Vienna Exposition of 
1873 with new kinds of plants, seeds and tools.^ In 1872 
the Shinjuku experimental station was established, partly 
in anticipation of testing the fruits of the Vienna Exposition, 
By 1876, some 313 varieties of foreign wheat and 398 foreign 
trees and grasses were being grown by the Shinjuku station.
^K. Bieda, The Structure and the Operation of the 
Japanese Economy (Sydney: John Wiley and Sons Australasia
Pty. Ltd., 1970), p. 243.
^Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, p. 8.
3r . p . Dore, "Agricultural Improvement in Japan:
1870-1900," in The Sociology of Economic Development: A
Reader, ed. by Gayl D. Ness (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1970), p. 556.
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Foreign tools were also purchased and studied at the 
experimental station. Several methods were used to diffuse 
the accumulation of agricultural knowledge. The exhibition 
method was one method of diffusing knowledge and the ex­
perimental stations were intended to be permanent exhibi­
tions. Five exhibitions, the Promotion of Industries Ex­
hibitions, between 1877 cUid 1903 were an important avenue 
of disseminating agricultural information. The Museum of 
Agriculture was established in Tokyo in 1874, and after 1880 
national prizes were given for certain products. By 1885 
the Japanese had begun to turn out trained personnel from 
their new agricultural schools and evening schools of con­
tinuing education.^
Japan's limited attempt to expand agriculture in 
the Meiji period was initially misguided. Mechanization 
and extensive cultivation techniques were borrowed from the 
Americans and British with little success. Most of the 
Japanese farmland, excepting a few acres of Hokkaido, were 
suited for small scale agriculture. Both the Americans 
who were hired to bring modern techniques to Hokkaido and 
the English who were to develop techniques for the rest of 
Japan tried to transplant Western agricultural technology 
in unaltered form in Japan. The Western experts concen­
trated on three forms of technology transplant; (1) dry-
llbid., p. 557.
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field fcurming techniques, extensive in nature, using horse- 
drawn equipment; (2) animal husbandry which included the 
introduction of pigs, sheep, cows and horses; (3) new seed 
varieties of corn, wheat, etc.l
The first of these efforts was the most misguided. 
Western techniques were extensive in nature and simply not 
applicable to wet paddy fields which are suitcible to 
intensive techniques which the Japanese had developed in 
the Tokugawa period. The second attempt to transfer animal 
husbandry ran contrary to existing agricultural patterns 
in Japan and was not likely to catch hold without consider­
able government effort and. even then with questionable 
returns. The third form of technology transfer, new seeds, 
was much more successful than the first two and was easily 
adaptable to local climactic conditions and existing agri­
cultural techniques. The Japanese government recognized 
its error in utilizing extensive farming technology, sold 
its infant farm machinery factory in 1888, and resorted to 
improving traditional Tokugawa techniques.
Japanese interest in water control brought Dutch 
engineers in 1872 with knowledge of drainage and reclama­
tion of land. Like their Western counterparts, the 
Americans and English, the Dutch also made the mistake of 
trying to literally transplant their technology unchanged
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, pp. 126, 127.
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into the different setting of Japan. The Dutch built 
flood control installations on major rivers throughout 
Japan. Unfortunately, the Dutch technology was designed 
only to control water coming up from the sea. In Japan it 
is also necessary to control the flood waters flowing down 
from the mountains. The deficiencies of the transplanted 
technology became evident with the breaking of the Yodo 
River levees in 1885, the Joganji River flood in 1891, and 
the flood of the Chikugo River in 1899. By 1896, the govern­
ment was forced to completely revamp its water control 
programs.1
After their initial failure in transferring Western 
agricultural technology, the Japanese made better use of 
German scientists brought in in 1881 to the Komaba School 
of Agriculture with surveys which permitted rational adap­
tation of Western technology to the special nature of 
Japanese agriculture.2 Komaba College was established by 
the government and eventually became the Faculty of Agri­
culture of Tokyo University. A private agricultural college 
was established in Saporo. In 1883 the Komaba college had
3a faculty of thirteen, and of these, four were foreigners.
The government began to formalize and widen the
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 127.
2lbid.
^Dore, "Agricultural Improvement in Japan," p. 557.
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channels of communication at an early stage. The publica­
tion of an agricultural bulletin was started in 1874. 
Representatives were appointed in each prefecture in 1877 
to correspond with the government Reclamation Bureau, 
called the Department, which would print information of 
value in the bulletin. Almost 2,000 farmers were receiv­
ing the bulletin by 1885.^
Experimental stations and research institutions 
were estedalished in each prefecture in 1893.  ̂ These in­
stitutions disseminated information to the farmers and were 
largely successful due to the high literacy of the popula­
tion. New techniques were accepted rapidly as a result of 
the Japanese respect for paternalistic leadership, a Confu- 
cian desire for learning, and demographic advantages of 
densely concentrated hamlets.^ In 1873 reform of the feudal 
land taxes eased the burden on the peasant which gave him 
considerably more incentive to increase his production than 
in the past. The opening of Japan to international markets 
allowed the expansion of the production of rice, tea and 
silk which provided new sources of foreign exchange.
The prefectural governments aided the dissemination 
of information and played a vital role in the pragmatic
llbid., p. 558.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 20. 
3lbid., p. 21.
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implementation of that information. Besides initiating
local organizations, they provided the necessary face-to-
face contact with the farmers.
There was a difference between the central gov­
ernment mailing a circular recommending the 
selection of seed by salt water or the drying 
of sheaves on wooden racks, and the prefectural 
office issuing the same recommendations to the 
village officials. In the latter face-to-face 
relationship with its still strong kanson-mimpi 
"the official is noble, the people base," over­
tones, a recommendation was likely to be taken 
as an order.1
In some cases, the prefectural governments did order farm­
ers to accept certain techniques or face legal punishment. 
There was some resistance to such authority, but the im­
proved techniques were eventually adopted.
Both the central and prefectural governments parti­
cipated in creating local agricultural associations. Various 
agricultural organizations had been organized on a local 
basis, either by the prefectural government or by private 
initiative. In 1880 the central government began to support 
and coordinate these organizations by urging each prefectural 
government to establish an agricultural organization. In 
1881 the Japan Agricultural Association was formed, which 
evolved into the Imperial Agricultural Association. In 1905 
compulsory membership in the Association was required of all 
farmers.%
^Dore, "Agricultural Improvement in Japan," pp. 560-61, 
Zibid., p. 558.
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Agricultural output increased in the Meiji period 
as a result of better use of land, better seeds and an 
increase in the utilization of fertilizers. During the 
period from 1880-1915 the amount of land under cultivation 
increased 30 percent. Phosphate fertilizer consumption 
increased seven times from 1878 to 1913. Inputs of 
nitrogen increased five times and potash three times in 
the same period. Other technological contributions in­
cluded the artificial incubation of silk worms permitting 
year-round production; dry paddy cultivation meiking double 
cropping possible; a rotary thresher operated by pedal was 
invented in 1910 and permitted the use of wheat and barley 
as second crops as well as reducing the manpower bottle­
neck. at harvest time; and the short soled plough which im­
proved the efficiency of ploughing small land plots.^
The government's policy of importing foreign cat­
tle, sheep, pigs, horses and poultry after 1867 helped to 
improve the Japanese diet and also provided new sources of 
fertilizer and traction power. This approach was supple­
mented by government support of literature on livestock 
farming and the training of veterinarians.%
Agricultural development was, on the whole, success­
ful in the Meiji period. The agricultural sector was able
^Maddison, Economic Growth, pp. 21-22
^Ibid., p. 22.
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to expand with only limited inputs and supplied most of 
government revenues as well as much of the savings and 
foreign exchange for the Japanese economy. The growth in 
agricultural output allowed other sectors to absorb the in­
crease in the labor supply.^ Much of the success in agri­
cultural output was the result of the pragmatic application 
of Western technology to Japan's unique social and geograph­
ical resources.
Role of Technological Transfer in Industry
As previously noted, the Japanese government di­
rected the bulk of its investment into the emerging indus­
trial sector of the economy. By the 1880s, Japan had begun 
to shift from direct government production to subsidizing 
industry. The close relationship between government and 
private enterprise in the Meiji period achieved the govern­
ment's goal of building the foundation of an industrial 
economy.
The opening of the Japanese economy to world trade 
was an important factor in stimulating technological trans­
fer. A strong demand for Japanese exports of silk, coal 
and porcelain-ware brought higher production and the appli­
cation of Western technologies to these industries. In­
creased imports of producer and consumer goods resulted in
llbid.
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a classical example of cross-fertilization of knowledge. 
Although monetary units do not fully describe the import­
ance of Japanese imports and exports in terms of techno­
logical transfer, they do offer one perspective of their 
influence. Imports of producers' durables increased from 
slightly over 1 million yen in 1868 to over 50 million yen 
in 1913. In the same period exports of producers' durables 
increased from an insignificant quantity to over 5.6 mil­
lion yen as shown in Table 21.
Japan's economic base began to change with the in­
troduction of Western technology. Great gains were made in 
mining, manufacturing, communications and transportation 
(especially shipping and railroads) . Th-̂  importation of 
kerosene and kerosene lamps permitted the use of night 
shifts.  ̂ Imported cheap iron and steel increased the dif­
fusion of new agricultural tools and machine tools.
It was not until after the third Meiji decade that 
the impact of heavy investments in capital became prominently 
noticeable. The first thirty years of Japan's capital in­
vestment were necessary before the results of the new tech­
nology could be realized in increased productivity. The 
substantial investments in transportation, railroads, ship­
ping, communications and mining did not reach a "critical 
mass" or a "take-off" stage until previous efforts could 
merge into an interrelated system.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 97.
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table 21
JAPANESE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF 
PRODUCERS' GOODS, 1868-1913 
(THOUSANDS OF YEN)
Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports
1868 1,157.2 1891 3,868.9 99.01869 480.0 1892 3,253.9 96.51870 187.0 189 3 5,162.2 200.71871 129.8 1894 15,136.5 194.41872 274.6 1895 13,300.3 310.91873 463.6 1896 12,175.1 250.11874 606.8 1897 28,850.9 256.81875 1,897.8 1898 25,974.9 234.31876 501.8 1899 13,212.9 257.31877 1,961.6 1900 15,919.8 412.71878 769.6 1901 18,956.0 730.81879 777.2 1902 14,053.3 1,353.51880 1,291.9 0.9 1903 14,927.9 1,494.51881 756.7 2.6 1904 25,447.3 1,760.21882 722.3 6.5 1905 36,579.1 2,767.91883 1,056.8 34.8 1906 28,262.9 3,195.01884 2,731.4 10.3 1907 39,515.5 8,066.31885 1,660.3 34.6 1908 45,799.3 6,598.51886 1,166.4 37.5 1909 27,535.3 3,019.51887 2,183.3 72.3 1910 23,231.0 2,978.91888 5,634.8 89.3 1911 42,104.5 2,988.31889 5,289.6 34.7 1912 44,123.0 4,366.01890 6,188.1 54.4 1913 50,490.9 5,611.5
Source; Adapted from Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in 
Japan, 1868-1940 (London: Free Press of Glencoe,
1969), Table XI-2, pp. 337-339.
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The initial introduction of Western industrial 
technology was hampered by a shortage of Japanese capital.
A glance back at Table 4 exemplifies Japan's excess of 
imports over exports of producers' durable goods. The 
capital shortage was complicated by the great expense of 
the heavy industrial systems Japan was trying to transfer 
from the West. Expensive equipment was made even more 
costly by overseas transportation costs and the expense of 
foreign experts. As in the case of agriculture, the Japa­
nese initially tried to transfer industrial technology from 
the West in unaltered form. But with the capital constraint 
and a large supply of low-cost labor the government recog­
nized the advantages of encouraging labor-intensive 
technologies.
In the 1870s the Japanese began to stress the 
adaptation of Western technology to industry. Private 
businessmen saw the government's error of attempting to 
introduce Western technology in unchanged form and began 
to work on adapting it to the uniqueness of the Japanese 
case. The Besshi copper mines are a good example of 
Japanese modification of Western technology. In 1874 
Sumitomo Besshi paid foreign technologists to make a 
detailed geological survey of the Besshi copper mines 
to see what changes should be made in plant operations. ̂ 
Specifications were established to guide new procedures and 
to acquire machinery best suited to the Besshi mines. Labor
^Ibid., pp. 138, 139.
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was substituted for machinery when possible. When capital 
became available, modern mechanization was adopted.
The problems of shortages of capital in Japan and 
the lack of technological know-how were complicated by the 
lack of marketing outlets for large-scale production.^
These factors caused the Japanese to focus on small and 
medium sized businesses. But Western machinery was de­
signed for large-scale production and had to be adapted to 
the smaller Japanese business unit. This was accomplished 
by producing a new version of the Western machinery in Japan. 
The transplant of Western machinery in toto did not work 
as illustrated by the government's failure in such attempts. 
Perhaps the best example of the Japanese modification of 
Western machinery is the silk industry.
The first mechanized silk reeling plant was estab­
lished by the government in 1871 and was a transplant of 
French technology.% It was intended to be a model for 
future mechanization but its huge size defied mass imita­
tion for the reasons stated above. Smaller business units 
utilized wooden machines which were cheaper and simpler 
than the expensive French machinery made of steel. Labor- 
intensive techniques were substituted for machinery when 
necessary.
llbid., p. 141. 
Zibid., p. 142.
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The textile industry is another example of Japan­
ese indigenization of Western machinery. In the first 
Meiji decade expensive and complicated machinery was 
imported from the West. In the second Meiji decade the 
Japanese began to produce their own textile machinery 
which was cheaper and easier to operate. Thus small-scale 
operations could afford mechanization, and the labor force 
could adapt more easily to the simplified machinery.
The rapid adaptation of Western machinery to Japa­
nese needs resulted in import substitution as various 
Western goods were produced domestically. The import of 
this transition can be seen in Table 22 for such varied 
products as umbrellas, cement, clothing and matches. Table 23 
demonstrates that the Japanese were highly successful in their 
newly acquired manufacturing techniques as testified to by 
the number of formerly Western products which the Japanese 
began to export. Table 24 suggests that the Japanese were 
also successful in producing their own durable equipment.
The production of locomotives shown in Table 25 is a 
specific example of the Japanese experience.
Although the adaptation of large scale Western ma­
chinery to the small-scale Japanese business unit was impor­
tant in developing the Japanese economy, it was the intro­
duction of heavy industry and modern mass production which 
enabled the Japanese to embark on a path of rapid economic
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TABLE 22
WESTERN-STYLE GOODS IMPORTED —  TENDENCY TO DOMESTIC
SUPPLY (THROUGH SECOND MEIJI DECADE)
Maximum Import Import Level
Money Value in 1884
Product 1,000 Yen Year 1,000 Yen
Stationery supplies 129 1879 7
Sailing ships 122 1879 3
Shoes 296 1872 11
Collars 14 1873 — —
Scarves 53 1878 7
Gloves 47 1873 16
Shirts 41 1873 — —
Socks 22 1873 14
Knitted cotton underwear 767 1873 17
Glass products 537 1873 146
Unbleached muslin 3,505 1874 856
Furniture 85 1873 10
Matches 96 1876 2
Laundry soap 48 1876 11
Cosmetic soap 56 1880 17
Umbrellas 412 1873 1
Miscellaneous goods 1,066 1873 209
Cement 52 1875 32
Lamps 139 1880 54
Source: Kcunekichi Takahashi, The Rise and Development of
Japan * s Modern Economy, trans. by John Lynch 
(Tokyo: The Jiji Press, Ltd., 1969), Table 1, p. 145.
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TABLE 23
TIME WHEN NEWLY INTRODUCED WESTERN 
PRODUCTS' INDUSTRIES' MERCHANDISE 









Cotton rugs 1880 1894
Cotton knitted goods 1878 1893
Umbrellas 1880 1893
Cosmetic soap 1879 1905
Socks 1880 1906
Tooth powder 1873 1918
Gloves 1880 1916
Shoes 1880 — —
Jinrikisha 1880 —  —
Unbleached muslin 1896 1899
Cement 1896 1903
Glass porducts 1902 1909
Source: Kamekichi Takahashi, The Rise and Development of
Japan's Modern Economy, trans. by John Lynch 




DURABLE EQUIPMENT EXCLUDING MILITARY 


















Source: Adapted from Henry Rosovsky, Capital Forma­
tion in Japan, 1868-1940 (London: Free
Press of Glencoe, 1969), Table 17, p. 50.
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TABLE 25
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF LOCOMOTIVES USED 
BY JAPAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS





1892 240 26 28
1897 484 282 55 3 11
1902 684 524 70 11 30
1907 966 908 160 11 95
1912 983 995 226 11 162
Source : Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, 1868-1940
(London : Free Press of Glencoe, 1969) , Table 25,
p. 94.
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growth. As stated earlier, the fruits of such investments 
did not become evident until after the third Meiji decade. 
The Japanese government had directly or indirectly supported 
modern industry in the first three Meiji decades. Mining, 
shipyards, model factories, cement, glass, and type foundry 
plants were developed by the government and then sold to 
private interests. Railroads, telegraphy, the Yokosuka 
shipyards, the Akabane military arsenal, and the Osaka mint 
were kept under public control.^ The government had drawn 
heavily from tax levies and gains made through the eradica­
tion of the inefficient feudal structure to finance these 
investments. As the amount of human resources and capital 
accumulation increased, productivity increased, permitting a 
more rapid development of the modern large-scale operations.
The typical expansion of Japan's modern industry 
followed the pattern of initial importation of foreign 
equipment combined with foreign exports and then developing 
its domestic capacity to produce modified Western equipment. 
Table 24 illustrates Japan's import of durable equipment in­
creasing from 8.1 million yen in the period 1887-1896 to 
28.4 million yen in the period 1907-1916. Total domestic
Ibid., pp. 231, 232. The government did rely on 
British financing for their first railroads (1869). British 
Engineers used British materials and equipment to construct 
the railway between Tokyo and Yokohama. See G. C. Allen 
and Audrey G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern 
Economic Development; China and Japan (New York: The Mac­
millan Company, 1954) , p. 192.
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output of durable equipment for the corresponding periods 
increased from 4.5 million yen to 111.7 million yen.
Japan's large increase in domestic production complemented 
its importation of embodied Western technology and was 
crucial for continuing growth. As the above figures dem­
onstrate, imports could not possibly have satisfied Japan's 
drive toward industrialization. Japan's rapid increase in 
durable equipment permitted expansion without foreign domi­
nation. Thus in the construction of railroads Japan imported 
a large amount of equipment, as shown in Table 25, but was 
êÜDle to maintain domestic control over this key sector of 
the economy.
CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE MEIJI PERIOD, 1913-1965
1913-1938 Accelerated Growth 
Japan's economic growth accelerated with the advent 
of World War I. This growth was made possible by the foun­
dation constructed in the Meiji era. Total output between 
1913 and 1938 increased by 4 percent per year while agri­
cultural and manufacturing output increased 1.2 percent and 
7 percent, respectively, in this same period. Growth of 
real gross national product in the period 1913-1938 in­
creased by 4 percent and the real gross national product 
per capita increased 2.6 percent in this time span.^
World War I broke the European control over inter­
national trade and opened new markets to the Japanese. As 
the European powers directed their efforts toward war pro­
duction the Japanese moved into previously unaccessible 
markets. The vast textile markets in India and China were 
exploited by Japan while the British were preoccupied with 
war. The export of cotton cloth in physical volume in­
creased by 185 percent between 1913 and 1918.  ̂ Great
^Maddison, Economic Growth, pp. 35-36. 
^Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, p. 38
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gains were also made in heavy industrial production, e.g., 
steel, machinery and ships. Between 1914 and 1919 the 
number of factory workers in Japan nearly doubled from 
1,187,249 to 2,024,870. The Nagoya physical output index 
rose 29 percent in mining while railway freight doubled 
in volume. In this period Japan began to build its infant 
chemical industry and engineering capabilities.^ Japan's 
tremendous growth in exports permitted the payment of debts 
and the financing of its growing industrial base.
In 1920 a depression hit Japan which was followed 
by a natural disaster, the earthquake of 1923 which de­
stroyed huge amounts of property. A reconstruction boom 
occurred after the earthquake but ended in financial panic 
in 1927.
The great worldwide depression of the 1930s affec­
ted Japan's growth but perhaps not so much as other coun­
tries. Many of the industrialized countries began to dump 
their goods in foreign markets. Japan, lacking many natural 
resources, imported raw materials and was able to acquire 
them at attractive prices. Cheap raw materials gave Japan 
a competitive edge over the industrialized countries where 
prices were maintained at a higher level.^ Japan's com- 
petetive success caused other countries to retaliate with
^Ibid., p. 40.
^Takahashi, Japan's Modern Economy, p. 5.
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trade barriers which limited Japanese growth. This touched 
off the Manchurian Incident (1931) giving Japan a source of 
raw materials and prompted a strategy of self-sufficiency 
in heavy industry and chemicals.^ From 1931 to 1938 Japan 
heavily engaged in the production of military goods. Heavy 
industry was rapidly developed to support the military.
Japanese exports increased an astounding 70 percent
in volume in the period 1929 to 1937. In value the amount
of exports increased 5.2 percent annually between 1931 and
1937 and exports accounted for 27 percent of gross national
product by 1937. The characteristics of Japanese exports
were changing dramatically, reflecting Japan's industrial
transition. In 1913, 29 percent of Japanese exports were
finished goods. By 1938, this figure had increased to 58
percent. The export of tea had become insignificant and
the export of raw silk accounted for only 14 percent of
2Japan's exports in 1938.
Great gains were made in the industrial sector for 
the period 1913 to 1938, but agriculture did not fare 
nearly so well. Instead of a net contribution, the agri­
cultural sector was subsidized by the emerging industrial 
sector. The government stabilized the price of rice and
^Ibid., p. 6 
2Maddison, Economic Growth, pp. 37, 38.
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insured crops. Agriculture accounted for 61 percent of 
the total labor force in 1913. This figure dropped to 
46 percent by 1938.^
Role of Technological Transfer in Agriculture
Agricultural production did not match the impressive 
growth rate of industry in the inter-war period. Korea and 
Formosa supplied food imports to Japan's lagging agricul­
tural sector. The export of tea became relatively unimpor­
tant while silk exports failed to regain the peak achieved 
in 1929.2 In fact, about the only favorable agricultural 
development was the enlargement of the ammonium sulphate 
industry which caused fertilizer prices to fall and consump­
tion to increase.^
Small farm size and tenancy limited technological 
innovations, but the government did promote the production 
and use of fertilizer, increased irrigation and drainage, 
and stimulated the use of some light machinery.4 Further,
llbid., p. 84.
2Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 44.
^Shujiro Sawada, "Innovation in Japanese Agricul­
ture, 1880-1935," in The State and Economic Enterprise in 
Japan; Essays in the Political Economy of Growth, ed. by 
W. W. Lockwood (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1965), p. 344.
^Production was further limited by the small amount 
of cultivated land area, approximately 16 percent of the 
total land area, due to the mountainous terrain. See Jerome
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advisory services were increased by the government subsid­
ization of co-operatives.1
The technological developments of Meiji agriculture 
continued into the 1930s but at a much slower pace. Tradi­
tional social structure, such as the small family farm, 
limited the amount of technological and economic growth.% 
Fortunately, the growth of the traditional sector in Japan 
continued long enough to permit the modern industrial sec­
tor to establish a firm base. Thus, when technological and 
economic growth slowed down in the inter-war period Japan's 
modern industrial sector had been secured.3 After the war, 
government support of agriculture increased greatly, and 
land reforms were enacted. Especially important were the 
contributions of the nonagricultural sector to agricultural 
technology. Insecticides, pesticides and chemical fertilizers 
were especially important in this regard.^
B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minne­
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 364.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 44.
Sawada, "Innovation in Agriculture," p. 348. One 
interesting indication of Japan's labor intensive approach 
to agriculture is the fact that the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry reported that only 99 farm tractors were in Japan in 
1942, and 65 of these were located in Hokkaido. See Cohen, 
Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p. 364.




In general, agricultural growth was very slow in 
the inter-war period, and the amount of technological 
transfer to Japanese agriculture in this period was very 
small. The Tokugawa and Meiji technological improvements 
were running into diminishing returns by the early 1900s.
It was not until the post-World War II period that Japanese 
agriculture began to move rapidly forward.
Role of Technological Transfer in Industry 
Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, 
the West was influential in Japanese commerce, shipping 
and the financing of Japan's foreign trade. By World War I 
the Western influence in these areas had become relatively 
minor. The case of manufacturing was quite different. Af­
ter World War I, the Western influence in Japanese manufac­
turing became much more important than in the past. The 
reason for this can be traced to the early intervention by 
the Japanese government in the manufacturing sector which 
delayed the entry of foreign firms. Foreign firms were 
faced with competition from Japanese firms subsidized by a 
government which was fearful of foreign domination. Further, 
Western firms were skeptical of the profitability as well as 
the security of their investments in Japan. The general 
foreign attitude toward Japan was to use it as an outlet 
for manufactured goods and a source of some raw materials. 
Westerners did not think it worthwhile to enter into the
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development of public utilities, mining, communications or 
manufacturing.
Even the foreign investment after World War I was 
not great in relation to the total investment of the Japa­
nese economy. Total foreign business investment increased 
from 70 million yen in 1913 to 200 million yen in 1933, not 
a quantitatively significant amount compared to the total 
Japanese investment. Japanese investment outside of Japan 
proper was nearly 2,500 million yen in 1931. The small 
size of foreign investment belies its importance in terms 
of technological inflow. Similarly, the importation of 
foreign automobiles, machinery and instruments only amounted 
to 39 million yen in 1909-1913 and 120 million yen in 
1929-1933, not even 10 percent of Japan's total imports, 
but was tremendously important in transferring technology 
to Japan.^
The foreign contribution to Japan was especially 
important after World War I in the manufacturing industries 
that required advanced technology. But even in this area 
the Japanese maintained a great deal of control over the 
foreign investment. Often the foreign investment flowed 
into firms originally established by the Japanese, and it 
was accepted only when it was necessary to permit further 
advances. The foreigner was therefore not a pioneer per se
^Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, p. 325.
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and his role was often similar to the Western advisors in 
the Meiji period.^ However, following World War I foreign 
technology could no longer be acquired by merely bringing 
in foreign advisors. The transfer of technology was done 
through the licensing of patents and the technical follow-up 
within a financial arrangement between foreign and Japanese 
firms.
It is interesting to note that the Japanese developed 
a conglomerate form of business organization before the 
American trend toward conglomerates began. To a great 
extent this is a product of Japan's adaptation to Western 
technology. As the zaibatsu bought out the mining industry, 
shipbuilding, etc., from the government, they needed to pro­
vide facilities for repair of imported Western equipment and 
eventually the manufacture of that equipment. There were no 
other outside companies in Japan capable of supplying this 
equipment and the large companies established their own 
machine-building plants. In some cases a single plant would 
engage in a variety of productive activities. The Hidachi
factory produced a vast range of electrical equipment, rail-
2way cars, mining machinery, automobiles and machine tools.
^Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, p. 228.
^G. C. Allen, "Japanese Industry: Its Organiza­
tion and Development to 1937," in The Industrialization of 
Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940, ed. by E. B. Schumpeter (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 612-13.
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After World War I many of the heavy industry compa­
nies manufactured equipment under patent by foreign firms 
and acquired license rights. Turbines were licensed by 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries from Escher Wyss and Ljungstron, 
Boilers were manufactured by Hidachi eind licensed from Yar­
row. Much of the production of telephone equipment and 
electric lighting products was licensed from Americans.^ 
Japanese and foreigners often joined together in 
forming engineering firms. Toyo-Babcock was owned by 
Mitsui and Babcock and Wilcox. General Electric joined
Mitsui in the Shibaura Engineering Works. Armstrong-
2Vickers combined with Mitsui to form Japanese Steel.
Siemens Schuckert of Germany combined with Furukaw 
and Westinghouse and Mitsubishi Electrical Engineering 
Company entered into the manufacturing and distribution 
of electrical goods. Other foreign firms, mostly American, 
acquired minority interests in industries such as glass, 
aluminum, petroleum, sewing machines and film.^ Toyo 
Electrical Engineering Company had patent licensing agree­
ments with Dick Kerr and Company of England. The Sumitomo 
Electrical Wire and Cable Company had patent agreements 
with British, American and Italian firms.^ Foreign firms
llbid., p. 612.
^Ibid.
^Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, p. 323.
^Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, p. 230.
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produced cotton card-clothing, sewing thread, paper bags, 
carbon brushes, protective paints and automatic sprinkler 
equipment.^
Several engineering plants were entirely owned by
foreigners in the period between 1920 and 1940. General
Motors and Ford accounted for four-fifths of the yearly
production of automobiles. Almost the entire Gramophone
2output was produced by one foreign firm.
It is useful to examine briefly the history of 
several industries which effectively transferred technology 
from the West. This is by no means a detailed analysis, 
nor is it all-inclusive. The purpose is to illustrate the 
pattern of successful technological transfer in Japan.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, two 
foreign oil companies were established in Japan, the 
Standard Oil Company and a subsidiary of Shell, the Rising 
Sun Petroleum Company. These companies imported refined 
oils and built oil refineries to handle crude oil imports. 
Following World War I these companies rapidly expanded 
their operations and created distribution outlets in Japan 
and in its colonies. The Rising Sun Petroleum Company and 
Standard Oil still maintained 45 percent of the sales of 
gasoline in 1535. The Japanese government finally brought
^Ibid., p. 231.
^Allen, "Japanese Industry," p. 612.
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the two companies under control in 1936.
The electric lamp industry was consolidated in 
1905 by the Tokyo Electric Light Company of America. Ex­
pansion outside of this company was limited by General 
Electric's patent on the tungsten filament. The patent 
expired in 1927 and several medium-size companies began to 
produce house lamps. By 1935 Japan produced almost three- 
fourths of its house lamps for domestic consumption and 
exported the remainder.
The Dunlop company began to manufacture in Japan 
in 1909 in order to avoid tariffs. Dunlop supplied the 
great majority of Japan's rubber tires for motor vehicles 
and much of the production of bicycle tires until World 
War II. The second largest producer of rubber goods was 
the Yokohama Rubber Company which was formed by the Good­
rich Company and Furukawa.
Another indication of the technological flow into 
Japan is the importance of the utilization of Western 
technology in Japan's war machine. Shortly after World 
War I Japan embarked on the building of an aircraft indus­
try and hired a British firm to train the Japanese in 
operations and design until they were capable of running 
their own installation.^ Japan entered World War II with 
its aircraft industry equipped with 50 percent foreign-
^Ibid., p. 231. 
^Ibid., p. 193.
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made tools. Japan's technicians were trained in American 
aircraft plants such as Douglas, Boeing and Lockheed. 
Japanese propellers and engines were based on American 
designs acquired under licensing agreements. The Japanese 
were also experimenting with German technology in the area 
of rocket and jet powered planes, although these never did 
become operational.̂
Technological transfer to Japan was aided by for­
eign importers who would send the Japanese sangles of for­
eign products for the Japanese to emulate, producing cheap 
tools for the importers. In about 1934 an American chain 
store sent samples of Czech glass atomizers and tableware 
to the Japanese and ordered large quantities of the cheap 
copies. An Italian merchant sent straw hats from Italy to 
be copied and sold to the Americans. Other Western prod­
ucts such as bicycles, toys and Gramophones were obtained 
by the Japanese and produced for export to the foreigners 
who had supplied the samples.^
1938-1965 —  Explosive Growth 
Given the devastating impact of the war upon Japan's 
economy, it is hardly surprising that most people, including 
the Japanese, were pessimistic about the future. Jerome
^Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, p. 331. 
Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise, p. 209.
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Cohen in his book Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruc­
tion could find few bright spots in the economic future of 
Japan. The prospects for the production of steel, tex­
tiles, food, etc., all looked quite gloomy. In regard to 
food production he stated in 1948;
U.S. grain iitports have in the post-war period 
come to replace the traditional sources of Japanese 
food imports. Nor can the gap be closed by the 
expansion of domestic output and the gradual elim­
ination of imports. The limited arable land area 
and the expanding Japanese population combine as 
factors to make this hope pure wishful thinking 
on the part of the Japanese.^
Japan today is self-sufficient in the production of rice, 
its main food, and faces a rice surplus problem. The Japa­
nese have surprised the world in their achievements in 
nearly every sector of their economy. By 1954 Japan's 
gross national product had regained its pre-war peaks.
Gross national product on a per capita basis matched pre­
war levels by 1957. By 1959 exports had regained their 
pre-war volume.̂
Explosive growth began in 1953 after Japan had 
recovered from the post-war shock of institutional change. 
Gross national product increased by 9.4 percent annually 
between 1953 and 1965. Manufacturing set the pace as out­
put increased 13.6 percent each year for the 1953-1965
p. 478.
2
^Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction,
Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 50.
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period. Agricultural output grew at a respectable 4.2 
percent yearly rate in this period.^
This rapid growth took place within a worldwide 
economic boom which gave additional impetus to the Japanese 
econony. The zaibatsu who had been broken in the post­
war period regained their powerful organizations and, com­
bined with government cooperation, they formed a formidable 
competitive force in the international markets.^
Japan's gross national product per capita grew at 
a remarkable 8.3 percent between 1953 and 1965.* Abortion 
clinics were set up throughout Japan and contributed to the 
decline of the birth rate from 34 per 1,000 in 1947 to 20 
per 1,000 in the late 1960s. The decline in the birth rate 
meant that less effort needed to be devoted to social over­
head projects for nonproductive children. This enabled 
more resources to be directly chaneled into improving in­
dustrial output.5
^Ibid.
^James B. Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy (Blooming­
ton: Indiana University Press, 1958), p. 19.
^The resurgence of the zaibatsu actually took a 
somewhat looser form of keiretsu (meaning linked group) 
composed of former zaibatsu but without the central control 
of the past. See Bieda, Japanese Economy, p. 210.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 51.
^Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: 
Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., T970), p. 77.
208
Japan's extraordinarily high rate of saving has 
permitted high investment. Saving as a percent of gross 
national product was more than 30 percent in 1960 and has 
risen to almost 40 percent in the 1960s. Half of the saving 
is done by firms, 30 percent results from personal saving 
and the remainder is accounted for by the government.^
Given the expansionary attitude of the keiretsu, the com­
mitment to economic growth by the government and the high 
value placed on education (requiring saving) by the Japanese 
people, it becomes obvious that the saving is predominately 
chaneled into areas which accelerate economic growth. The 
combination of the historical frugality of the Japanese and 
the elimination of military expenditures has aided the in­
vestment process. Investment in research and development, 
purchasing of foreign technology, education, transportation, 
communications, industry and agriculture have been vital 
contributions to Japan's explosive growth.
Japan's gross national product declined from 1939 
to 1944 due to the ravages of World War II. Japan emerged 
from the war without her colonies, her merchant marine 
destroyed and perhaps one-fourth of the buildings destroyed. 
Japan's recovery lagged as the very economic and social 
structure underwent jolting change. The zaibatsu were 
broken, crippling Japan's competitive ability. China and
^Bieda, Japanese Economy, p. 49.
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North Korea were lost as trading partners while European 
countries erected formidable trade barriers. The Japanese 
had to assimilate some five million returning soldiers and 
expatriates from former colonies. Japan's industrial sec­
tor had been fractured by the war and could not absorb the 
returning manpower. The vast military conplex was disman­
tled, leaving Japanese industry without its principal raison 
d'etre. For more than sixty years the Japanese had allocated 
more of their resources to the military than any other coun­
try. What capacity was left was not readily translated into 
peace time production.^
In spite of these obstacles, Japan became the third 
largest industrial power in the world (in terms of gross 
national product) in only a quarter of a century. Many 
books in the literature offer essentially the same inter­
pretation for this success. Some of the success factors 
mentioned are: the high propensity of the Japanese to save,
foreign aid from the United States, land reform, a strong 
commitment to development by the government, a high level 
of education and an ability to assimilate new technologies. 
All of these factors are important, but if any one factor 
were most crucial, it would probably be the development of 
human resources. The Japanese quite simply had developed
^Maddison, Economic Growth, pp. 45-48 and also 
Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, pp. 417-504.
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their most important resource, people. Secondly, they
began to direct their knowledge toward nonmilitary oriented
sectors of their economy. In the words of one expert on
world resources :
Japan has demonstrated for all times, that a country 
with educated people anywhere in the world, if it 
puts progress as its goal, avoids wasting its re­
sources on military ventures, and plans for economic 
development, can make substantial progress. Japan 
has done this by concentrating on the development of 
humem resources and man-made institutions, a coopera­
tive government, a unique labor-management relation­
ship, and a banking system devoted to the concept of 
economic development.1
Japan's spectacular recovery did not spring mysteriously
from the rubble of its devastated cities. Japan has an
ancient heritage of advanced culture. Even in the Tokugawa
period the peasant farmer had a relatively high exposure to
education.2 The Meiji Restoration relied upon the agricul-
Ŵ. N. Peach and James A. Constantin, Zimmerman * s 
World Resources and Industries (3rd ed.; New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 535.
2Thomas C. Smith concludes his authoritative book 
The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan with the following 
paragraph: "For the past century . . . the villages have
been exporting much of their best human material, or rather 
those best fitted for the relentless competitive struggle 
of urban life. Part of the dynamism of Japanese moderniza­
tion must be found in this continuous flow of talented, 
aggressive, ambitious people. What was there in village 
life to produce such people in great number from the end of 
the Tokugawa period on? What social alchemy made of peasant 
boys men who could found international banks and trading 
companies? I do not know, but beyond question part of the 
answer is to be found somewhere in the history of change in 
rural Japan before 1868." See Smith, Agrarian Origins of 
Modern Japan, p. 213.
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tural sector as the principal source of revenue for indus­
trial development. Japan's social fabric, the religion, 
kinship patterns and samurai ethic were translated into 
resources for development. World War II interrupted the 
surge of growth which began in the Meiji period. After 
the war the Japanese still had their cultural heritage and 
a high level of literacy. War had not destroyed this heri­
tage which was the foundation for the Japanese recovery.
Pole of Technological Transfer in Agriculture 
Attempts by the government following the Meiji Re­
storation to create large farms failed. The failure was a 
result of the lack of appropriate machinery in that period 
combined with the peculiarities of rice production. Further, 
the lure of high rents from landless peasants was a great 
incentive to breakdown large farms.̂  Thus, the cultivated 
land under tenancy rose until it reached a peak of 46 per­
cent of all cultivated land in 1941.^
Bie agricultural sector had to absorb millions of 
returning soldiers, expatriates of former colonies and the 
displaced workers from Japan's war-wrecked industry. The 
Second Land Reform initiated in 1946 broke up large owner­
ships and allowed millions of farmers to purchase small
^Ibid., p. 244.
^R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (London: Oxford
University Press, 1959), p. 19.
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plots of land. Thus large numbers of people were engaged 
in labor-intensive agriculture in the post-war period while 
the nonagricultural sector slowly recovered. The unemploy­
ment problem in the cities was alleviated at the same time 
that more human effort was directed toward the critical 
food shortage.
The Second Land Reform was very successful in in­
creasing agricultural output and in absorbing the labor 
supply not demanded by the industrial sector. Approximately 
one-third of the farming land was expropriated and redis­
tributed to previous tenants. Land tenancy was effectively 
eliminated by the reform program. The new owners purchased 
the land under generous loan arrangements with the govern­
ment. Payments were no longer made in kind but in cash.
Since the payments were set at very low rates,the farmers 
have had relatively little trouble in meeting their obli­
gations.^ The end of the land tenancy system greatly in­
creased the farmers' incentive to produce and to improve 
their land. The concomitant redistribution of income allowed 
them to acquire new seed varieties, fertilizers, pesticides 
cind mechanically powered cultivators, tractors, sprayers, 
dusters, ventilating and drying machines, trucks and powered
^There were a significant number of repossessions 
by landlords from previous tenants. Some were justified, 
such as those families that had temporarily leased land 
while their sons went to war. See Dore, Land Reform in 
Japan, P. 152.
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tricycles. Japan now has the highest utilization of chem­
ical fertilizers, pesticides and mechanical power per ha 
(1 ha = 2.45 acres) than any other country in the world.^
As the nonagricultural sector began to grow more 
rapidly, there began an exodus from rural to urban areas 
and from agricultural to nonagricultural employment. Dur­
ing the period 1953-1965, 4.6 million fewer workers were 
engaged in agriculture. At the same time the number of 
nonagricultural jobs was growing by 3.8 percent annually.% 
Japan's labor-intensive agriculture became more mechanized 
as the flood of labor flowed into the industrial sector.
As stated earlier, the average farm size did not increase 
significantly for a variety of reasons, and Japanese 
agriculture remains labor-intensive though highly mechan­
ized.
The role of technological transfer to agriculture 
is not so easily traced in the post-war period as in ear­
lier periods. Perhaps this is because Japan had already 
developed its own labor-intensive technology and had little 
need of foreign flows.^ It produces most of its own small 
tractors and power-operated sprayers, cultivators, etc.
^Bieda, Japanese Economy, pp. 249, 261.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, pp. 52-53.
^Japan did import both European and American 
pesticide technology. See Allen, Economic History of Modern 
Japan, p. 122.
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Even an automatic rice-planting machine was developed in 
the 1960s.1 Japan is now an exporter of rice, a result of 
increased inputs and a protectionist policy, but also as a 
result of the Green Revolution. However, Japan, a country 
seemingly so conscious of comparative advantage, could do 
much better by importing much more of its agricultural sup­
plies. This would enable it to devote more energy toward 
the industrial sector and allow the less developed countries 
to purchase more Japanese products.
While Japan's Second Land Reform was stTcessful in 
solving the problems of the 1940s and 1950s it has since 
become a hindrance to further development. Instead of 
labor surpluses, there are now labor shortages —  in both 
industry and agriculture (as witnessed by the increased 
mechanization of Japanese agriculture). Returns are far 
higher in the industrial sector, but the land system retards 
the flow of manpower to the urban areas. Larger farms are 
prevented by government maximum limits on land holdings,
^Bieda, Japanese Economy, p. 253.
^Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change; The Green 
Revolution and Development in the 1970s (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1970), pp. 191-92.
^Increasingly farming is becoming a part-time occu­
pation. Much of the work is done by women and the elderly. 
In 1967 there were nearly one million more women engaged in 
farming than men. See Prue Dempster, Japan Advances; A 
Geographical Study (2nd ed.; London: Methuen and Company,
Ltd., 1969), p. 119.
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low land rents from leasing and prohibition of leasing some 
lands, an inadequate pension plan, an attachment to land 
ownership, inflated prices of land, government price sup­
ports, expensive urban housing and high capital gains taxes.^ 
Japan's land system has evolved from a feudalistic 
arrangement to a concentration of land ownership (but not 
large farms) under the Meiji Restoration to the present 
highly labor-intensive agricultural land-use pattern. Japan's 
labor-intensive approach in the post-war period may serve as 
a model to the less developed countries today who have labor 
surpluses. However, the labor-intensive agricultural system 
may well have outlived its usefulness in Japan.
Role of Technological Transfer in Industry 
In 1945 industrial activity was only 63.2 percent of 
the 1934-1936 base industrial activity index. Public utili­
ties were only 87.8, industrial production only 60.2, mining 
only 73.0 and manufacturing only 59.1 percent of the 1934- 
1936 base years figures as shown in Table 26. Not until 1951 
did the index for any of these sectors except public utilities 
surpass the 1934-1936 base. By 1955 all of these indexes ex- 
cept mining had surpassed the war and pre-war peaks.
^Bieda, Japanese Economy, p. 254.
2The fact that Japan has had to import large amounu. 
of raw material such as oil, coal and iron, may be an advan­
tage. The transportation by huge ships may be cheaper than
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TABLE 26









1934 89.9 90.9 89.8 92.0 89.6
1935 99.2 100.4 99.0 98.3 99.1
1936 110.3 108.7 110.5 109.7 110.6
1937 128.6 119.1 129.7 118.2 130.7
1938 141.1 130.3 142.4 126.0 143.7
1939 146.6 136.7 147.8 131.3 149.2
1940 147.9 140.4 148.8 142.7 149.3
1941 150.0 153.5 149.6 145.0 150.0
1942 145.6 154.5 144.5 140.7 144.8
1943 159.7 156.2 160.1 147.0 161.2
1944 176.2 154.4 178.8 138.5 182.1
1945 63.2 87.8 60.2 73.0 59.1
1946 39.2 109.1 30.7 52.2 28.9
1947 46.2 124.0 37.4 66.6 35.1
1948 61.8 137.9 54.6 80.3 52.5
1949 76.7 155.4 71.0 92.2 68.9
1950 88.0 168.1 83.6 96.9 82.0
1951 119.4 184.7 114.4 110.8 115.1
1952 131.8 201.2 126.4 114.2 128.2
1953 161.2 220.7 155.1 122.6 159.7
1954 173.5 236.9 166.9 117.0 173.8
1955 187.9 255.0 180.7 117.7 189.4
1956 227.4 294.8 219.1 129.7 231.3
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics of Japan (Tokyo:
Bank of Japan, 1956), p. 203.
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The United States occupation forces had initially 
followed a policy of making the Japanese create their own 
recovery. It soon became obvious that this policy was un­
realistic. In order to ease the United States tax burden 
and to stave off communism, it was deemed necessary to aid 
Japan's reconstruction. Two billion dollars of direct aid 
flowed into Japan in the five years following the war.^
Japan, like Germany, was able to reconstruct its industrial 
base v/ith the most modern technology. Japan's international 
trade relations began to normalize in 1952 when it was al­
lowed to enter the Gene^-al Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The United States helped Japan enter trade agreements with 
other countries. United States corporations formed arrange­
ments with Japanese corporations to transfer technology 
through patents, machinery, copyrights and the training of 
technicians. In conjunction with direct government aid and 
private cooperation, the World Bank greatly aided the recon­
struction of the Japanese steel and electric power industries.^ 
The Korean War spurred the growth of Japan's indus-
land transportation. These ships unload raw materials 
directly to factories and steel mills located in port cities. 
See Kiyoshi Kawahito, The Japanese Steel industry; With an 
Analysis of the U.S. Steel Import Problem (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 56, 123.
^Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy, p. 18.
^Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction,
p. 20.
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trial activity, generating profits which were used to ac­
quire new technologies. A domestic boom followed the 
Korean War, driving profits upward and resulting in the 
very high capital formation. Table 27 shows comparative 
rates of capital accumulation for Japan and other selected 
Western countries. Japan has continued to have a greater 
rate of capital accumulation than any other country in the 
world.1 This capital formation was different in kind from 
the pre-war investment. This time capital formation was 
not directed to military growth, but to improving general 
industrial productive capacity with the most up-to-date 
technology.
TABLE 27
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION RATES IN MAJOR COUNTRIES* 
(Annual Percentage Changes)
Year Japan U.S. U.K.
West
Germany France Canada
1939 24% 8% 11% 19% 13% n . a.
1950 25 21 11 23 19 24%
1951 32 19 16 23 20 26
1952 28 16 13 23 19 23
1953 28 17 15 21 17 25
1954 25 16 14 22 18 22
1955 25 19 17 25 18 24
1956 29 18 16 24 19 28
^Public and private gross capital formation.
Source; Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy (Bloom­
ington: Indiana University Press, 1958), p. 52.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 57,
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Ten years after World War II the Japanese had con­
structed modern plants which contained, however, obsolete 
equipment. The Japanese sought technical assistance from 
foreign countries. Thus,
by March 31, 1957, 662 private technical assis­
tance contracts had been signed, 448 of them, 
or 67 percent, with U.S. firms. These agree­
ments, which follow no one set pattern, provide 
for Japanese use of foreign patents, permit the 
sending of Japanese engineers and technicians to 
the foreign corporation's plants for training, 
bring United States and other foreign engineers 
and specialists to Japan to train the Japanese in 
new techniques and procedures, etc. The capital­
ized value of these contracts, at the end of 1955, 
was placed at $353 million and during fiscal 1956 
the Japanese paid royalties on them amounting to 
$28 million.1
Over 50 percent of the contracts were for developing ma­
chinery, although many contracts were also designed to 
build the chemical industry.% With rare exceptions the 
Japanese government has refused to approve wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures that have more than 
50 percent of the equity under foreign control (IBM is a 
wholly owned subsidiary, but it was created before the 
Second World War.)^ A great number of cooperative ventures 
can be cited. A few typical examples of foreign agreements 
should be illustrative.
^Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy, p. 53.
^Ibid.
^John E. Tilton, International Diffusion of Technol­
ogy; Th<=;. Case of Semiconductors (Washington; Brookings 
Institution, 1971), p. 146.
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B. F. Goodrich and the Japanese Geon Co., Ltd., 
cooperated to double the output of the most modern vinyl 
plastic. Goodrich supplied the technical support necessary 
to complete the project. RCA entered into over two dozen 
agreements with Japanese companies to build radio and 
television sets. The latest technology in transistors and 
cathode ray tubes was transferred to the Tokyo Shibaura 
Denki corporation from RCA. E. I. du Pont contracted to 
develop Japanese manufacturing capacity in synthetic fibers. 
Both the Yawata and Fuji Steel companies were aided by Armco 
in modernizing their plants.
Foreign technology flowed into the electrical ma­
chinery industry as Japanese firms made contracts with for­
eign enterprises like Westinghouse, Escher Wyss, Siemens- 
Schuckert, and Brown Boveri. After 1952 license arrangements 
were made with foreign automobile manufacturers such as 
Kaiser Motor Company, Hillman, Renault, Willys Overland and 
Austin.^
The case of the semiconductor industry typifies the 
Japanese procedure for acquiring industrial technology.^
^Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy, pp. 53-54.
^G. C. Allen, Japan's Economic Recovery (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 102.
^Government approval from the Ministry of Interna­
tional Trade and Investment is required of foreign invest­
ments and generally not granted except on favorable grounds 
See Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 80.
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Throughout the 1950s the Japanese relied on foreign technical 
assistance (mainly the United States) for obtaining the 
latest technological developments. During the 1960s Japanese 
research and development increased in the semiconductor field 
but still remained only nearly one-third of the United States 
research and development as a percent of sales.^ Most Japa­
nese research and development was devoted to engineering and 
development projects as opposed to basic research. Thus few 
major technological breakthroughs occurred in Japan, but many 
imaginative improvements were accomplished. This is the same
strategy followed by other Japanese industries and has re-
2suited in great gains from relatively small investments.
The lag between innovation and imitation has been quite short 
as shown in Table 28.
By the late 1960s the acquisition cost of foreign 
technology had increased, and technology became more dif­
ficult to obtain. Further, Japanese technology had advanced 
so greatly that it often rivaled foreign technology and 
therefore restricted the amount of useful foreign technology 
available.3 These factors caused the Japanese government to
p. 139.
^Tilton, International Diffusion of Technology,
^Ibid., p. 140.
^The case of the Texas Instruments company's attempt 
to form a wholly owned subsidiary is informative. When the 
Japanese government refused to approve their request, Texas 
Instruments denied patent rights to Japanese firms. But the
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TABLE 28
PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES FIRST 
PRODUCED IN JAPAN, BY FIRM, AND AVERAGE 
IMITATION LAGS, 1953-1968
Percentage of Average
Type and Name Innovations Imitation
of Firm Initiated Lag (Years)
Receiving tube firms









Total and average 100 2.54
Source: John E. Tilton, International Diffusion of Technology:
The Case of Semiconductors (Washington, D. C.: Brook-
ings Institution , 1971), Table 6-3, p. 143.
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initiate a change in Japan's traditional imitative approach. 
More government effort in the area of the subsidization of 
basic research is probable in the future.̂  In fact, Japan 
has invested 1.4 percent of gross national product (1964) to 
research and development, which is the same as for Germany, 
but below that of the United States (3.4), Russia (2.6), 
United Kingdom (2.3) and France (1.9). However, about half 
of the research and development for those countries is de­
fense oriented.2
Summary
Japan was successful in its attempt to transfer 
Western technology for economic development. Japan's in­
herited economic surplus in agriculture was large enough 
to permit acquisition of technology in the Meiji period. 
Resources were channeled into the industrial sector, and 
increases in productivity became evident after the third 
Meiji decade. Japan's military success gained it a large 
indemnity from China which was directed into further devel-
Japanese produced the integrated circuits without purchasing 
the patent rights. Administrative delay prevented prosecu­
tion against these companies. When Texas Instruments relented 
in the late 1960s to sell their patents, the Japanese had 
become very sophisticated in the production of integrated 
circuits which increased the difficulty of Texas Instruments' 
entry into that market. See Tilton, International Diffusion 
of Technology, pp. 146-47.
^Ibid., p. 140.
^Maddison, Economic Growth, pp. 61, 62.
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opment. World War I opened new markets to Japan and stim­
ulated the industrial sector of the economy. Japan was even 
able to take advantage of the world depression in the 1930s 
by purchasing cheap raw materials from the industrial powers 
as they dumped their goods in foreign markets. Military ex­
penditures in the 1930s rapidly increased the growth of 
Japan's heavy industry preparing it for war.
The Japanese cultural heritage was adjusted to ac­
cept the rapid infusion of Western technology. The samurai 
class was transformed from a parasitic group to a rich 
source of bureaucratic and entrepreneurial talent. The 
Japanese people had a common denominator in race, law and 
language, and a trait of obedience.
The political leadership beginning with the Meiji 
Restoration was committed to the acquisition of Western 
technology for the purpose of rapid industrialization. 
Fortunately, Japan was free of the imperialistic exploita­
tion from which its neighbors China and India suffered so 
much.
Japan's remarkable recovery from World War II was 
a result of the efficient and ingenious use of human re­
sources developed before the war. The Japanese government 
devoted these resources to development and constructed the 
institutions necessary for accomplishing this goal. Japan's 
labor-intensive agriculture absorbed the urban unemployed 
until the industrial sector began to draw on this labor
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resource. Japan was aided by the course of world events; 
United States fear of communism, the Korean War and world­
wide post-war prosperity. The Japanese culturally inherited 
frugality and determination led to high saving which per­
mitted investment to be directed toward development. Japan's 
capital formation growth rate has been the fastest in the 
world. Expenditures on research and development have been 
high since the 1960s, and virtually none of this is wasted 
on the military.
Japan has continued its tradition of tight control 
over foreign investment. This has not stemmed the flow 
of foreign technology into Japan in the form of licensing 
of patents, joint ventures, bringing in foreign technical 
specialists and sending Japanese engineers, scientists and 
technicians to observe foreign technology. The transfer of 
technology to Japan's receptive cultural fabric has been 
the foundation of the Japanese success story.
CHAPTER VII
JAPAN AND MEXICO: A COMPARISON^
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to point to differ­
ences and similarities in the transfer of technology to 
Japan and Mexico. Some differences between the two coun­
tries are obvious, but important. Japan is an island nation 
with a dense population. Mexico has a smaller population 
(although a very high growth rate) and is adjacent to the 
largest industrial nation, the United States.
Japan is now the third ranking industrial nation 
in the world (in terms of gross national product), so it 
is not the purpose of this chapter to compare this economic 
superpower to the developing economy of Mexico. However, 
it may be useful to compare the process of development and 
the corresponding transfer of technology to these countries. 
To make such a comparison meaningful, it is necessary to 
consider the land systems and cultures of the two countries 
as well as the course of historical events. Land systems 
in conjunction with population density and natural endow-
^The material in this chapter is primarily based on 
the preceeding chapters on Mexico and Japan.
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ment are essential in determining whether capital-intensive 
or labor-intensive techniques may be employed. The cultural 
milieu of each country determines the receptivity to new 
technologies. Historical events such as foreign domination 
affect the land systems and culture and thus the basic in­
frastructure of society.
Role of Government
With the termination of the Tokugawa period in Japan 
and the Porfirian period in Mexico, both governments engaged 
in pragmatic and eclectic action which was fundamental to 
their successful economic development. Both governments 
purposely strived for economic development and the acquisi­
tion of foreign technology. In each case the government was 
active in building the economic infrastructure, providing 
institutions and overhead capital necessary for later eco­
nomic expansion. Importantly, the governments of both coun­
tries directed economic development in such a manner as to 
lessen the dependence on foreign powers. In both cases the 
governments were influential in initiating the growth of 
both the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Financial institutions were created to promote devel­
opment and to facilitate the purchase of new technologies.
In 1925 the Bank of Mexico was established and evolved into 
the major financial institution responsible for the post-1940
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economic growth. Fiscal and monetary policies have been 
directed toward the goal of economic growth within the 
context of political stability. The Nacional Financiera 
was created in 1934 and has provided long-term financing 
of industrial projects deemed most necessary to break 
bottlenecks to economic expansion. Other financial in­
stitutions formed in the late 1920s included the Ejidal 
Credit Bank and the Agricultural Credit Bank to encourage 
agricultural development and the Foreign Trade Bank to 
promote the Mexican export sector.^
In Japan the government established a variety of 
financial institutions to promote economic development.
The Yokohama Specie Bank was established in 1880 to promote 
the financing of exports. The Bank of Japan was created 
in 1882 as the central bank responsible for controlling the 
Japanese banking system. In the period 1897-1900 the Banks 
for Industry and Agriculture were established providing 
credit in Japan's 46 prefectures. Regional banks were also 
established in Hokkaido, Formosa and Korea. The Hypothec 
Bank was established in 1897 to facilitate channeling funds 
from agriculture and the network of local banks into the 
industrial sector. The creation of the Japan Industrial 
Bank in 1902 further aided the flow of credit to industry.%
^Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development, p. 35.
^Maddison, Economic Growth in the West, p. 23-26.
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The respective governments have played different 
roles in regard to the agricultural sector. The Japanese 
were able to tax the agricultural sector heavily in the 
Meiji period and channel the funds into industrial develop­
ment via the acquisition of foreign technology as described 
in Chapter V. At present the agricultural sector is a drag 
on the rest of the economy due to diminishing returns from 
inputs into small land plots. On the other hand, Mexico 
was unable to tax the agricultural sector immediately after 
the Porfirian period since most of the rural population 
were living at a subsistence level. Since the 1940s, the 
large public investment in agriculture has permitted in­
creasing exports of agricultural products which have earned 
foreign exchange that often finds its way into the indus­
trial sector. Thus agriculture, though it still receives 
greater investments than it provides in revenues, provides 
an important link to the acquisition of foreign technology.^ 
In the area of education, the Japanese government 
was much more active in developing human resources than 
was the Mexican government. The Japanese government was 
fortunate to inherit a relatively highly educated populace 
and readily embarked on programs directed toward better 
education. This early emphasis on education was stressed
^Reynolds, The Mexican Economy, p. 179
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in Chapter V. The Ministry of Education was established 
in 1871 and standardized education throughout the country. 
By 1907 six years of schooling were compulsory. At the 
close of the Meiji period, some 20 percent of the children 
went on to secondary education. The Japanese government 
built schools, subsidized local education programs, and 
generally encouraged education. Universities, vocational 
schools, agricultural colleges, and research institutes 
were formed. Informal education was aided by agricul­
tural extension services and the general exposure of the 
population to the industrial process. The Japanese did 
not hesitate to bring in large numbers of foreigners to 
bolster their educational system. The high level of edu­
cation in Japan was of great importance to the acceptance 
of Western technology.
The Mexican government did not emphasize general 
education but was instrumental in creating institutions in 
agriculture and industry, as detailed in Chapter IV, which 
were of fundamental importance to the development of the 
economy. This effort has largely been directed to elite 
institutions available to only a small segment of the pop­
ulation. This point is emphasized by the fact that even 
today, only about 10 percent of the children in rural areas 
finish six years of education —  a dramatic contrast to 
Japan's experience in the Meiji period.
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The Mexican Ministry of Education has attempted to 
spread education informally through the dissemination of 
handtools and information to the peasant population, but 
the magnitude of educational aid is very low. The National 
School of Agriculture does make important contributions to 
agriculture on the university level and cooperates with the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the area of agricultural research. 
But, as mentioned in Chapter IV, the dissemination of the 
fruits of higher education and research is hampered by the 
poor educational level obtained by the mass of the Mexican 
population.
The Japanese and Mexican governments have dis­
played a great deal of eclecticism in their approach to the 
acquisition of foreign technology for economic development. 
Both countries utilized import controls to encourage import 
substitution and to channel scarce reserves of foreign ex­
change into technology embodied in capital goods imports. 
Beginning with the Meiji period, the Japanese government 
fostered the importation of Western technology for both the 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. By trial and 
error the government experimented with Western technology, 
developing and adapting technologies compatible with the 
unique requirements of the Japanese socio-economic setting. 
When foreign technology was not useful or too expensive, or 
if it was too capital-intensive, it was eliminated or
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adapted to Japanese needs. As noted in Chapter V much of 
the industrial system which was built upon foreign technol­
ogy was turned over by the Japanese government to the pri­
vate sector after a relatively short period. Thus from the 
Meiji period to the present there has been a close working 
arrangement between the government and the private sector. 
The eclectic selection of foreign technology begun in the 
Meiji period has been a consistent theme continuing to the 
present day.
The Mexican government encouraged the importation 
of technology in a variety of ways, but initially its 
alternatives were narrower than were those of the Japanese 
as a result of its long history of foreign domination and 
different endowment of natural resources. Extractive 
industries, eventually nationalized, were an obvious asset 
to be exploited with modern technology. The government 
was virtually forced by circumstances to improve those 
industries which had initially been developed by foreign­
ers. But with government guidance Mexico built the neces­
sary infrastructure of roads, irrigation projects, hydro­
electric plants, etc., as outlined in Chapter III and 
Chapter IV which permitted the rapid growth of manufacturing 
and large commercial farming. The government controlled, to 
varying degrees, the establishment of foreign branch plants, 
the importation of modern technology for government-owned
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enterprises, the border industries, and the import substi­
tution programs. Thus, the Mexican government, like the 
Japanese government, played an influential role in devel­
oping the economy and determining the channels of techno­
logical transfer.
Cultural Values and Ethic 
Throughout this paper it has been stressed that 
successful technological transfer and diffusion depends on 
the adaptation of a process package to the uniqueness of 
each country's cultural milieu. The degree of success 
achieved by Mexico and Japan in economic development is 
at least in part due to the ability of both countries to 
acquire new technologies within the traditional framework 
without tearing apart the existing institutional fabric. 
However, the Japanese have been even more successful at 
smooth institutional adjustments than the Mexicans.
The Mexican Revolution broke traditional values 
and replaced them with new images rooted in the past. 
Everything of foreign origin became suspect —  only the 
Indian heritage was respected as the national culture.
The Church and large landowners were easily identified 
targets and were rejected along with foreign domination.^
Religion was a greater barrier to economic develop-
^Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur, p. 23.
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ment and technological change in Mexico than in Japan.
The Catholic Church acted to enforce the status quo of an 
archaic, rigid social arrangement and an inefficient land 
system. Buddhism was much less a barrier to the Japanese, 
and its influence was further reduced by the Meiji govern­
ment as described in Chapter V.
The Meiji Restoration broke the outmoded feudal 
ties to the past. Certain attributes of the Japanese 
culture, including loyalty to superiors and respect for 
authority, allowed the Japanese to make the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism with relative ease and rapid­
ity. Loyalty to the Tokugawa Shogunate was transferred to 
the Emperor. Important segments of the samurai class 
supported the change partly out of fear of foreign domi­
nation. Previously wasted human resources were utilized 
under the new prefectural government which focused its 
effort upon industrialization through the rapid assimi­
lation of Western technology. The government was aided 
in this effort by a relatively well educated population 
and by an agricultural sector which could supply the 
needed impetus for industrialization.
Japan had a rich heritage conducive to the accep­
tance of Western technology. The intellectual drive of 
the samurai and their previous exposure to Chinese culture 
facilitated technological acceptance. Japan's common
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denominator in race, law and language aided the acceptance 
of new technology for national development. The trait of 
obedience in the population combined with a government 
which purposely promoted new technology in an eclectic 
manner were essential factors in the rapid assimilation of 
Western technology.
The Mexican heritage was quite different in that 
Mexico suffered under Spanish exploitation for hundreds of 
years before the Profirian era. The Spanish took advantage 
of the cultural heritage of the Mexican Indians, i.e., 
their respect for the warrior class, king, and church and 
superimposed their own system, which was similar to the. 
Indian culture in these respects, on that of the Indian 
culture. Whereas the Japanese cultural traits were used as 
a vehicle for attaining independence and rapid economic 
development via the assimilation of Western technology, the 
Spanish utilized the Indian cultural traits for exploitation. 
The transference in one culture was internal; in the other 
it was externally imposed.
The Porfirian regime was interested in rapid devel­
opment but did not have the human resources which were 
available to the Japanese government such as a relatively 
educated peasantry and a dedicated upper class. The theme 
in the Porfirian period was to exploit Mexico's natural 
resources and to develop an infrastructure to aid this
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endeavor. Unlike the Japanese, who brought in foreign 
technology and rapidly sent the foreigners home, the 
Mexican government accepted foreign investments which led 
to foreign domination. While the Japanese built an indus­
trial base for the purpose of maintaining independence, the 
Mexicans were subjugated by foreign powers. As a result 
the Mexican railroads were built north and south instead 
of east and west to facilitate the export of tropical 
fruits and ores to the United States. Pipelines were built 
to Veracruz to ship oil out of the country and not to Mexi­
can cities (where no refineries had been built) for inter­
nal development. In the case of Mexico, unlike Japan, 
there was a long history of foreign entrepreneurs who came 
to Mexico and remained there. The contributions of these 
men aided the technological flow into Mexico but their 
positive contribution must be weighed against the exploita­
tive impact of foreign domination.
Japan developed the necessary overhead capital in 
the Meiji period, as described in Chapter V, which enabled 
economic growth to accelerate in the 1913-1938 period.
The new Meiji government channeled available resources 
into economic development projects. Taxes on agriculture 
were another important source of revenue in this period 
of initial development. The tremendous influx of foreign 
capital into Mexico in the Porfirian period was of some
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value, but the enclave nature of these investments led to 
little technological diffusion.
A brief comparison of the samurai ethic and the 
mestizo personality sheds some light on the differences 
in economic development emd acquisition of technologies 
in Japan and Mexico. The samurai ethic often resulted in 
selfless dedication to economic development through the 
acquisition and diffusion of foreign technology. The 
samurai's impact was felt mostly in the new government 
in the form of bureaucrats, but they also formed a small 
but powerful group of gentlemen entrepreneurs. Their com­
mitment to higher authority and their selfless dedication 
were a sharp contrast to the Mexican mestizos.
The mestizo had no place in the social order and 
as a result, developed a personality which was self- 
serving and highly individualistic. The mestizo class 
gained political control in the power vacuum which re­
sulted at the end of the Spanish rule. Power was personal 
and was used for the domination of others since the 
mestizo sought national power for self-aggrandizement and 
little else. Foreign technology was valued as a means of 
obtaining national power, but the mestizo personality was 
ill suited for aiding the diffusion of this technology to 
the mass of the population. Thus while Japan created 
human resources and institutions conducive to the broad
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acceptance of new technology the mestizo influence restric­
ted the development of a social system amenable to domestic 
technological incubation.
Even today the samurai ethic and mestizo personal­
ity have an influence on the Japanese and Mexican cultures. 
The mestizo personality contributes to the direction of 
development taken by Mexico as is reflected in part by the 
uneven distribution of wealth, income and social services. 
Economic dualism in both agriculture and industry appear 
to be firmly entrenched in Mexico whereas in Japan this 
dualism is weakening with the steady growth of the modern 
sector.
The mestizo personality often finds its expression 
today in family controlled businesses which have tradition­
ally been associated with a high resistance to new tech­
nologies. This situation is changing, however, and the 
modern Mexican entrepreneur increasingly finds prestige 
in his managerial role instead of simple wealth-holding.1 
Therefore, recently there has been a strong force for the 
modernization of industry and a greater degree of accept­
ance of new technology.
The samurai ethic is still expressed in the roles 
of government leaders and corporation executives. The
^Derossi, The Mexican Entrepreneur, p. 110.
239
fictive kinship pattern existing in modern Japanese corpo­
rations has its roots in the traditional kinship organiza­
tion. There is great respect for one's company and a 
corresponding paternalistic attitude on management's part 
to take care of the employees- The Japanese corporation 
readily accepts new technology which is in turn accepted by 
the Japanese worker. This dedication is exemplified by the 
following workers' song of the Matsushita Electric Company 
which is sung every morning before work:
For the building of a new Japan,
Let's put our strength and mind together,
Doing our best to promote production.
Sending our goods to the people of the world.
Endlessly and continuously.
Like water gushing from a fountain.
Grow, industry, grow, grow, growl 
Harmony and sincerity!
Matsushita Electric! 1
Such fanatical dedication to production by workers is not
found in Mexico, nor probably any place in the world.
Land Systems and Agricultural Technology 
Historical events, culture and geographical differ­
ences have created different land use patterns in Mexico 
and Japan. The Spanish developed the hacienda system sup­
ported by the Church, state and the hidalgo mentality. The 
concentration of land increased under Diaz and it was not 
until 1934 that land reform began on a massive scale.
^Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: 
Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 110.
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Partly as a result of the popularity of land reform, Mexico 
now has a dualistic agricultural system. Political pres­
sure has required that the government channel most of the 
agricultural inputs into large commercial farms. These 
farms are highly mechanized and utilize modern farming tech­
niques. The many small farms, whether ejido or minifundia, 
have received much less in terms of irrigation, roads, 
credit accessibility, general education of the peasants, 
and extension services. Thus the small farmer is using 
antiquated techniques without the aid of capital inputs 
comparable to those received by the large commercial farms. 
The result is that technological transfer and diffusion 
have been severely limited in this sector of Mexican agri­
culture. The fruits of the research by groups such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation have reached relatively few of the 
peasants engaged in small-scale farming. Lack of educated 
peasant farmers, extension services, and sufficient capital 
inputs, combined with small uneconomical land plots, have 
retarded the exploitation of much of the potential agricul­
tural output in Mexico. The use of small land plots has, 
however, absorbed much of the labor that would have been 
superfluous in the industrial sector. But as it will be 
pointed out, there are major differences in the role of 
small land units in Mexico and Japan.
Historically the Japanese never developed much
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large-scale farming as a result of the relatively small 
amount of cultivatable land and the dense population. But 
there has been some concentration of land ownership. Since 
the Tokugawa period, the agricultural output has been high 
by Asian standards making possible the Meiji government's 
heavy reliance on the wealth of the agricultural sector in 
building Japan's industrial base. Unlike the Mexican farmer, 
the Japanese farmer has been fairly well educated and has 
become increasingly so since the Meiji period. Further, 
since the Meiji period the government has been active in 
aiding agricultural development by providing general educa­
tion and extension services to the farmers. Though the 
government has varied in its efforts to aid agriculture, it 
has continued to build a valuable human resource base. This 
combination of government assistance and educated farmers 
has greatly facilitated the diffusion of agricultural tech­
nology. This human resource base has done well by Japanese 
agriculture and has provided Japan's growing industrial 
sector with hard-working labor. The small land plots, es­
pecially after the reform in the post-World War II period, 
helped absorb labor which would have been unemployed in the 
industrial sector. In the 1960s and 1970s, Japan has faced 
a shortage of both agricultural and industrial workers so 
that Japan's intensive agricultural system is now a hindrance 
to economic growth.
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The dualism in Mexico's agricultural sector and 
the near universality of small farming in Japan have led to 
different types of technological adaptation. The techno­
logical flow into Mexican agriculture has been embodied in 
modern machinery imports, technological assistance in build­
ing plants to produce fertilizers and pesticides, technical 
supervision of irrigation projects, educational exchange 
programs with foreign countries, and the establishment of 
research centers such as the Rockefeller Foundation.
As noted earlier, the dualistic development of Mex­
ican agriculture hindered the transfer and diffusion of 
technology outside of the large commercial farms. Further, 
the Mexican focus on large farms in conjunction with the 
peasant attachment to owning land has necessitated the 
creation of many small and inefficient farms. A policy of 
developing more farms of moderate size might have resulted 
in more efficient land use and a greater absorption of sur­
plus labor. New seeds, fertilizers and pesticides yield 
greater returns in terms of cost-benefit calculations on 
relatively small farms rather than on capital-intensive 
farms.
It is much easier to criticize economic policies 
in retrospect from the vantage of hindsight. Small farms 
resulting in the early period of Mexican land reform may 
have been necessary to promote political stability as the 
Porfirian enclosures had been one of the main factors in
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the rural discontent which resulted in revolution. Al­
though the distribution of uneconomic farm plots may have 
sacrificed short-run efficiency, it may have been a polit­
ical necessity yielding stability for future economic de­
velopment.^ Yet another consideration to be taken into 
account is that the initial land redistribution helped to 
break the feudal land system which permitted the government 
to make innovations in the industrial and agricultural 
sectors,%
Perhaps the Mexican government can move toward the 
creation of more economically efficient farm sizes as the 
peasant realizes he may gain from such a policy. Once the 
small farm owner becomes aware that mere land ownership is 
not likely to greatly improve his standard of living he may 
be more amenable to new farm size arrangements if assured of 
personal security.
The Japanese approach to agriculture has been 
labor-intensive and has been closely related to intermediate 
technologies providing a link to the modern sector. Had the 
Mexicans followed the Japanese example, they might well have 
made better progress not only in agriculture, but also in
^Alexander J. Kondonassis, "Contributions of Agri­
culture to Economic Development; The Cases of England, 




their intermediate and modern technological sectors. Cer­
tainly more labor could have been absorbed in agriculture 
with perhaps greater productivity resulting from a more 
even allocation of inputs. However, as mentioned above, 
this approach may not have been a realistic political al­
ternative for the Mexican government.
Some commonalities exist in the agricultural ex­
periences of Japan and Mexico. In both countries the gov­
ernments enacted reforms which broke feudal ties and thus 
permitted nascent industrialization. Small farm plots in 
both countries have helped to contain the movement to urban 
areas while remaining a labor source for future industriali­
zation. In Japan and Mexico, the increase in agricultural 
productivity has resulted in higher farm incomes which have 
stimulated the demand for manufactured goods as well as 
permitted more investment to be channeled into the agricultural 
and industrial sectors of the economy. And in both countries 
the increase in agricultural productivity resulted in increased 
reserves of foreign exchange which enabled them to purchase 
capital goods for the industrial sector.^
The Japanese proved to be masters of eclecticism in 
their approach to adapting Western technology to their agri-
This analysis draws upon the work presented in 
Kondonassis, "Contributions of Agriculture to Economic 
Development," 377-96.
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cultural system. Chapter V offered numerous examples of 
the Japanese talent for pragmatic selectivity in the ex­
perimentation with Western techniques. Dry-field farming 
technology was attempted with little success and rapidly 
discarded. Animal husbandry techniques were imported with 
more success and were complemented by the government's de­
emphasizing the Buddhist influence which had previously 
been a barrier to advances in this field. The greatest 
success was accomplished with the introduction of new seed 
varieties, greater utilization of fertilizer, crop rotation 
and the improvement of simple tools. Irrigation projects, 
though initially misguided by Dutch technologists, were 
adapted to Japanese requirements and helped to increase 
agricultural productivity. Thus the Japanese achieved suc­
cess in the agricultural sector by selectively applying 
Western techniques to Tokugawa agricultural methods which 
resulted in their own unique Meiji technology.
Industrial Technology 
The outstanding difference in the transfer of in­
dustrial technology in the early development of Japan and 
Mexico was the degree of foreign domination and direction 
of technological flow. In the Porfirian period, Mexico 
received large amounts of technology in the form of rail­
roads, mining, and hydroelectric construction. There was 
little technological diffusion due to the enclave nature of
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these projects. Further, the development of Mexico's in­
frastructure was molded toward the export of raw materials 
rather than toward the internal development of the country. 
Japan, on the other hand, immediately directed technological 
inputs toward the internal development of Japanese industry, 
attempting to attain the goal of independence from foreign 
domination.
The opening of Japan to foreign markets stimulated 
domestic industries such as silk, coal and porcelain ware 
whicfh began to utilize Western techniques. Unlike the 
Mexican case, the fruits of increased exports were funneled 
back into the Japanese economy. During the Meiji period, 
the Japanese rapidly developed a sound structure for future 
economic growth. Western technology was used in shipping, 
railroads, communications, manufacturing and mining. And 
this industrial base was purposely designed for Japanese 
development —  not for foreign exploitation. Foreign tech­
nicians, engineers, and scientists were welcomed briefly 
until the Japanese could operate their own industries and 
adjust Western technology to the unique requirements of 
Japanese conditions.
Within this context the Japanese began by trial and 
error to adapt Western technology to their labor-intensively 
suited economy. Often labor was substituted for machinery. 
Inexpensive wooden machinery replaced expensive steel machines.
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The importation of Western products was an important source 
of technology transfer and many of these products were soon 
imitated for export.
Chapter V enumerated several cases of Japanese ex­
perimentation with Western industrial technology. As in 
the case of agriculture, mistakes were made in attempting 
to incorporate Western technology in toto. But these er­
rors were soon corrected. The geological survey of the 
Besshi copper mines was offered as a typical example.
Plant operations were changed to utilize cheaper, labor- 
intensive techniques wherever possible. Later, as more 
capital became available, more modern and expensive ma­
chinery of a capital-intensive nature was imported.
Small markets, shortages of capital and an unskilled 
labor supply necessitated small and medium size business 
units. Thus Western machinery, not designed for small-scale 
production, was modified for Japanese purposes. The textile 
industry was an exemplary case where expensive French ma­
chinery made of steel was found incompatible with the Japa­
nese system. Wooden machines replaced the more expensive 
steel models, and labor was substituted for capital whenever 
possible. The Japanese labor force, markets and capital 
resources were much better served by this adaptive process.
At the end of the Meiji period, Japan had a sound 
base for future development, while at the end of the For-
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firian period Mexico had an infrastructure built for 
exploitation and which led to relatively little technolog­
ical diffusion when compared to Japan. Japan accomplished 
the goal of technological transfer for development in spite 
of a scarcity of capital and high costs of acquisition due 
to the need for overseas transportation. Japan, an island 
nation, developed its industries around coastal harbors while 
rapidly building its merchant marine. Although transportation 
costs were relatively high, the Japanese compensated for this 
by its singular focus upon industrialization as supported in 
Chapters V and VI.
The modes of transfer of technology to Japan and 
Mexico differed greatly in the period 1910-1940 following 
the Meiji Restoration (1912) and the Porfirian period (1910) 
largely due to historical events. Mexico was in a state of 
political turmoil for much of this period while Japan con­
tinued to build on its economic base established in the 
Meiji period. Mexico did manage to finally achieve political 
stability in the 1920s, initially under the guidance of General 
Obregon and more permanently with the formation of the Estab­
lishment of the Party of Revolutionary Institutions in 1929, 
and proceeded to build an economic base for later expansion. 
The Party of Revolutionary Institutions has maintained 
stability by co-opting labor and agrarian leaders while 
rewarding the political, agricultural, and industrial elites,
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and to some degree the growing middle class.^ The nation­
alization of railroads and the expropriation of oil companies 
and land reform created a setting more conducive to national 
economic development and the concomitant transfer and diffu­
sion of industrial technology.
Transfer of technology into the extractive indus­
tries and railroads of Mexico dropped sharply in the 1910- 
1940 period due to nationalization and expropriation. 
Hydroelectric technology continued to flow into the country 
due to the different relationship between the hydroelectric 
companies and the Mexican government as explained in Chap­
ter III. A number of foreign branch plants were established 
in the 1920s in the manufacturing sector, but these were 
generally under varying degrees of control by Mexican in­
terests. Mexico managed to maintain control of basic indus­
tries such as iron and steel, cement, glass and textiles. 
Foreign technicians were often utilized under the control of 
Mexican firms or the Mexican government. Foreign investments 
have become steadily smaller as a share of the total value of 
total assets. Thus the Mexicans began to follow the Japanese 
experience of economic development largely independent of 
foreign economic influence.
Mexican firms have often demonstrated the capacity 
to adapt foreign technology to their needs following the
^Hansen, Politics of Mexican Development, pp. 112-20.
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Japanese example with some distortion due to a bias for 
capital-intensive techniques. Before the Porfirian period 
foreign entrepreneurs brought new innovations to Mexico 
as described in Chapter III. The French were especially 
important, since many Frenchmen settled in Mexico and 
helped to develop retailing and later manufacturing. The 
Spanish were influential in forming the papermaking indus­
try and introducing modern equipment and techniques ac­
quired from the Germans. American settlers were important 
in developing the manufacturing sector, particularly the 
shoe industry and the steel industry.
But indigenous entrepreneurs also played an impor­
tant part in the Mexican experience of industrialization.
The Mexican role expanded with nationalization, and Mexicans, 
often with the help of foreign advisors, began their own 
innovations. The lack of em educated skilled work force 
has forced Mexican managers to adjust Western factory 
techniques. Much more supervision is required than in 
the industrialized countries. Directions must be simple 
and often pictorial as many of the workers are illiterate.
A typical explanation for the utilization of antiquated 
equipment comes from a Mexican woods products manager:
We use the mechanization of the 1930s because 
newer equipment requires understanding that two 
or three years of school might make difficult to 
impart.̂
1•^Strassman, Technological Change and Economic Devel­
opment , p. 71.
251
The lack of a high level reserve of human resources has 
caused the Mexican manager to have to choose between 
utilizing antiquated equipment which is prone to break 
down and which requires close supervision and task simpli­
fication or purchasing capital-intensive equipment to 
alleviate labor problems. Low import duties on capital 
goods as well as easier credit terms from United States 
suppliers of machinery often bias the decision-making 
process toward the substitution of capital for labor.
Some examples of brilliant Mexican innovation 
were mentioned in Chapter IV. The development of the 
"Hy L" process in the steel industry in an illustration 
of what Mexican talent can do. This process is well 
suited to Mexico's abundant supply of hydroelectric power, 
natural gas and high grade iron ore. The process of 
making paper from sugar stalks after the milling oper­
ation (bagasse) was improved upon and made economical 
by a Mexican firm. Stabilized tortilla flour is another 
example of Mexican innovation (in conjunction with United 
States firms' assistance) mentioned in Chapter IV. This 
development makes one of the main staple foods of Mexico 
less perishable while maintaining a higher nutritional 
level.
Japan had built the beginnings of an industrial 
base in the Meiji period. Consequently, Japan was ready
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to take advantage of the First World War by greatly in­
creasing its share of the export market. However, with 
the fall of Diaz in 1910, Mexico was gripped by heavy 
fighting and political instability. Though recovery began 
in 1915, Mexico did not have the economic infrastructure 
nor stability to gain as greatly as Japan from World War I. 
Benefits from increased Mexican exports, such as oil, 
accrued to foreigners.
Japan used its huge gains from increased exports 
to accelerate industrialization. Heavy industry grew 
rapidly in steel, machinery and ships. During this period 
Japan begam to build its chemical and engineering indus­
tries. The surge in exports not only permitted rapid 
industrial expansion but aided the payment of debts, thus 
increasing Japanese independence. The importation of 
embodied technology grew after World War I and was an 
important source of technological transfer. This was 
especially the case for automobiles, machinery and instru­
ments.
Barriers to entry of foreign firms were eased 
after World War I allowing an increase in technological 
flow in the manufacturing sector. As in the Mexican case, 
foreign investment continued to decline as a share of 
total Japanese investment. However, the kind of foreign 
investment was very important since the technological
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transfer was often of a very sophisticated nature. The 
Japanese generally maintained tight control over foreign 
investments and accepted foreign help only when it became 
necessary to make further advances. After World War I, 
the Japanese were required to shift from their policy of 
bringing in foreign advisors for brief periods to a policy 
of licensing patents in conjunction with arrangements for 
technological follow-up between Japanese and foreign firms. 
Some companies in engineering, automobile assembly and 
Gramophones were entirely or nearly entirely foreign 
owned. Most of these companies lost their control during 
and after World War II.
The textile industry has played an important role 
in the development of Japan and Mexico. Mexico has imi­
tated the Japanese experience by utilizing the interme­
diate technology of the textile industry as a link to the 
modern sector. Antiquated textile machinery imported from 
foreign countries was and still is combined with labor- 
intensive techniques following the Japanese example.
The textile industry has been absorbing much labor which 
could not be absorbed by the growing industrial sector in 
Mexico. If Mexico follows the Japanese example, this 
labor will be transferred into more sophisticated manu­
facturing activities at a later date. The textile industry 
in Mexico has basically utilized intermediate technology
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as Japan did which integrates the agricultural and indus­
trial sectors. However, Mexico does not have the rela­
tively high educated human resources which were so useful 
in developing Japan's rudimentary and intermediate tech­
nologies. Thus it is questionable whether Mexico can 
imitate the Japanese story with the same success. Further, 
Mexico's rapidly expanding population creates additional 
pressure for very rapid growth of the industrial sector 
which may not be forthcoming.
The United States firms operating just inside the 
Mexican border have facilitated the creation of inter­
mediate technologies conducive to eventual absorption of 
labor into the modern industrial sector. But the limited 
size of this activity and its geographical setting have 
limited its impact on the overall economy. It is an exam­
ple, however, of a Mexican advantage in acquiring technology 
which was not accessible to Japan. Another important channel 
of technological transfer which was not available to the 
Japanese, the bracero program, has been canceled.
Mexico continued to develop its economic base during 
the 1940s and took advantage of the war and post-war boom. 
Japan suffered a devastating defeat and faced staggering 
recovery problems. The technological flow to Mexico in the 
1940s increased through the growth of capital goods imports. 
As the Mexican overhead capital developed the manufacturing 
sector grew rapidly.
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New -technologies have accelerated the movement 
from traditional to modern sectors and from rural to urban 
areas. Mexico no longer is an export-based economy depend­
ent on enclave technologies. However, Mexico apparently 
has shifted from foreign financial dependence to foreign 
technological dependence in the high technological areas 
such as chemicals, electronics and sophisticated machinery.^ 
Even though the government has had control of many of the 
basic economic sectors, technological dependence has not 
been eliminated. In fact, nationalization of such indus­
tries as mining and petroleum may have helped shift foreign 
investments into more profitable ventures. The multi­
national corporations have thus shifted there sphere of 
interest to the modern high growth industries with the 
aid of the Mexican government.
The Japanese are also dependent on United States 
technology, but their dependency is abating. The Japan­
ese have steadily moved away from dependence on foreign 
technology and have internally developed some of the most 
sophisticated technology in the world. The growth of 
modern industry in Mexico, unlike the case of Japan, has 
not been accompanied by sufficient scientific research to
^Leon Hollerman, "Mexico's Dilemma in Economic Devel­
opment and the Japanese Solution," Inter-American Economic 
Affairs, XXIII, No. 2 (Autumn, 1969), 80.
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become less dependent on foreign technology. The Japanese 
acquired foreign technology selectively and adjusted it 
to their unique needs. Mexico has often imported foreign 
technology in toto and relied on continued technological 
assistance from foreign countries.
If the product cycle theory mentioned in Chapter 
II is valid, Mexico and other less developed countries may 
experience great difficulty in overcoming technological 
dependence. While it is true that the less developed 
countries may initiate industrialization through the 
production of goods requiring intermediate technologies, 
it does not necessarily follow that they will be able to 
make the next step to building an independent modern sec­
tor utilizing their own sophisticated technologies. The lag 
between invention and innovation appears to be decreasing 
in the advanced countries. This places an even greater 
pressure on the less developed countries to accelerate their 
growth in order to simply maintain their relative technological 
position vis-a-vis the advanced countries.
Summary
This chapter has attempted to bring out some of 
the commonalities and differences in the Mexican and Japa­
nese experiences. The differences between the two coun­
tries' development and technological acquisition are great.
257
but there are some common factors. The role of the gov­
ernment in each country was critical in building the eco­
nomic infrastructure and determining the channels of 
technological transfer. In both countries a great deal of 
eclecticism was displayed by the government and the private 
sector in the acquisition of new technology. Both coun­
tries' methods of acquiring technology within their insti­
tutional frameworks have roots in the past. Both countries 
managed to achieve institutional changes without tearing 
apart their cultural fabric. A quality of submissiveness 
in the population of Japan and Mexico affected the modes of 
technological transfer —  in one case national independ­
ence was the result while in the other case the result was 
foreign domination.
Several commonalities existed in the agricultural 
sector as a result of government reform and small labor-
intensive land plots. Both governments initiated land
reform, and the two countries are still burdened with 
inefficient small land plots in the agricultural sector.
In both cases, especially in Mexico, land reform was a 
politically popular measure which took precedence over
economic efficiency. Small farms in each country were an
asset in absorbing potentially surplus labor while the 
industrial sector was still in its nascent stage. Japan 
was seen to be much more successful in adapting new
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technologies to labor-intensive agriculture as a result of 
the educational level of the farmer and elaborate govern­
mental support in the form of extension services. Both 
governments initiated agricultural policies conducive to 
industrialization. The new Meiji tax system provided 
revenues for the acquisition of Western technology.
Mexican land reform broke up the hacienda system which had 
been an obstacle to industrialization. In both countries 
increased agricultural productivity resulted in greater 
farm Incomes which caused an increase in demand for manu­
factured goods.
Textiles played an important role in the acqui­
sition and adaptation of technology in both countries. 
Intermediate labor-intensive technology in the textile 
industries was useful in absorbing labor surpluses while 
building a semi-skilled labor force in both countries. 
Mexico was able to take advantage of the World War II 
textile market, as Japan had in World War I, to expand 
exports and build up supplies of foreign exchange to be 
utilized for the purchase of foreign technology.
Japan and Mexico have a history of fear of foreign 
domination and have directed their policies since the 
early 1900s toward economic independence. Wholly owned 
foreign branch plants have become less important in both 
countries as the focus has shifted to acquisition of tech­
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nology through the licensing of patents and joint ventures, 
often within the framework of multinational corporations.
The vast differences in history, geographical 
location, and land systems were contrasted. The resource 
endowments of the two countries were very different and 
affected the types of technologies acquired from foreign 
countries. The role of religion was less a barrier in 
technological acceptance in Japan than in Mexico. Mexico's 
experience of foreign domination, enclave technology, and 
early traditional export-based economy is quite different 
from the Japanese experience. The homogeneity of Japanese 
culture and the differences between the samurai ethic and 
the mestizo personality were emphasized. The Japanese 
advantage in education, agriculture, extension services, 
labor-intensive agriculture, imitation of Western products 
for export and use of foreign technical advisors are quite 
different from the Mexican example. It was noted that 
Mexico did have the bracero program and border industries 
as a source of technology not available to the Japanese. 
Finally, the possibility was raised that Mexico, unlike 
Japan, is becoming more technologically dependent upon 
sophisticated foreign technology. Whether Mexico and 
other less developed countries can overcome this tendency 
remains an important and unsettled question.
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been to compare, from 
a cultural and historical perspective, the experiences of 
Mexico and Japan in acquiring foreign technology. Technol­
ogy and technological transfer were defined and related to 
the process of economic development. Since most research 
and development takes place in the developed countries the 
study of the transfer of new technologies to the less de­
veloped countries was seen as a crucial factor in their de­
velopment. An examination of the cultural setting and 
institutional arrangements of a country was deemed necessary 
to understanding the processes of technological transfer and 
diffusion. It was noted that technology is not generally 
successfully transferred in toto but requires adaptation to 
each country's unique requirements. Further, the more back­
ward a country in terms of industrialization, the more 
likely institutional adjustment is necessitated.
A vast variety of channels of technological transfer
exist. These were discussed placing special emphasis upon
the role of the multinational corporations, the local firm,
governments, research institutes, and universities. Three
factors emerged as crucial to the successful transfer of
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technology through these channels. First there is a need 
for multilateral assistance from the developed to the less 
developed countries. The assistance may take the form of 
soft loans, grants, special trading status, technicians, 
student exchange programs, funding of regional development 
organizations, etc. Multilateral assistance of this type 
is essential for a steady flow of technical assistance unen­
cumbered with political vagaries. Second there must be a 
commitment on the part of the government of the less devel­
oped country to direct technical assistance toward con­
sciously planned development. Third the multinational cor­
porations play a key role in the transfer process. However, 
it is by no means certain that the development of the less 
developed countries and the interests of the multinational 
corporations are always compatable. Some countervailing 
power in the form of cooperation between nonprofit inter­
national agencies and the governments of the developed and 
less developed countries may be necessary to pre^jnt exploi­
tation or misguided economic growth.
The product cycle theory was examined in conjunction 
with the rise of multinational corporations. This theory 
may at least partially explain the pattern of investments of 
the multinational corporations. New products originate in 
the developed countries as a result of their heavy research 
and development. After the products are established in 
domestic markets they are eventually exported to other coun-
262
tiies. Finally the less developed countries may begin to 
produce these products for domestic consumption and eventu­
ally export these products to other countries. The validity 
of the product cycle theory is still being hotly debated and 
was not offered as a factual process but rather brought 
forth as a plausable possibility. If the theory is valid, 
it raises the spectre of the less developed countries being 
left in a technological backwash. With some equivocation it 
was noted that the production by the less developed coun­
tries of the goods at the end of the product cycle may have 
positive effects in initiating industrial growth. Thus the 
stage was set for potential economic development or techno­
logical exploitation. The end result depends on political 
and historical events. At the time of the writing of this 
study, the outlook does not appear to be encouraging to the 
author.
The purpose of the study, however, has not been to 
predict from a clouded crystal ball but rather to examine the 
setting in which technological transfer and economic devel­
opment take place. The cases of Japan and Mexico were used 
to illustrate the successes and failures of this process. 
Other countries may not be able to imitate the Japanese and 
Mexican examples, but there are lessons to be learned from 
an examination of their experiences. The accelerating pace 
of technological change and the emergence of the multina­
tional corporation create a different set of circumstances 
to be coped with by the less developed countries. But even
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within this new environment, the less developed countries 
may be able to avoid the mistakes of the past and take ad­
vantage of the lessons of history.
One factor, foreign domination, was of overwhelming 
importance in the development of Mexico. The land system 
and mestizo personality grew out of this heritage. It is 
within this context that the initial foundation for the 
transfer of technology and economic development took place. 
From Spanish rule through the Porfirian period the resources 
of Mexico were directed toward the interests of foreign 
powers. The vast influx of capital into Mexico during the 
Porfirian period resulted in relatively small benefits for 
long-run development. Railway lines were built north and 
south to connect raw materials to the United States instead 
of east and west for the development of the Mexican infra­
structure. Pipelines were directed to Veracruz for ship­
ment to foreign countries instead of to the Mexican interior, 
where no refineries had been constructed for Mexican devel­
opment projects. Technological enclaves in agriculture and 
the extractive industries led to little technological diffu­
sion.
Greater domestic control followed the Porfirian pe­
riod, and foreign branch plants were established under the 
guidance of the Mexican government. Even under these cir­
cumstances foreign firms managed to circumvent government 
regulation. Increased nationalization marked by the expro-
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priation of the oil industry in 1938 gave Mexico greater 
independence in many key sectors of the economy. During 
World War II and the following decades Mexico was able to 
acquire foreign technology, mainly in the form of capital 
goods, which resulted in steady economic development. But 
history and tradition especially the mestizo personality, 
contributed to the very uneven distribution of the fruits of 
economic growth. Dualisms in agriculture and industry have 
inhibited the transfer and diffusion of technology to a 
large segment of the Mexican population. The lack of avail­
able credit and the general neglect of the peasant popula­
tion has tended to cement the dualistic nature of the Mexi­
can system.
Dualism as an obstacle to development was seen to be 
especially severe in the agricultural sector. The brilliant 
research of the Rockefeller Foundation and the ensuing Green 
Revolution did not spread to the peasant farmer. A general 
lack of education and an insufficient extension service sys­
tem impeded the diffusion of the new technology to the vast 
majority of Mexican farmers. This was unfortunate since the 
new seed varieties are well suited to labor-intensive tech­
niques and require relatively little inputs such as large 
irrigation systems. The result has been an inefficient 
allocation of agricultural inputs within the context of a 
cost-benefit analysis. Further, the reliance upon large 
commercial farms utilizing capital-intensive techniques has
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virtually necessitated, given the present land system, a 
large number of small farms of inefficient size. And even 
if Mexico becomes self-sufficient in the production of 
modern capital-intensive farm machinery, foreign parts still 
have to be imported, putting a strain on foreign exchange 
reserves. Another impact of capital-intensive agricultural 
technology was a displacement of rural labor which could not 
be absorbed in the industrial sector. Agricultural dualism 
has left large segments of the rural population with very 
little purchasing power and therefore has impeded the inter­
action between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the 
Mexican economy. It was noted, however, that the Mexican 
government may have had little choice but to establish small 
farm plots in order to achieve poltical stability.
Dualism in the industrial sector apparently does not 
obstruct technological diffusion to the degree it does in 
agriculture. In fact the industries utilizing intermediate 
technologies may serve as a bridge to the modern sector. 
Border industries, automobile assembly, textiles, and the 
footwear industries all offer the possibility of integrating 
intermediate technologies with the modern sector while ab­
sorbing large amounts of labor. However, it was noted that 
the dualism in the Mexican industrial sector appears to be 
becoming a permanent part of the economic system. Japan, on 
the other hand, purposely and steadily phased out intermedi­
ate technological industries while shifting more and more to
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industries requiring advanced technology.
The two chapters on Japan were developed along a 
format similar to the analysis of Mexico. Two factors were 
basic to the successful transfer and diffusion of technology 
in Japan. From the beginning the new prefectural government 
emphasized independent development through the acquisition 
and dissemination of Western technology. This effort was 
aided by the relatively high level of education of the 
Japanese population and their willingness to accept new 
technologies. Through trial and error the Japanese adapted 
Western technology to their unique requirements. Institu­
tional adjustment, especially the changing role of the 
samurai, was smooth and oriented around the assimilation of 
Western techniques for the building of a modern, powerful, 
and independent Japan.
Western technology was adapted to the labor-intensive 
wet paddy farming of Tokugawa heritage. Increased producti­
vity in agriculture permitted the acquisition of Western in­
dustrial technology necessary for building the base of a 
modern economy. Military success and increased exports 
added to the foreign exchange reserve, permitting further 
acquisition of foreign technology. Western scientists, 
engineers, and technicians were brought to Japan only long 
enough for the Japanese to learn to use their technology, and 
then the foreigners were sent home.
After World War I the Japanese were forced to ac-
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quire foreign technology through the establishment of branch 
plants and the licensing of patents. But even within this 
changed environment the Japanese were selective in their 
choice of technologies and demanded technological follow-up 
by foreign interests. Foreign technology was not accepted 
in toto but adapted to the labor-intensive nature of Japan's 
industry.
Following World War II, the Japanese recovery fal­
tered and then steadily grew with the help of land reform 
and American aid. Once again the Japanese pursued economic 
development through the selective acquisition of foreign 
technology. The government closely supervised agreements 
between foreign and Japanese firms and helped Japanese firms 
to acquire technology useful to the development of the mod­
ern sector on favorable terms. The pattern of development 
was strikingly similar to that of the Meiji period, estab­
lishing the historical continuity of the Japanese experi­
ence. Japan's recent success has its roots deeply embedded 
in its past. The re-emergence of the zaibatsu in the form 
of the keiretsu gave Japan powerful business organizations 
capable of competing with the modern multinational corpora­
tions. Japan's development since World War II was marked 
by a dependence on foreign technology. Japan initially 
often imitated foreign technology but has steadily moved 
away from technological dependence by establishing its own 
research and development base. It was noted that the Japa-
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nese research and develoment has been of a non-military 
nature and therefore extremely rewarding.
The comparison of the Mexican and Japanese experiences 
has revealed vast differences but also some important 
commonalities. The successes and failures of technological 
transfer and diffusion in both countries had roots in the 
past. Institutional adjustment was achieved in both countries 
without destroying the cultural fabric. Traits of obedience 
existed in the populations of Japan and Mexico and both 
countries were oriented toward obtaining economic develop­
ment for national power. Both governments were important 
in establishing an economic base for future expansion. Each 
government was eclectic in its acquisition of new technologies 
and in the role the government played vis-a-vis the private 
sector. Textiles were important in the acquisition of inter­
mediate technologies of the two countries. Both Japan and 
Mexico were able to overcome the foreign exchange obstacle by 
increasing their exports while other countries were at war. The 
two countries also had a fear of foreign domination which affected 
their model of technological acquisition. Political stability 
in both countries created a framework conducive to the acquisi­
tion of foreign technology. In both countries there was a 
shift from the acquisition of foreign technology through 
foreign owned branch plants to the utilization of licensing
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patents within a context of joint ventures and multinational 
corporations.
Mexico has been referred to as the Japan of the 
Western hemisphere due to its rate of economic growth since 
the 1940s and the government's active role in striving for 
economic development. Yet the differences between the two 
countries perhaps offer more enlightenment than their com­
monalities. Great contrasts have existed in land systems, 
cultural heritage, historical events, geographical location, 
and resource endowment. Particularly important was the 
Japanese emphasis on education, agricultural extension ser­
vices, and the adaptation of Western technology to Japan's 
unique requirements. Japan's freedom from foreign domina­
tion and policy of using foreign advisors only for periods 
long enough to acquire domestic expertise were different from 
the Mexican experience.
Both Japan and Mexico developed economic dualisms 
in their industrial sector. The main flow of foreign tech­
nology has been directed toward the modern sector of both 
countries. But in the case of Japan the economy apparently 
has become less dualistic while in Mexico dualism has become 
more deeply embedded in the economic system. Thus there has 
been greater diffusion of industrial technology in Japan 
than in Mexico.
Japan's agricultural sector has always been labor- 
intensive whereas Mexico has developed a dualistic agricul-
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tural economy. This pattern in Mexico resulted in an influx 
of capital embodied technology on the large commercial farms 
at the near exclusion of the rest of the rural economy. 
Perhaps Mexico could make significant gains in agriculture 
by imitating the Japanese model of labor-intensive methods 
on medium size land plots. Japan, it was seen, needs now to 
engage in less labor-intensive methods and devote more human 
resources to the modern industrial sector.
The comparison of Japan and Mexico brought forth 
commonalities and differences in the process of technologi­
cal transfer which may be useful to the less developed 
countries in their attempt to achieve economic development 
through the acquisition of new technologies. This was the 
primary purpose of this study and this goal seems to have 
been fulfilled. The importance of technological acquisition 
for economic development was established. The successes and 
failures of the two countries examined dramatically demon­
strated the need for the less developed countries to selec­
tively acquire technology suited to their unique 
requirements. The selection of rudimentary, intermediate, 
and sophisticated technologies must be made according to 
each country's resource endowment. As yet there is no gen­
eral eccncnomic theory for the less developed countries to 
use, tliey must adapt their economic theory as well as their 
technology and institutions to their own special case.
The Japanese and Mexican experiences illustrate the
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need for development economists to understand the historical 
background, culture, and the process of technological and 
institutional adjustment in the less developed countries.
The experiences of these two countries demonstrate the 
necessity that the less developed countries establish gov­
ernments committed to economic development while avoiding 
foreign domination or uncritical emulation of advanced econ­
omies. Human resources should be developed within an insti­
tutional framework conducive to the acceptance of new 
technology.
It was concluded that one reason for the degree of 
success of Japan and Mexico in their acquisition of technol­
ogy was their ability to utilize cultural patterns rooted in 
the past for the transition to modernization. Institutional 
change was achieved in both countries without tearing apart 
the cultural fabric. The less developed countries, it would 
appear, should attempt to follow this pattern of institu­
tional adjustment based on their unique cultural heritage.
The role of the state has been a vital factor in 
creating political stability and building the economic in­
frastructure of Japan and Mexico. It would seem that in this 
age of more sophisticated technology the role of the state 
is still a crucial element in the development process. The 
fact that both countries devote only a minute portion of 
their resources to the military may be informative to gov­
ernments seeking rapid development.
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The selectivity of both governments, especially 
Japan, in the acquisition of foreign technology should be 
particularly illuminating to the less developed countries. 
The Japanese pragmatically experimented with Western tech­
nology in both agriculture and industry. They experienced 
some failures in acquiring technology not suited for their 
unique requirements. Through trial and error the Japanese 
selected, imitated, and adapted Western technology to their 
land system, labor force, and natural resource endowment.
The Japanese proved, both in the Meiji period and in the 
years following World War II, that a paucity of natural re­
sources was not an absolute barrier to economic development.
In the introductory chapter of this study, an addi­
tional hypothesis stated was that human resources are per­
haps the most important factor in the development process. 
The experiences of both Japan and Mexico appear to validate 
this hypothesis. Japan's initial development in the Meiji 
period and dramatic postwar recovery was receptive to ac­
quiring new technologies for the purpose of economic devel­
opment. Education of both a formal and informal nature was 
largely responsible for the high level of human resources 
in Japan. Japan's human resources enabled the Japanese to 
overcome obstacles to technological transfer such as a pau­
city of natural resources, a shortage of capital, and high 
transportation costs.
The general lack of an educated population has not
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aided the Mexican process of acquiring and diffusing 
technology. The result has been lower productivity in both 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. It was seen 
that insufficiently educated supervisors and workers reduce 
productivity and direct managers to acquire capital- 
intensive technologies out of proportion to the available 
supply of labor. Inadequate primary education and a poor 
extension service in rural areas has hampered the diffusion 
of technological advances created in Mexico's fine research 
centers. Thus in considering their priorities the less 
developed countries may do well to consider the development 
of their human resources through initially rudimentary edu­
cation techniques.
Japan and Mexico sent students and technologists 
to foreign countries for the purpose of acquiring human 
skills necessary for transmitting technology to their coun­
tries. Mexico has had an advantage over Japan in this 
aspect due to the close proximity of the United States. 
However, Japan's greater stress on education compensated 
for geographical isolation and as a result Japan has con­
tinuously sent a proportionately greater number of students 
to foreign countries. Students from both countries have 
concentrated on engineering, the physical sciences, and 
other areas of study crucial to the development process.
The less developed countries may find it useful to concen­
trate their educational efforts in a similar manner.
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Another lesson from the study of the Japanese and 
Mexican experience is the necessity for face to face contact 
with the foreigners conveying the new technologies. In both 
cases technological transfer was more successful when licen­
sing agreements included face to face contact and techno­
logical follow-up. It is not enough to simply ship a piece 
of machinery or a technological process to a less developed 
country. Personal demonstration and help in modification 
of the technology to each unique situation is required. 
Examples throughout this study seem to support this 
conclusion.
Both Mexico and Japan were able to overcome the fi­
nancial barrier to the acquisition of foreign technology.
In both cases increased agriculture productivity permitted 
the transfer of an economic surplus to the industrial sec­
tor. In each case the two countries were able to obtain 
more foreign exchange by increasing their exports. The 
agricultural sector was of paramount importance in the 
general acquisition of technology —  a point which should 
not be ignored by less developed countries.
Japan and Mexico developed labor-intensive agricul­
ture and adapted foreign technology to their land systems. 
Mexico, unlike Japan, also developed large commercial farms 
utilizing capital-intensive technology. The impact of 
Mexico's dualistic approach to agriculture has resulted in 
great increases in production, especially in the large
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capital-intensive sector. The labor-intensive sector has 
absorbed potentially surplus labor thus easing the migra­
tion from rural to urban areas. In both countries the small 
land plots have caused economic inefficiency but may have 
been politically necessary. Many less developed countries 
may find that labor-intensive agriculture is well suited to 
their needs. The challenge is to adapt and create tech­
nologies to different types of labor-intensive systems 
which is dependent upon each countries resource base. The 
Green Revolution has made this task easier than in the past.
The commonalities revealed in the experience of the 
two countries suggest that the less developed countries may 
profit by following the general approach of Japan and Mexico 
in acquiring foreign technology. However, the thrust of the 
study emphasized that each country must tailor foreign tech­
nology to their own distinctive characteristics.
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